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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Smallholder farmers are confronted with many challenges when adapting to new food 
markets. These challenges are mainly associated with the disadvantageous status of 
smallholder farmers in markets. The first constraint comes from the small scale of 
transactions. Buyers prefer transactions which save their time of sourcing and collecting 
information for a given quality of raw materials. They thus prefer a small number of large-
scale suppliers over a large number of small-scale producers (Sauer et al., 2012). Another 
constraint experienced by smallholder farmers is asymmetric information. Lacking 
appropriate market information makes it difficult for farmers to comply with the quality and 
other requirements and puts them in a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis other parties in the 
value chain. 
A cooperative is considered to be an institutional vehicle that can help farmers to deal with 
the above described challenges. Cooperatives can improve farmers’ bargaining power in both 
input and output markets (Fischer and Qaim, 2012) and facilitate information flows between 
farmers and the market (Mojo et al., 2017). In addition, compared with bilateral contracts or 
other types of market institutions, a cooperative is generally more inclusive of smallholders 
(Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014). By strengthening the market position of smallholder 
farmers, cooperatives can contribute to alleviating poverty and rural development (Bernard 
and Spielman, 2009). 
The potential role of cooperatives is particularly relevant for China, as Chinese agriculture is 
facing two important challenges. The first challenge refers to how to further develop modern 
agriculture given the condition of land fragmentation and the existence of a very large 
number of smallholder farmers. The other challenge is about how Chinese smallholder 
farmers can cope with the structural changes in agro-food markets and obtain benefits in the 
changing market environment. 
Since the implementation of the Reform and Opening Up policy in 1978, China has obtained 
great societal and economic achievements. However, the development of agriculture tends to 
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lag behind the industrialization and urbanization. The creation and adoption of the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) in the early 1980s has made the farm household the basic unit 
of agricultural production. On the one hand, the HRS provided most farm households with an 
adequate base for achieving sustainable livelihoods. On the other hand, it resulted in a high 
degree of land fragmentation and the existence of millions of smallholder farms, which has 
become an important obstacle to the development of modern agriculture and to further 
growth in farm incomes (Tan et al., 2006).   
Due to the increasing purchasing power of consumers, technical developments in controlling 
food safety, and especially the recent food scandals, demand for food with better quality and 
stricter safety standards is growing within China (Narrod et al., 2009). Furthermore, with the 
rise of supermarkets and international trade, especially the increasing share of high quality 
food in international trade (Tran et al., 2013), consumption patterns have been evolving. 
Therefore, agro-food markets are experiencing major structural changes.  
These changes can be both opportunities and challenges for smallholders in China. They 
allow farmers to benefit from new market opportunities arising from export markets, local 
supermarkets and new processing firms (Bijman, 2016). However, they also call for products 
of high and consistent quality, which requires farmers to comply with both stricter production 
and safety standards and a better coordination of sequential activities in the value chain (Fritz 
and Schiefer, 2008; Reardon et al., 2009; Abebe et al., 2013).  
The Chinese government has been promoting the development of cooperatives to meet the 
new demands in food markets since the 2000s (Jia et al., 2012) and to link smallholder 
farmers to modern markets. The promulgation of the Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Farmers’ Specialized Cooperatives in 2007 is considered to be a milestone for the 
development of Chinese cooperatives. As of September 2017, over 100 million farmer 
households are participating in at least one cooperative, accounting for 47% of the total 
number of farm households1.  
 
                                                 
1 The statistic of Chinese cooperatives has been obtained from the webpage: http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-
09/04/c_129695890.htm. 
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1.2 Literature review and problem statement 
Acknowledging the importance of cooperatives in agricultural development and rural 
development, many countries consider cooperatives as major policy tools to improve farmers’ 
welfare (Mojo et al., 2017). Much research has been done on the effectiveness of 
cooperatives in Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Kenya and other developing countries. The findings 
indicate that cooperatives have positive effects on agricultural production, the adoption of 
agricultural technology, and farmers’ incomes in general (Wollni and Zeller, 2007; 
Francesconi and Ruben, 2012; Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Chagwiza et al., 2016). Another 
major topic in research on cooperatives is the relationship between cooperatives and their 
members (Kalogeras et al., 2009; Cechin et al., 2013; Fischer and Qaim, 2014). 
The rapid growth in the number of cooperatives in China has attracted much attention from 
academia. Chinese scholars have recently carried out studies on (1) the relationship between 
institutional settings and cooperative development (Deng et al., 2010; Zhang and Huang, 
2014), (2) the impacts of cooperatives on farmers’ income and agricultural development 
(Huang et al., 2008; Ito et al., 2012), and (3) the internal governance structure of cooperatives 
(Liang et al., 2015). This thesis can be placed in the second group of studies, as the focus is 
on the impact of cooperatives on the position and welfare of smallholder farmers in China 
given the two major challenges that Chinese smallholder agriculture is facing. Under this 
overarching theme, four issues that have received little or no attention in the literature so far 
will be explored.  
First, the Chinese cooperatives’ development status needs to be understood before their 
impact be assessed. According to the ICA principles1, a cooperative is owned, controlled and 
patronized by its members. Some scholars argue that Chinese cooperatives have deviated 
from the ICA principles by introducing shareholder-ownership and shareholder-benefit. Yuan 
(2013) claims that some Chinese cooperatives have muted into “strange animals”. Others 
point out that Chinese cooperatives are experiencing problems such as rent seeking, and that 
small farmers are getting exploited by large farmers (Pan, 2011). A large number of farmers 
are still hesitant to join a cooperative even in areas where cooperatives are developing well. 
Understanding the (lack of) impact asks for an evaluation of the current development status 
of Chinese agricultural cooperatives.  
                                                 
1 More contents about cooperative principles can be found on the webpage of International Co-operative Alliance. The 
website is: https://ica.coop/, which was last accessed to on 1-3-2018. 
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Second, cooperatives enable farmers to bargain collectively with buyers of farm products 
(Bijman and Iliopoulos, 2014). Mujawamariya et al. (2013) and Milford (2014) analyse the 
reasons for producers’ choice of different marketing outlets by comparing production 
costs and transaction costs involved in dealing with different buyers with different product 
and process requirements. However, the question whether cooperatives play a role in farmers’ 
choice of marketing channels remains unanswered so far. Jia et al. (2012) analyse the main 
marketing channels of cooperatives in China and find that cooperatives mainly sell products 
to wholesale markets and facilitate farmers’ access to markets by bridging farmers and 
agribusiness. Since they use the cooperative as the unit of analysis, they do not examine 
farmers’ motivations for joining cooperatives, nor the impact of membership on farmers’ 
choice of marketing channel. 
Third, cooperatives are generally considered to be able to help farmers overcome market 
failures and increase agricultural income and thus reduce rural poverty (Markelova et al., 
2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Much research has examined cooperatives’ effectiveness. 
On the one hand, Wollni and Zeller (2007) and Sauer et al. (2012) provide evidence that 
cooperatives improve the coffee and milk prices that farmers in Costa Rica and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries received, respectively. Abebaw and 
Haile (2013) and Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014) find that cooperatives promote the use of 
chemical fertilizers and agricultural innovations, which contributes to improved agricultural 
productivity and higher farm incomes. But Addai et al. (2014) find that farmer organization 
membership exerts no significant impact on the yields or technical efficiency of maize 
farmers in Ghana. Whether or not, and the way in which, cooperatives improve Chinese 
smallholders’ economic status still needs to be examined.  
The fourth issue relates to the sustainable development of cooperatives. Liang and 
Hendrikse (2013) argue that the genesis of cooperatives in China is not the result of bottom–
up collective action by small farmers, but is due to the political pressure and the converging 
interests of specific agricultural entrepreneurs. Deng et al. (2010) claim that the government 
is of primary importance in the establishment and growth of cooperatives after 2006. Most 
successful farmer cooperatives in western countries have been voluntarily initiated (Cook, 
1995). Whether Chinese cooperatives can develop sustainably, given that the pursuit of 
potential policy benefits has been the important motivation for their formation (Deng et al., 
2010), is an issue that deserves more research.  
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1.3 Research objectives and research question 
Most current research on farmers’ cooperatives uses neoclassical microeconomic producer 
theory. However, the limitation of neoclassical economics is that it provides little insight in 
how to structure transaction relationships or the relationship between members and the 
cooperative. Socio-economic factors and psychological variables have received little 
attention, for example, when examining factors influencing farmers’ decisions on marketing 
their products.   
The objective of the study is to assess the impact of cooperatives on smallholder farmers in 
China by using transaction cost and other economic theories and taking into account socio-
economic and psychological factors. This objective will be realized by identifying and 
assessing economic and non-economic factors affecting Chinese farmers’ choice of 
participating in cooperatives, evaluating the impact of cooperatives on farmers’ choice of 
production behaviour and marketing channels, and discussing the possibility for cooperatives 
to sustainably develop.  
To reach this objective, four specific research questions will be examined: 
 What are the developments and characteristics of farmers’ cooperatives since 2007? 
 What are the effects of cooperative membership and other factors on farmers’ choice 
of marketing channels? 
 What is the effect of cooperative membership on smallholder farmers’ yields and 
profits, and how are the effects produced? 
 What factors influence member commitment to cooperatives?  
 
1.4 Methodology 
Both qualitative and quantitative research methods have been used to answer these questions. 
In Chapter 2, a comparative literature research is conducted to answer the 1st research 
question. The evolution and characteristics of cooperatives in China in comparison with those 
in Western Europe are examined mainly from six key perspectives, based on an extensive 
review of both Chinese and English language literature on agricultural cooperatives. The 
English language literature referred in the thesis starts from 1940s onwards and the Chinese 
language literature mainly covers 2005 until 2017. 
The answers of Questions 2 to 4 are based on field survey data collected among apple farmer 
households and apple farmer cooperatives. China is the world’s leading producer of apples, 
producing roughly 55% of the total apple output in 2015 (Frederick et al., 2015). Apples are 
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the fruit crop with the largest acreage and the highest production value in China, and have 
been the dominant income source for farmers in the two main apple production regions – the 
Bohai Gulf area and the Loess Plateau area (Wang and Huo, 2014). Apple farming is 
typically done by smallholder farmers in these two regions; the average contracted farmland 
size is around 0.5 ha (Lin, 2017). Given the importance of the apple sector in China, insights 
into the effects of apple cooperatives on smallholder farmers will be very relevant for China’s 
cooperatives policy. The field survey was conducted in Shaanxi Province (in the Loess 
Plateau area) and Shandong Province (in the Bohai Gulf area) between January and March, 
2015.  
A multistage sampling procedure was used for the selection of observation units. In the first 
stage, we used the probability proportional to size (PPS) method to select 7 out of the 10 most 
important apple production counties in Shaanxi and 8 out of the 10 most important apple 
production counties in Shandong, according to the size of apple production in 2014. In the 
second stage, we asked the Agricultural Bureau in each county for the list of apple 
cooperatives in the county; 5 cooperatives were randomly selected from those lists. 
Therefore, in total we first selected 75 cooperatives. However, the chairmen of 12 out of the 
75 selected cooperatives could not be reached. Therefore, we dropped these 12 cooperatives 
from our sample, resulting in a final sample of 63 cooperatives that were interviewed (30 in 
Shaanxi and 33 in Shandong). We did face-to-face interviews with the chairperson or another 
official involved in managing the cooperative. Data about the cooperative (e.g., number of 
members, initiators) were also collected by interviewing the cooperative chairperson face-to-
face. Next, 10 - 12 farm households were interviewed in the village where the cooperative is 
located. At least 6 cooperative members in each village were interviewed. This gave a total 
number of 700 farm households that were interviewed, composed of 429 member households 
and 271 non-member households. Using a structured questionnaire, information was 
collected on apple production in 2009 and 2014 and apple marketing in 2014 (including input 
use, costs, yields, and output price), as well as household and farm characteristics (e.g., age, 
education, farm size, and investments), and farmers’ perceptions about transactions. The 
collected information was based as much as possible on written records; for those farmers 
who did not keep records it was based on recall data. Question 2 is answered in Chapter 3 
using transaction cost economics as the theoretical framework. Besides asset specificity in 
production, also geographical location and transaction uncertainty are incorporated in the 
framework. The main marketing channels for apple farmers are wholesalers, small dealers 
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and cooperatives. To avoid losing relevant information about the households who sold their 
produce via two or more marketing channels, dummy variables for each of the channels used 
by the farmers in the sample are used as dependent variables. Given the potential endogeneity 
of cooperative membership when evaluating the effect of cooperative membership on 
farmers’ choice of marketing channels, endogenous switching probit models are employed to 
estimate the determinants of cooperative memberships and the effect of memberships and 
other factors on farmers’ choice among the three marketing channels. 
Research question 3 is answered in Chapter 4 where endogenous treatment regression models 
(ETRM) are used to evaluate the treatment effect of cooperative membership on apple 
farmers’ yields and profits per capita, respectively. A theoretical framework is developed 
based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. We hypothesize that cooperative services 
give member farmers an edge in production. ETRM allows interactions between treatment 
and outcome covariates, through which we can obtain insights into the pathways through 
which different outcomes for members and non-members are produced. 
Chapter 5 answers the fourth research question by employing structural equation models and 
is based on Allen and Meyer’s (1990) three-component model of commitment. Given the 
important role of the chairperson in the development of Chinese cooperatives and the 
Confusion cultural characteristics of Chinese society, trust in the leadership and social 
pressure are the foci of factors influencing member commitment. Structural equation models 
make it possible to explore the underlying mechanism by which trust and social pressure 
influence member commitment. Data of 391 apple cooperative members are used for the 
analysis.  
Chapter 6 presents the general conclusion and discussion of the whole thesis. The results 
from the previous chapters are synthesized and a general discussion on the research objective 
and the main findings is presented in this chapter.  
 
1.5 Policy relevance  
The thesis contributes to the understanding of the current status of cooperatives in China and 
their impact on smallholder farmers. Specifically, it summarizes characteristics of 
cooperatives and factors influencing their evolution, evaluates the effects of cooperatives on 
farmers’ choice of marketing channels and on the yield and profits from produce, and 
examines the factors influencing member commitment to cooperatives. The results and 
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conclusions of the analyses provide important novel insights into the effects of the ongoing 
policy of promoting farmers to participate in farmer cooperatives. They may also be very 
relevant for policies promoting integration of stallholders into high-value chains in other 
developing countries with large numbers of small and fragmented farms such as Vietnam.  
The reasons why smallholders participate (or not) in cooperatives with Chinese 
characteristics are explored from the perspective of farmer households while taking the 
influence of local governments into account. The insights obtained from the analysis will be 
relevant for policies aimed at promoting farmer membership of agricultural cooperatives. 
A sound understanding of the evolution and characteristics of cooperatives in China in 
comparison with those in Western Europe can assist Chinese policy makers in evaluating the 
current cooperative policy and developing future policies based on lessons learned in other 
countries. Insights into factors affecting the choice of marketing channels by farmers are 
particularly relevant for policies that aim at promoting smallholders’ involvement in high-
value food chains through facilitating their participation in cooperatives. The findings of the 
chapter on the impact of cooperatives on yields and profits are expected to contribute to 
policy making in the field of developing modern agriculture, and specifically the role of 
cooperatives and other types of agricultural business entities in this respect (Hu, 2012). The 
conclusions drawn with respect to factors affecting member commitment can provide 
important insights into the effectiveness of policy instruments aimed at making cooperatives 
develop sustainably in the Chinese cultural environment. 
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 Development and Characteristics of Farmers’ Cooperatives in 
China: A Review and Comparison1 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to obtain a better understanding of the development of Chinese 
farmer cooperatives by exploring and discussing the underlying causes of the different 
characteristics and development paths of Chinese and Western European cooperatives in 
agricultural markets. The paper compares the evolution and characteristics of cooperatives in 
China with those in Western Europe, based on an extensive review of both Chinese and 
English language literature on agricultural cooperatives. Differences in development between 
Chinese and Western European cooperatives can be explained by six key aspects: genesis, 
legal framework, financial structure, membership characteristics, internal governance and the 
relationship between cooperatives and the (local) government. While Chinese agricultural 
cooperatives have been growing rapidly in number and scope, scholars differ in their 
assessment of the effectiveness of these organizations for improving farmers’ income and 
rural development. Part of this disagreement originates from lack of understanding of the key 
characteristics of the cooperatives. By comparing Chinese with Western European 
cooperatives, and embedding the comparison in the international literature on cooperatives, 
we provide better insights into what can be expected from Chinese cooperatives. 
Key words: legal requirements, membership heterogeneity, financial structure, internal 
governance, government relations 
Abbreviations used: EU (European Union); BoD (Board of Directors); GA (General 
Assembly); ICB (Industrial and Commercial Bureau); SB (Supervisory Board);  
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Unpublished paper by Jinghui Hao, Jos Bijman, Wim Heijman and Nico Heerink. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The development of Chinese cooperatives has been a complicated story. In the 1950s and 
1960s, agricultural cooperatives evolved into “people’s communes”, which used to be the 
basis of Chinese agriculture and the basic unit of the rural administration before 1983. The 
Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1961) led to the agricultural crisis 1959-1961 and 
resulted in thirty million deaths through famine (Lin, 1990). This disaster was a great 
constraint for any type of agricultural collective economy. However, in the late 1980s, with 
problems in marketing of agricultural products, some farmers, especially those with large 
farms, began to collaborate voluntarily to form cooperatives. These are considered as the 
embryo of the new generation of Chinese professional farmer's cooperatives (Huang et al., 
2010)  
In contrast, cooperatives in the Western world has been undergoing the prosperous and 
vigorous development for a long time and have been playing an important role in European 
agriculture. The European Union has about 22,000 operating cooperatives, with 6.2 million 
farmer-members (COGECA, 2015). Although the number of cooperatives is constantly 
declining, their market share has not been reduced. For the EU as a whole, cooperatives 
market 40% of all agricultural products, but in countries in the north-west of Europe, 
cooperatives have market shares up to 80% (Bijman and Iliopoulos, 2014). While agricultural 
cooperatives have been established to bring economic benefits to their farmer-members, they 
have also been helpful in tackling social issues, for instance in mitigating poverty and 
promoting rural community development (Kalmi, 2007).  
The first Chinese national law on cooperatives, the Law on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives 
of China, was promulgated in July 2007. Since then the development of cooperatives has 
been facilitated by supportive policies, including tax exemption, financial subsidies and 
preferential credit programs. With this government support, the number of Chinese 
agricultural cooperatives has increased rapidly. By the end of 2014, the number of registered 
farmers’ cooperatives reached almost 1.3 million (SAIC, 2015), which is 3.7 times as high as 
the total number of agricultural cooperatives in 2010. In 2014, around one third of Chinese 
farmers were participating in at least one cooperative. The rapid growth in the number of 
cooperatives has attracted much attention from the Chinese academic world. Scholars have 
recently carried out studies ranging from analysis of the relationship between political and 
institutional settings and cooperative development, through the impacts of cooperatives on 
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farmers’ income and agricultural development, to studies on the inner governance structures 
of cooperatives. 
Though the number of registered agricultural cooperatives has been expanding rapidly, 
scholars question how many of them are actually functioning well. Ma (2013) claims that in 
the “jungle of the vast number of cooperatives”, some cooperatives have mutated into 
“strange animals”. At the same time, Yuan (2013) complains that the basic principles of 
member-ownership and member-benefit has transformed into shareholder-ownership and 
shareholder-benefit. In contrast to the enthusiasm in most of the academic world and policy 
circles, large numbers of farmers are still hesitant to join cooperatives even in areas where 
cooperatives are doing well. Pan (2011) found that the phenomena of “bogus cooperatives”, 
“rent seeking” and “big farmers bullying small farmers” are ubiquitous among Chinese 
cooperatives, leading various scholars to re-examine whether Chinese cooperatives actually 
work in the interest of their farmer-members. 
With the rapid changes in the cooperative landscape and the conflicting viewpoints presented 
by scholars, it is hard for readers from Europe to fully understand what cooperative 
development in rural China really means. It is the objective of this paper to shed more light 
on the recent development of Chinese farmer cooperatives and their impact on farmers’ 
incomes and rural development. The paper does so by exploring and discussing the main 
differences and the underlying factors between agricultural cooperatives in China and those 
in Western Europe. While the number of studies on farmer cooperatives in China is 
increasing, a comparative analysis has not been done yet. Our paper is based on a thorough 
review of the literature both in Chinese and English languages on agricultural cooperatives. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. We present and discuss the differences between 
European and Chinese cooperatives on six different aspects, each in a separate section. Thus, 
section 2 presents the genesis of cooperatives, using a historical perspective. Section 3 
discusses the legal requirements for cooperatives. Section 4 presents the finance of 
cooperatives. Section 5 discusses the extent of membership heterogeneity. Internal 
governance is presented in section 6. Section 7 discusses the relationship between 
cooperatives and the government. The concluding section presents a discussion on the 
efficacy of Chinese cooperatives in strengthening the position of (smallholder) farmers in 
agricultural markets. 
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We also provide a comprehensive picture of the advances and trends of research in 
agricultural cooperatives by Chinese scholars. We review peer-reviewed articles published in 
the six most highly ranked Chinese agricultural economics journals published in the Chinese 
language. The journals are China Rural Survey, China Rural Economy, Issues in Agricultural 
Economy, Journal of Agro-technical Economics, Rural Economy, and Agricultural Economy.  
Based on our review, we generate interesting observations in the research of agricultural 
cooperatives by the Chinese scholars. These observations can provide valuable information 
and models for future research in Chinese agricultural cooperatives as well as agricultural 
cooperatives in other developing countries. 
 
 2.2 The genesis of cooperatives 
The history of cooperatives in Europe dates back to the mid of 19th century. Also in North 
America and Oceania, cooperatives emerged in the second half of the 19th century 
(Fernández, 2014). The formation of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers took place 
in Great Britain in 1844; the Society aimed to improve its members’ living conditions, by 
reducing the cost of food, and increasing employment and education opportunities. In 
Germany, the first Raiffeisen Bank was established in 1864, which is considered as a 
milestone in the development of cooperatives. The main objective of Raiffeisen was to 
provide savings and credit services in rural areas based on the idea of ‘self-help’. 
The set-up of Danish cooperatives in the 1880s was closely linked to the threats of both cheap 
imported grain and the decrease of tariff protection, which impelled farmers to shift to high 
value-added products such as bacon and butter (Gutierez et al., 2005). Similarly, the 
establishment of cooperatives in France and the Netherlands can also be considered as 
farmers’ response to the crisis in the agricultural economy in the late 19th century. In 1877, 
farmers in the Netherlands established the first cooperative for the purchase of good quality 
chemical fertilizers (Gutierez et al., 2005). In the 1880s, French farmers formed a union for 
the joint purchase of fertilizers in an attempt to countervail merchant power (Dedieu and 
Courleux, 2011). 
According to Chloupkova (2002), the most important reason for establishing farmers’ 
cooperatives in EU countries was the economic challenges that small farmers were facing. 
With the imbalance in bargaining power, agricultural producers needed institutional 
arrangements to improve their economic conditions and to mitigate the reverse effects of 
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market failures. In the words of Cook (1995), the entrepreneurial energy in the first stage of 
the agricultural cooperative lifecycle was rooted in a survival-defensive strategy. 
Establishing federations, or cooperatives of cooperatives, have supported the development of 
local cooperatives, both by influencing government policies and by setting up joint 
businesses at the regional and national level. The genesis and prosperity of the Finnish 
agricultural cooperative is evidence of this claim. Finland, where the farmers have always 
had a tradition of cooperation, experienced a rapid growth in cooperatives after the setting-up 
of a central organization, the Pellervo Society (now Finnish Cooperatives Pellervo). 
Agricultural cooperatives have been playing an important role in the Finnish agricultural 
sector since the beginning of the 20th century, accounting for more than half of the market 
for most food products (Pyykkönen et al., 2012). 
The genesis of most Chinese cooperatives has been on a different basis. Before 2006, the 
development of agricultural cooperatives was slow. For instance, only 2% of Chinese farmers 
belonged to cooperatives in 2005 (Huang and Rozelle, 2015). Several scholars used research 
on cooperatives to show the necessity to develop farmers’ cooperatives and to establish the 
legal status of cooperatives in China. They argued that cooperatives were needed to improve 
the negotiation and competitive position of farmers in the market, to lower transaction costs 
for individual farmers, and to develop a regional agricultural economy (Huang, et al., 2010; 
Zheng et al., 2012; Peng and Yuan, 2014).  
Since 2007, various new breeds of farmers' cooperatives have appeared and the number of 
officially registered cooperatives has been soaring. By the end of 2014, the percentage of 
farmers participating in cooperatives reached around 30% (SAIC, 2015). This large increase 
is not a coincidence. The Chinese government has played a major role as catalyst in the 
establishment of new cooperatives. Based on a national survey of 380 villages in 2003 and 
2009, Deng et al. (2010) found that the quest for economic benefits is the farmers' main 
motivation to join cooperatives, but that the role of the government is crucial for establishing 
cooperatives. Liang and Hendrikse (2013) support this claim with their empirical study and 
find that the genesis of cooperatives in China is not the result of bottom–up collective action 
by small farmers, but is due to the converging interests of specific agricultural entrepreneurs 
and the political pressure. 
In terms of the genesis of farmers' cooperatives, we can see a major difference between 
European and Chinese cooperatives. While the former was established bottom-up by farmers 
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themselves, motivated by the need to solve economic challenges, the latter are the result of 
the collaboration between entrepreneurs and local governments. We call this the external or 
top-down approach to cooperative initiation. 
 
2.3 Legal requirements of cooperatives  
Cooperatives have a long history in Europe. Most EU countries, especially the Western and 
Northern European nations, established cooperative laws more than a century ago. These 
laws have promoted the development of cooperatives, and legal reforms have proceeded hand 
in hand with the cooperative development (Fici, 2013). Though cooperative laws differ in 
each country, they generally show more similarities than divergences. The legislation on 
cooperatives in the Netherlands can be considered an example of cooperative development in 
North-West European. We will compare Dutch and Chinese cooperative law when we 
elaborate on the differences of legal status between Chinese and European cooperatives. 
Dutch Cooperative Law provides the following definition of a cooperative: “A cooperative is 
a legal person. It is established by at least two incorporators, and must have two or more 
members at incorporation. At least two of these initial members must also be incorporators of 
the cooperative. After its incorporation the cooperative may have a single member. The name 
of the cooperative must include the word ‘coöperatief’ or ‘coöperatie’. (...) Both natural 
persons and legal entities may be members of a cooperative”.  
In China, registration at the Industrial and Commercial Bureau (ICB) constitutes the official 
establishment of Chinese specialized farmers’ cooperatives. According to Chinese 
cooperative law, a cooperative is a legal person, and can be registered without fees in the ICB 
by “at least five (5) or more citizens, including the firms and other entities related to the 
production and operation activities of the cooperatives, or benefiting from the service by 
cooperative”.  The law also stipulates that in a farmers’ cooperative more than 80% of the 
members have to be farmers. An easy registration procedure facilitates farmers to establish 
cooperatives efficiently. However, the low cost of registration without further monitoring and 
control has been considered a weakness in the law that encourages the existence of “fake 
cooperatives” which are only established for obtaining subsidies or other state benefits (Pan, 
2011). 
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As to the funding and profit distribution rules, Dutch cooperatives have clearly stipulated. 
“There are no statutory minimum capital requirements in respect of the cooperative. The 
members may provide funds to the cooperative in the form of loans or capital, but this is not 
mandatory. The profits of the cooperative may be allocated to the members’ capital or reserve 
account or may be distributed to its members directly. (...) Any distribution or allocation to 
the capital or reserve account can be made irrespective of the funds contributed by each 
member”.  
Chinese Cooperative Law has similar profit distribution rules to Dutch Cooperative Law. The 
difference between the two laws is in the percentage of distributed profits. According to 
Chinese Cooperative Law, “the distributed profits should be allocated to the members based 
on their turnover with the cooperative, and the percentage of profits allocated to the members 
must exceed 60% of the total yearly profits”.  
Another obvious difference between Chinese and European cooperative law is about the 
decision making process and the distribution of votes among members. According to Chinese 
cooperative law, “each member has one basic vote. Additionally, the members with a large 
share in the equity capital of the cooperative or the ones with a large trading volume with the 
cooperative can have additive voting rights. The additional votes cannot exceed 20% of the 
total basic votes (which are the total votes without additional votes) in the cooperative.”  
Allowing additional voting rights is one of the most important origins of membership 
heterogeneity (see section 4). 
We can conclude that the main differences between the legal characteristics of Chinese and 
Dutch cooperatives lie in the decision control rights and residual claim rights. Chinese 
Cooperative Law allows the existence of additional voting rights per member according to 
that member’s share in the equity capital of the cooperative or the trading volume with the 
cooperative, while there is no such rule in Dutch or other European cooperative laws. 
Additionally, Chinese Cooperative Law has a clear minimum percentage of distributed profits 
of the cooperative, while there is no such requirement regarding profit distribution in Dutch 
cooperative law. 
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2.4 Membership heterogeneity 
The topic of membership heterogeneity and its impact on the behavior of the cooperative has 
interested scholars ever since the 1950s. According to Kaarlehto (1955) and Ohm (1956), the 
cooperative can be viewed as a coalition of participants with different goals, and the behavior 
of the cooperative can be seen as a result of negotiation among different members 
(Valentinov and Iliopoulos, 2013). Generally, uniformity of member interests is critical for 
marketing cooperatives because it minimizes costs of collective decision-making (Hansmann, 
1999). An increase in member heterogeneity leads to higher decision-making costs and 
reduced strategic focus. The decision-making costs may include the costs of collecting and 
processing information from members with diverse interests as well as influence costs 
stemming from (groups of) members trying to steer decision making towards their private 
interests. Membership heterogeneity problems have been grouped into the following 
categories: free rider problems, horizon problems, portfolio problems, control problems and 
influence cost problems (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Cook, 1995; Iliopoulos and Hendrikse, 
2009). 
Membership heterogeneity may be due to geographic dispersion, different commodities 
produced or inputs purchased by the members, the variance in members’ age, educational 
levels, farm size, the percentage of non-farm income, or differences in business objectives 
(Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999). Particularly, differences in the quality of the products that 
members deliver may negatively influence the daily operations of the cooperative. If 
members deliver different qualities but get paid an average price, the high quality producers 
are likely to leave the cooperative and look for alternative market outlets. This adverse 
selection problem will leave the cooperative with only the inefficient or low quality 
producing members, which may threaten the competitive position of the cooperative 
(Karantininis and Zago, 2001). 
In addition, member heterogeneity impacts the internal governance structure of cooperatives. 
Kalogeras et al. (2009) found that different business sizes and attitudes toward risks affect 
members’ preferences for internal governance. In general, the less risk-averse members with 
large scale operations prefer more professional managers in the decision-making position, 
while the more risk-averse members prefer decisions to be taken by their representatives. 
Osterberg and Nilsson (2009) found that the diversity of members' attributes, particularly the 
diversity of members’ perception of their participation in the governance of the cooperative, 
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has a large impact on members’ satisfaction with the service provided by the cooperative as 
well as their assessments of their cooperative's degree of success. 
As for the problem of membership heterogeneity in Chinese cooperatives, Huang and Shao 
(2009) pointed out that because of differences in production scale, various technical and 
management levels and distinctive attitudes to risks, memberships in Chinese cooperatives 
show substantial levels of heterogeneity. This membership heterogeneity can be traced back 
to the initiation of the cooperative. The legal option of multi-membership, ranging from 
individual farmers to agribusiness companies, allows the existence of large differences 
among members in scale of production, capital holdings and social capital. 
The increasing number of cooperatives has been initiated by dragon-head firms, big farmers 
and agro-technical organizations (including inputs merchants) while the number of traditional 
cooperatives initiated by ordinary farmers have been shrinking (Cui and Xie, 2014). In 
addition, the existence of “bogus cooperatives”, “elite capture in the cooperative” and “small-
scale farmers exploited and bullied by big farmers” have drawn heated debate in academic 
circles about the essence of the cooperative (Xu, 2012; Sun, 2014). 
Because of the diversity in holding capital shares, farmer households will be vulnerable to 
exploitation by those members who are large shareholders (Wen, 2009). The members with 
additional voting rights are the so-called core members, while those who invest only a small 
amount in capital shares or pay only an entry fee when joining the cooperative are called 
common members (Liang and Hendrikse, 2013). This leads to a stratified membership and 
divergent influence on decision-making. For example, in a cooperative initiated by a dragon-
head company, the company is often one of the core members, holding a substantial share in 
the equity capital (Zhang, 2009). 
We can learn from this part that due to the stratified membership, Chinese cooperatives are 
more likely to have membership heterogeneity problems than the European ones, particularly 
due to the large inequality among members in terms of the number of capital shares they 
hold. The large membership heterogeneity may have a negative influence on the efficacy of 
Chinese cooperatives, and it is also considered a constraint on cooperative development as 
small-scale farmers are often exploited and bullied by big farmers and agribusiness 
entrepreneurs. 
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2.5 Cooperative finance 
Finance is crucial to the success of the cooperative. The three basic cooperative principles, 
namely user-ownership, user-control and user-benefit (Dunn, 1988), are tied to each other by 
the members’ financial stakes in the cooperative. Failure of members to maintain financial 
contribution to the cooperative may jeopardize the very existence of the cooperative. 
Particularly in the formation stage of the cooperative, member contributions are crucial, but 
also difficult. According to a survey by Bhuyan and Leistritz (2001), raising equity and debt 
capital rank first and second respectively amongst the most important problems for a 
cooperative in the start-up stage 
In Europe and North America, cooperatives have three main sources of capital. First, 
members contribute by paying membership fees. Second, members buy membership shares. 
Third, members purchase investment shares. However, the most important source of capital 
for the cooperative is retained earnings. This means that a cooperative do not distribute all 
surplus to its members, but add part of it to the general reserves. The percentage retained 
earnings can differ per cooperative. In addition to these sources of equity capital, 
cooperatives may raise debt capital. Debt capital is money borrowed with a legal obligation 
to repay it under stated interest rates, terms, and conditions. Agricultural cooperatives use 
many of the same debt capital sources as other businesses, although it more common for 
agricultural cooperatives to obtain loans from cooperative banks. 
Marketing cooperatives operating in highly competitive markets often need more equity 
capital than their members can or are willing to contribute. One of the classical strategies for 
a cooperative to grow without obtaining additional equity capital is merge with another 
cooperative (Richards and Manfredo, 2003). If mergers are not attractive, and members 
cannot contribute more capital, outside investors may be an option (Chaddad and Cook, 
2004). For instance, in The Netherlands and Finland cooperative law allows equity capital 
investment from outsiders (Brusselaers et al., 2014). This cooperative financial strategy may 
have implications for the internal governance structure of cooperatives (Bijman et al., 2014). 
Unlike European cooperatives, where equity capital is provided by all members together 
(either as investment or through retained earnings), the equity capital of Chinese cooperatives 
mainly comes from a small portion of members (the core members) and from subsidies 
provided by the government (Yuan and Gao, 2012). Finance is seen as the largest difficulty 
for the development of Chinese cooperatives, because most of the smallholder members do 
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not have capital to invest in their cooperative (Wang and Dong, 2009; Zheng et al., 2011). In 
addition, cooperatives have difficulties in obtaining loans from commercial banks. Some 
cooperatives receive financial support from the local government. 
We thus can summarize that the main difference in finance between Chinese cooperatives 
and their European counterparts are shown in the difference in development stage. In the 
start-up phase, Chinese cooperatives rely heavily on the core members, who constitute a 
small portion of the total members, while the start-up capital of the cooperatives in the EU is 
contributed by all members. Moreover, in the later stage of development, some Chinese 
cooperatives receive financial support from the government, which composes part of the 
capital needed for their development. However, European cooperatives’ additional capital 
mainly comes from retained profits and members’ additional investments. 
 
2.6 Internal governance  
A cooperative is owned and democratically controlled by its members and the members are 
the users of the services provided by the cooperative (Dunn, 1988). The internal governance 
of the cooperative is about how the members determine the strategies and policies of the 
cooperative. Thus, the internal governance refers to the allocation of control rights, which in 
turn affects the allocation of residual claim rights (Bijman, et al., 2014).  
As cooperatives operate in a dynamic environment, with changing market conditions, policies 
and technology, it is important that cooperatives are able to adapt their internal governance to 
the changing circumstances (Mooney, 2004; Yu et al., 2015). Also McMaster (McMaster, 
1996) stressed the importance of organizational adaptability, claiming that networks that seek 
commercial success must develop and maintain the ability not only to change in the face of 
highly competitive environments, but also to adapt in ways that influence that environment. 
Generally, the traditional model of the European cooperative governance has evolved into 
Northern European model and Southern European model (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013). 
The traditional model consists of the General Assembly (GA) and Board of Directors (BoD), 
which are mandatory by cooperative law, and a Supervisory Board (SB). In Northern Europe, 
the traditional model has evolved into three other models: the extended traditional model, the 
managerial model and the corporate model (Bijman et al., 2013). By contrast, the dominant 
models of internal governance of cooperatives in Southern Europe are the traditional and 
extended traditional models (Rebelo et al., 2008; Bono, 2012). 
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Specifically, the extended traditional model includes professionals who manage the 
cooperative enterprise. With the increasing scale and complexity of cooperatives and the 
market-oriented strategies adopted, cooperatives more often employ professional managers to 
take over the executive tasks of the BoD (Bijman et al., 2014).The managerial model 
consolidates the BoD and the professional management, where only professional managers 
make up the BoD to carry out the management activities, whereas the corporate model 
consolidates the SC with the BoD and forms an extended BoD, where most decision rights 
are delegated to professional managers and the BoD is merely in charge of decision control 
(Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013). This trend has been foreseen by Hind (1999) in the research 
on the cooperative life-cycle, where she concludes that with the growth of the cooperative 
and the increasing membership heterogeneity it is inevitable that the decision-making rights 
will shift from the members to the managers. 
The majority of Chinese agricultural cooperatives have a similar basic internal governance 
structure as Western cooperatives, consisting of a General Assembly, a Board of Directors 
and a Supervisory Board. The BoD, as the main body of decision-making, is often comprised 
of the initiators and core members of the cooperative. Liang et al. (2015) investigated 37 
farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang Province in 2010 and found that the cooperatives had 
merged BoD and management and that this management team consisted of only core 
members. The GA, however, does not have the decision-making role as cooperative 
legislation prescribes. The GA is often used by the managers of the cooperative popularize 
agricultural production techniques and to inform members about the government’s 
agricultural policies (Liang, et al., 2015). 
The initiator of the Chinese farmer cooperative can be an influential figure in the village, or 
someone who used to work in the government or used to be a wholesaler of agricultural 
products (Zhang and Huang, 2014). This initiator usually becomes the chairman of the board. 
Compared with ordinary farmers (i.e., common members), the chairman holds “better 
knowledge regarding production technologies, asset capital, marketing capabilities, and social 
networks” (Lin and Huang, 2007), and has good connections with the local government. As 
to the allocation of decision rights in Chinese farmer cooperatives, Liang et al. (2015) found 
that the cooperative is dominated by the core members, as 92% of decisions is made by the 
chairman and the core members without consulting the common members. Since core 
members hold more shares in the cooperative than the common ones, core members also 
receive a higher share of the surplus generated by the cooperative (Liang, et al., 2015).  
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Last but not least, the Chinese cooperatives are hardly ever managed by outside 
professionals. Liang et al. (2015) found that all chairmen are cooperative members, more 
specifically core members. Due to a lack of working capital, employing managers from inside 
instead of outside can be a preferable choice for most of Chinese cooperatives at the current 
stage. These chairmen/managers will be self-motivated and devote their own resources and 
social capital to the cooperative (Huang and Xu, 2008). However, (Ma and Meng, 2008) 
point out that the common members can be exploited by the core members in case the BoD 
chooses to hide financial information from the common ones, and the SB colludes with rather 
than supervises the BoD. Furthermore, chairmen may have a constraining effect on the 
development of the cooperative due to their lack of professional knowledge and skills, 
particularly related to marketing (Liang and Hendrikse, 2013). 
Part of the research on internal governance of Chinese cooperatives focuses on residual claim 
rights. To solve the financial constraint confronted by most Chinese cooperatives, the 
government encourages capital investment in the countryside and attracts dragon-head 
companies to set up cooperatives. These two strategies have been viewed as the causes of the 
strange mutations currently seen among Chinese cooperatives, as they blur the boundaries 
between cooperatives and investor-owned firms (Sun, 2003). 
In short, Chinese cooperatives follow the traditional model of internal governance, while 
Northern and Southern European cooperatives seen an evolution in their internal governance 
models. On the one hand, in the life span of the European cooperative, the decision-making 
rights gradually shift from the members to the professional management. On the other, the 
decision rights in Chinese cooperatives are usually held by a small group of members, 
namely the core members. 
 
2.7 Relationships between cooperatives and the government 
The government has been playing an important role and has been considered as the main 
external support for developing cooperatives (Fock and Zachernuk, 2006). Because of free-
rider problem, lack of experience, low trust among potential members, and high 
organizational costs, it is often difficult for farmers to set up a new cooperative without 
external support (Ostrom, 1990; Fairbairn, 2004). Many governments around the world have 
been involved in cooperative development. According to Iliopoulos (2013), public support 
comes in different forms: (1) provision of a friendly legal framework, where friendliness in 
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this context implies that the legal framework does not discriminate against cooperatives in 
any way; (2) exemption from anti-trust laws and regulations; (3) beneﬁcial tax treatment; (4) 
access to favorable credit terms; and (5) technical assistance. “The intensity and mix of 
policies supporting agricultural cooperatives vary signiﬁcantly from country to country” 
(Iliopoulos, 2013: 243).  
From the rapid development agricultural cooperatives in China after 2007 it is obvious that 
government support has been quite important. The provincial ministries of agriculture are 
responsible for promoting and fostering farmer cooperatives. The relationship between the 
government and the cooperative can be mutually beneficial. To respond to the central 
government’s call, local governments may use the growth in the number of the cooperatives 
as one of the criteria for judging the performance of particular officers. Some local 
governmental officers even initiate cooperatives themselves. This government push could 
also be the cause of the large number of so-called fake cooperatives, i.e. cooperatives that 
only exist on paper (Pan, 2011; Deng and Wang, 2014), 
The cooperatives receiving governmental support usually have the stronger economic status, 
and are therefore called pilot cooperatives (Peng and Yuan, 2014). However, government 
support is not available for all cooperatives. Pilot cooperatives and dragon-head companies 
have received most of the subsidies and other benefits due to their better connections with the 
local government. In contrast, many cooperatives initiated by common farmers have found 
themselves out of the reach of policy support (Yuan, 2013). The cooperative chairman, who 
usually has strong ties with the local government, plays a critical role in communicating with 
the government and obtaining subsidies. For local governments it is easier to support 
cooperatives of members that already have a strong economic position, such as large-scale 
farmers or agribusiness firms, rather than to support cooperatives of only small farmers. Also 
the political gain is likely to be higher when the local government is collaborating with the 
more advanced farmers (Wen, 2013). 
In general, Chinese cooperatives seem to have closer connections with the local government 
than their European counterparts. The close relationship is mainly due to the political interest 
local governments have in establishing cooperatives. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
Cooperatives are important in agricultural industries throughout the world, as they have a 
major impact on farmers’ income and rural development (Bijman, 2016). This paper has 
compared Chinese cooperatives with their European counterparts in order to obtain a better 
understanding of the factors that cause Chinese cooperatives to follow their own evolutionary 
path. 
The main difference between China and other Western countries in the genesis of the 
cooperatives lies in the distinctive motivations. The cooperatives in the Western world 
originated from intrinsic self-defense because of economic challenges, which can be 
generally categorized as a bottom-up. By contrast, the establishment of Chinese cooperatives 
was the result of the combination of (top down) political pressure with agribusiness 
entrepreneurs recognizing economic opportunities in changing market conditions. These 
entrepreneurs had strong social networks and close connections with local governments. 
Finance plays a critical role in the start-up of a cooperative, but it also has a strong influence 
on the success of the cooperative in later stages. Chinese cooperatives receive the largest part 
of their equity capital from a small group of members, the core members. While this may 
provide the cooperative with sufficient capital for building their competitive position, it holds 
the risk that common members are less committed, because the uneven distribution of shares 
is accompanied by an uneven distribution of decision-rights. European cooperatives do not 
face this problem, as all members contribute a similar share of equity capital. 
The main differences in terms of the legal characteristics of cooperatives is the legitimacy of 
additional voting rights in decision control in the legal framework of Chinese farmers' 
cooperative versus the strict one-member one-vote principle which is the foundation of the 
democratic decision-making in cooperatives European countries. Nonetheless, both Chinese 
and Western cooperatives have certain legal characteristics in common, especially the 
flexible rules about formation and membership. 
Both Chinese and Western cooperatives need to deal with membership heterogeneity. 
However, since the cooperatives are at different life cycle stages, heterogeneity has different 
impacts on them respectively. In Europe, increasing membership heterogeneity has become a 
barrier to seeking further risk equity and efficient decision making. As Chinese cooperatives 
are in an early stage of their life cycle, the heterogeneity in members shows up particularly in 
the capital share hold in the cooperatives. The categorization into core members and common 
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members is the most obvious result of divergences among the members. The differences may 
cause conflicts of interest among members, resulting in farmers doubting whether or not to 
continue participating in the cooperative.  
Though both Chinese and Western cooperatives have similar internal governance structures, 
the background of the current status of the internal structures is different. The innovation of 
internal governance in EU cooperatives was driven by the need to attract outside risk capital 
and to strengthen the position of professional managers. The current internal structure of 
Chinese cooperatives is more the result of the implementation of cooperative law, which 
allows a differentiation between core and common members. From the perspective of the 
principles of effective collective action developed by Ostrom (1990), the internal governance 
of Chinese cooperatives entails certain risks for their future development. Particularly the 
principle that sustainable collective action requires effective monitoring by monitors who are 
part of or who are accountable to the membership seems to be violated. 
Finally, the topic of the relationship between cooperatives and the government is different in 
China compared to Europe. Government support has been playing an indispensable role in 
the formation and development of cooperatives in China. In Europe, various policies exist to 
support the development of policies. These policies, however, do not interfere with the 
internal governance and internal operations of cooperatives. The Chinese government has 
been crucial for the genesis of cooperatives after 2007, and government support has been 
instrumental in the establishment of a large number of new cooperatives. However, abundant 
government support has also lead to the establishment of fake cooperatives.  
Through a comparative literature review on Western European and Chinese cooperatives, 
several knowledge gaps on Chinese cooperatives have become apparent. One of the 
important topics for further research is the role of cooperatives in value chains, particularly 
their contribution to improving food quality and food safety (Royer et al., 2016). The 
structural changes in the agro-food markets, such as concerns about food safety, quality and 
socio-economic and environmental conditions of production, calls for better coordination of 
the sequential activities in the value chain (Bijman et al., 2011). These changes are also 
happening in transition countries like China and in developing countries (Swinnen and 
Maertens, 2007). In these circumstances, smallholders become increasingly vulnerable to 
exploitation, and cooperatives are becoming more important for these farmers to increase 
their bargaining power (Clegg, 2006; Ito et al., 2012). 
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Another knowledge gap relates to the internal governance structure of agricultural 
cooperatives in China and its effect on the relationship between members and cooperative 
and the impact on members’ trust and commitment to the cooperative. Though many 
economists have contributed to analyzing the current status of Chinese cooperatives, most of 
the research is based on qualitative analysis, lacking solid empirical ground. Therefore, it 
would be useful to explore these questions through quantitative research in order to generate 
stronger evidence. 
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 Cooperative membership and farmers’ choice of marketing 
channels: Evidence from apple farmers in Shaanxi and Shandong 
Provinces, China1 
 
Abstract 
Cooperatives are established to improve farmers' production conditions, to increase their 
bargaining power and to enable them to benefit from modern value chains. In China, farmers 
are members of a cooperative for multiple reasons. Little is known on whether and how 
cooperative membership affects farmers’ choice of marketing channels. This paper examines 
determinants of farmers’ choice of marketing channels, especially how cooperative 
membership impacts upon this choice. Our analysis is based on survey data collected in 2015 
among 625 apple growing farm households in the provinces Shaanxi and Shandong. We 
employ endogenous switching probit models to deal with potential endogeneity of 
membership in estimating the determinants of marketing channel choices. We find that 
cooperative membership has a positive impact on selling to wholesalers and a negative 
impact on selling to small dealers, but no significant impact on selling to the cooperative 
itself. As products sold through cooperatives generally comply with relatively stringent food 
quality and safety standards, these results imply that policies promoting cooperative members 
to sell their products through cooperatives are likely to have a significant impact on food 
quality and food safety in China.      
Keywords  
Cooperative membership, marketing channels, endogenous switching probit model, China 
  
                                                 
1 Revised based on the paper by Jinghui Hao, Jos Bijman, Cornelis Gardebroek, Nico Heerink, Wim Heijman, Xuexi Huo, 
published in Food Policy, 2018 (74), pp. 53-64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.11.004 
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3.1 Introduction 
Recent structural changes in agro-food markets are characterised by increasing public 
concern about food quality and food safety in both developed and developing countries. 
Demand for better quality food and for stricter safety standards is growing, mainly due to the 
increasing purchasing power of consumers (Narrod, et al., 2009). These changes can be both 
opportunities and challenges to smallholder farmers. On the one hand, the changes allow 
farmers to benefit from opportunities arising from export markets, local supermarkets and 
new processing firms (Bijman, 2016). On the other hand, these new markets in turn require 
compliance with higher production and food safety standards and the stronger coordination of 
sequential activities in the value chain (Abebe, et al., 2013). The high costs of compliance 
with these standards can exclude smallholder farmers from these new markets. 
Cooperatives can facilitate smallholder farmers to access markets and strengthen their 
economic position. Firstly, cooperatives enable farmers to bargain collectively with both 
sellers of inputs and buyers of farm products (Bijman and Iliopoulos, 2014). Secondly, 
cooperatives can support the information flow between farmers and the market and thus help 
farmers to meet the specific requirements of high-value added food markets (Wollni and 
Zeller, 2007). In addition, cooperatives can help realise food traceability (Moustier, et al., 
2010), thereby contributing to food safety. 
The Chinese land tenure reform in the late 1970s turned the farm household into the basic 
unit of agricultural production. The land reform provided most farmers with an adequate 
basis for their livelihoods. However, the reform also resulted in land fragmentation and 
small-scale agriculture, which have become an obstacle to develop modern agriculture (Tan, 
et al., 2008). Like smallholder farmers in other developing countries, Chinese farmers often 
have difficulties in accessing high-value agricultural markets. Having realised that 
cooperatives can facilitate smallholders to meet market requirements, the Chinese 
government began promoting the development of cooperatives at the beginning of the 21st 
century (Jia, et al., 2012b). The promulgation of the Chinese law on Specialised Farmers 
Cooperatives in 2006 has been a milestone in the development of Chinese cooperatives. By 
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October 2015, over 40% of farm households had become members of at least one 
cooperative. 1 
Research on agricultural cooperatives has focussed on two main issues. One issue is the 
relationship between the cooperative and its members, such as the determinants of 
cooperative membership (La Ferrara, 2002, Fischer and Qaim, 2012), the relationship 
between farmers’ preferences and the functions of the cooperative (Kalogeras, et al., 2009, 
Cechin, et al., 2013), and the effect of cooperatives on farmers' market participation (Barrett, 
2008, Hellin, et al., 2009). The other issue is the impact of cooperatives on agricultural 
production, the adoption of agricultural technology, and farmers’ welfare (Abebaw and Haile, 
2013, Chagwiza, et al., 2016) . 
Limited literature is available on whether or not, and to what extent, the development of 
cooperatives affects farmers’ choice of marketing channels. Mujawamariya, et al. (2013), 
Milford (2014) analyse the reasons for producers’ choice of different marketing outlets by 
comparing production costs and transaction costs involved in dealing with different buyers 
with different production requirements, respectively. Both studies do not examine the impact 
of cooperative membership on the choice of marketing channels. Jia, et al. (2012b)  analyse 
the main marketing channels of cooperatives in China and find that cooperatives mainly sell 
products to wholesale markets and facilitate farmers’ access to markets by bridging farmers 
and government-driven agribusiness. Since they use the cooperative as the unit of analysis, 
they do not examine farmers’ motivations for joining cooperatives, nor the impact of 
membership on farmers’ choice of marketing channel. Insights into such choices by farmers 
are important to evaluate recent policies in China that aim at stimulating farmers’ 
involvement in high-value food chains through promoting their participation in cooperatives. 
The objective of this paper is therefore to examine the determinants of cooperative 
membership for farmers and the effect of membership and other factors on farmers’ choices 
of marketing channels.  
We focus our analysis on apple farmers in the two main apple producing areas in China. 
China is the world’s leading producer of apples, producing roughly 55% of the total apple 
output in 2015 (Frederick, et al., 2015). Apples are the fruit crop with the largest acreage and 
                                                 
1  Translated by authors from the news report entitled “1.47 million cooperatives including 40% of farm households 
nationwide”. The original text is written in Chinese and was released on January 1, 2016; it can be found at:  
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0111/c1001-28035566.html. 
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the highest production value in China, and have been the dominant income source for farmers 
in the two main apple production regions – the Bohai Gulf area and the Loess Plateau area 
(Wang and Huo, 2014). The empirical analysis is based on an extensive field survey of 625 
apple farm households in Shaanxi Province located in the Loess Plateau and Shandong 
Province in the Bohai Gulf. We employ an endogenous switching probit model to estimate 
the determinants of each marketing channel taking into account the potential endogeneity of 
the membership decision.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework  
Arguments for the existence of cooperatives can be found both in neoclassical economics and 
in transaction cost economics. Sexton (1990) posits the competitive yardstick effect of 
cooperatives, which means that cooperatives have a competition enhancing effect in 
oligopolistic markets. It was found that the degree of yardstick effect is determined by 
membership, market structure and the resulting volume of deliveries (Hoffman and Royer, 
1997). However, neoclassical economics provides little insight in how to structure transaction 
relationships. Transaction cost economics offers a better framework to analyse the transaction 
attributes and the governance structures (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). In this section we use 
transaction costs economics to analyse which factors may affect farmers’ choices of 
cooperative membership and marketing channels. 
3.2.1 Transaction cost theory  
Transaction costs arise due to attributes of the transaction as well as characteristics of the 
human actors involved in the transaction. Williamson (2005) assumes that transaction costs 
are caused by bounded rationality and opportunism of human behaviour and by the attributes 
of a transaction, especially its uncertainty, frequency1 and asset specificity (Williamson, 
1979). The choice of cooperatives as an institutional arrangement results from high levels of 
asset specificity and transaction uncertainties (Ménard, 2007). Transactions between farmers 
and buyers are closely related to farmers’ assets for production and their geographical 
location (Key, et al. (2000). For example, due to the small size of the farm, economies of 
                                                 
1  In our empirical analysis we use cross-section data on marketing channels used by apples producers in the year 2014. We 
therefore disregard transaction frequencies in the remainder of this paper. 
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scale cannot be realised by smallholders; they thus face higher external transaction costs in 
obtaining inputs and financial services.  
3.2.1.1 Production-specific assets 
We define production-specific assets as both physical and human investments that are 
specialised and unique to a product. Physical production asset specificity consists of 
investments in land, machinery, buildings and is closely related to the specialisation of the 
farm. Human asset specificity arises from “learning by doing” (Williamson, 1998). Skill 
acquisition requires time, energy and money. Acquired skills, especially job-specific skills, 
are not easy to transfer across jobs. Human asset specificity in this sense is a sunk cost, which 
leads to a high probability of being locked in.  
3.2.1.2 Geographical location  
Geographical conditions limit the size and distribution of farms. Small farms usually face 
high transaction costs because economies of scale in transacting cannot be realised. 
Smallholders have higher unit costs of procuring inputs, obtaining credit and other financial 
services, getting agronomic and market information, and marketing products (Wiggins, et al., 
2010). In addition, adverse geography generally co-occurs with poor roads, leading to high 
transportation costs.  
3.2.1.3 Transaction uncertainty 
Transactions are subject to both behavioural and environmental uncertainty. Behavioural 
uncertainty comes from opportunistic inclinations of the transacting parties (John and Weitz, 
1988), while environmental uncertainty results from the inability to specify the exact 
conditions of the future exchange. Uncertainties contribute to transaction costs. Direct ex ante 
transaction costs arising from behavioural uncertainty and information asymmetry include the 
costs of screening and selecting partners. Direct ex post transaction costs are related to the 
processes put in place to measure a partner’s performance (Standifird and Marshall, 2000).    
3.2.2 Farmers’ choices  
We distinguish between two choices farmers can make. The first choice is about membership 
of a cooperative, while the second choice is about marketing channel. We assume that 
farmers make these decisions on the basis of the costs and benefits related to each choice. 
However, it is impossible to measure all the costs and benefits of both decisions (Masten, et 
al., 1991). It is particularly difficult to measure accurately the transaction costs associated 
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with the marketing process. Transaction costs thus are mainly assessed in a comparative 
manner (Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2001). We adopt the empirical approach 
proposed by (Williamson, 1991), which means that we focus on the transaction 
characteristics in order to estimate the determinants of farmers’ membership and marketing 
channel choice.  
3.2.2.1 Choice of cooperative membership  
Cooperative membership brings both material and immaterial benefits to farmers. Firstly, 
cooperatives decrease transaction costs and improve transaction efficiency (Royer, 2011). 
Buyers can offer higher prices for products because of the reduced transaction costs 
(Swinnen, 2005). Secondly, participating in cooperatives can improve small farmers’ access 
to both input and output markets (Key et al., 2000). In addition, members can benefit from 
the decision rights over the cooperatives’ strategic assets and thus reduce the risk of being 
locked in or held up (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). The immaterial benefits of membership 
mainly refer to the social interaction with other members, developing both personal social 
networks and business relationships (Hansen, et al., 2002). 
The typical costs of membership include membership fees, time and energy involved in 
cooperative affairs such as decision-making  and  monitoring manager performance 
(Pascucci, et al., 2012b). We assume that farmers decide to participate in a cooperative when 
the benefits of participation exceed the costs thereof.  
3.2.2.2 Choice of marketing channel 
A marketing channel refers to a set of interdependent organisations involved in the process of 
making a product or service available for use or consumption (Palmatier, et al., 2014). We 
focus on the upstream segment of the marketing channel: the transaction relationship between 
apple producers and their buyers. In China, the main marketing channels for apple farmers 
are small dealers, wholesalers and cooperatives. Farmers choose one or more of these 
channels to sell their products. 
We assume that a farmer decides to sell products after evaluating transaction costs and 
benefits associated with each marketing channel given his/her own production conditions. To 
a large extent transaction costs and benefits are determined by the characteristics of the 
marketing channels.  
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Small dealers are small and itinerant traders. They visit villages and look for potential sellers. 
When an agreement is reached between the small dealer and the farmer, the dealer buys the 
products directly from the farmer. Such transactions are spot deliveries, most of which are 
carried out either at farm gate or storage location. Grading and packaging work is usually 
done by the farmers themselves. 
Compared with small dealers, wholesalers usually have a larger scale of business. Instead of 
buying products directly from farmers, they usually employ local villagers as brokers to 
contact with potential sellers. Most wholesalers will choose a convenient location in the 
village where all the potential sellers bring their products. Wholesalers employ workers to do 
grading and primary packaging. 
Cooperatives are relatively new actors in marketing channels. Cooperative membership does 
not necessarily mean choosing the cooperative as the marketing channel. Not all members 
deliver their products to the cooperative, while non-member farmers can also sell the 
products to the cooperative.  
Other channels mainly consist of juice processors and selling within personal social 
networks. Farmers usually sell degraded apples to juice processors. 
The conceptual framework presented above is depicted schematically in Figure 3.1.  
 
Transaction Cost 
Cooperative 
Membership 
Marketing Channels 
Production-specific Assets, 
Geographical Location, 
Transaction Uncertainties  
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework 
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3.3 Model specification 
When we evaluate the effect of cooperative membership on farmers’ choice of marketing channels, 
we cannot ignore the potential endogeneity of membership. Farmers may self-select into cooperatives 
because of unobserved factors such as incentives and ability. These same unobservables may also 
influence the choice of marketing channel. For example, a farmer may choose to become a 
cooperative member with the intention to benefit from the possibility of selling outputs through a 
certain marketing channel. In such cases, the error terms of the membership model and the marketing 
channel model will be correlated, and membership will be endogenous in the marketing choice 
equation. Neglecting or failing to account for endogeneity of cooperative membership will result in 
inconsistent estimates and lead to spurious conclusions (Heckman, 1978). 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation and control function approaches are two common methods to 
deal with endogeneity of strictly continuous outcome variables (Heckman, 1978, Wooldridge, 2014). 
However, addressing the problem of endogeneity in limited dependent variable models is complicated 
by the fact that a nonlinear model is applied to fit the data, which invalidates a simple IV procedure 
(Wooldridge, 2010). For binary outcomes a simple alternative strategy is to use a Linear Probability 
Model (LPM) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) to instrument the endogenous binary regressor 
(Angrist, 2001). However, the LPM has many known problems such as predictions outside the [0,1] 
interval and constant marginal effects. Moreover, a 2SLS approach is less efficient than a full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach that is used in the method applied in this study. 
An alternative approach is to estimate a bivariate probit regression with a recursive structure, viz. one 
of the outcomes is an endogenous regressor in the other equation. E.g. the cooperative membership 
decision is a covariate in the marketing channel decision equation but not vice versa. Greene (2008) 
shows that by using FIML one can ignore the endogenous nature of the binary regressor and proceed 
as if there were no endogeneity problem. For an application of this approach see e.g. (Pascucci, et al., 
2012a).  
In this study we use a related though slightly different approach, the endogenous switching probit 
model (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). Like the recursive bivariate probit, this model jointly 
estimates two binary equations, one for cooperative membership and one for marketing channel with 
the membership dummy included as a covariate in the latter. The endogenous switching probit differs 
from the recursive bivariate probit in that it explicitly models the dependence between the residuals of 
the switch equation (cooperative membership) and the outcome equation (choice of marketing 
channel) via shared random effects, thus mimicking the selection problem described above. The 
bivariate probit model only considers the correlation between residuals of both equations, without 
explicitly modelling why these residuals are related. The shared random effect in the endogenous 
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switching probit reflects unobservables related to both cooperative membership and choice of 
marketing channel.    
Building on Pascucci, et al. (2012a), we specify the membership equation (Ci
*
) and the 
marketing channel choice model (Mij
*) as: 
Ci
* = αXi + ui,                    Ci= 1 if Ci
*
> 0, Ci = 0 otherwise      (1) 
Mij
* = βYi + γCi
* + vi,      Mij= 1 if Mij
*> 0, Mij
*= 0 otherwise (2) 
Where Xi represents a vector of explanatory variables of cooperative membership, Yi 
represents a vector of explanatory variables of marketing channel choices,  α , β and γ are 
coefficients to be estimated, and ui and vi are residual terms. To model the potential 
endogeneity of cooperative membership, we use a shared random effect εi that reflects the 
dependence between ui and vi (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006), 
ui = λεi + ζi (3) 
vi = εi + δi (4) 
Here εi, ζi, and δi are independently and identically distributed, with mean 0 and variance 1; 
λ is a factor loading.  
We can derive the correlation ρ between ui and vi as ρ =
λ
√2(λ2+1)
. If ρ equals 0, Ci
* will be 
exogenous in the marketing choice equation and consistent estimates of  β and γ can be 
obtained by fitting ordinary probit models. If ρ is significantly different from 0, Ci
* is 
endogenous and thus an endogenous switching model will be employed. 
 
3.4. Farm survey  
We conducted a farm households and cooperatives survey between January and March, 20151 
in Shaanxi Province in the Loess Plateau region and Shandong Province in the Bohai Gulf 
region. A multistage sampling procedure was used for the selection of observation units. In 
the first stage, we used the probability proportional to size (PPS) method to select 7 counties 
(out of the 10 most important apple production counties) in Shaanxi and 8 counties (out of the 
                                                 
1 Because of the Chinese spring festival in February, our survey was conducted in two periods, before and after the spring 
festival.  
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10 most important apple production counties) in Shandong according to the size of apple 
production in 2014. In the second stage, we asked the Agricultural Bureau in each county for 
the list of apple cooperatives in the county1; 5 cooperatives were randomly selected from 
those lists. Therefore, in total we first selected 75 cooperatives. However, the chairmen of 12 
out of the 75 selected cooperatives could not be reached. Therefore, we dropped these 12 
cooperatives from our sample resulting in a final sample of 63 cooperatives that were 
interviewed (30 in Shaanxi and 33 in Shandong). We did face-to-face interviews with the 
chairperson or other officials involved in cooperative management2. Data about the 
cooperative (e.g. number of members, initiation) were also collected.  
Next, 10 - 12 farm households were interviewed in the village where the cooperative is 
located3. At least 6 cooperative members in each village were interviewed. This gave a total 
number of 700 farm households that were interviewed, composed of 429 member farm 
households and 271 non-member households. Using a structured questionnaire, information 
was collected on apple production in 2009 and 2014 and apple marketing in 2014 (including 
input use, costs, yields, and output price), as well as household and farm characteristics (e.g. 
age, education, farm size, and asset investments), and farmers’ perceptions about 
transactions. The collected information was based as much as possible on written records; for 
farmers that did not keep records it was based on recall data. Some of the interviewed farmers 
had not sold the apples harvested in 2014, but kept these apples in cold storage. We excluded 
these farmers from our analysis. Finally, data from 625 farmers, including 374 member 
farmers (184 in Shaanxi and 190 in Shandong) and 251 non-member farmers (110 in Shaanxi 
and 141 in Shandong) have been used in the empirical analysis.  
 
                                                 
1 We did not register the number of cooperatives that were on each list. For the sake of confidentiality, the local agricultural 
bureaus did not allow us to take the name lists of cooperatives out of their offices. 
2 In two cases, the cooperative chairmen were out of office for business during our survey time. We had no choice but to 
interview others involved in the cooperative management. Both of them knew their chairmen well and could pass on basic 
information about the chairmen, such as age, education level, and work experience.   
3 One team had five enumerators, the other team had ten enumerators. The enumerators went in different directions from the 
local village offices and interviewed the first one or two farm households that were found at home. 
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3.5. Variable specifications and expected effects 
Table 3.1 shows the variables used to explain farmers’ decision on cooperative membership 
and choice of marketing channels. Their choice is based on the conceptual framework in 
Section 2.  
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Table 3.1 Expected effects  
Hypothesis  
Variable 
name  
Impact 
on TC 
Impact on 
membership 
Description 
Control 
Variables 
 
gender +/- +/- gender of the household head (male=1)  
quality +/- 0 
% of the apples without blemishes in the total  
apple output in 2009  
Production-
specific 
Assets 
(PA) 
Physical PA 
area + + size of land bearing apples (unit: mu1) 
non-farm 
work 
- 0 
the household head participating in non-farm 
work=1, otherwise=0  
specialization + 0 share of land dedicated to apple production 
Human PA 
age +/- +/- age of the household head 
education - + years of education of the household head 
household 
size 
+/- +/- household size  
training + + 
frequency of participation in technical 
trainings in 2009 
skill level + + 
self-evaluated level of apple producing skills 
(1=bad; 2=mediocre; 3=good; 4=excellent) 
Geographical 
Location 
 plots + + number of plots cultivated by the household 
 apple brokers - - 
presence of apple brokers in the same village 
or nearby villages=1, otherwise=0 
 distance + + 
distance to the nearest agricultural spot 
market (unit: km) 
Transaction 
Uncertainty 
(TU) 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
weather loss + + 
loss caused by extreme weather in the past 5 
years=1, otherwise=0.  
Behavioural 
Uncertainty 
ex-ante TU1 + 0 
ex-ante TU (To what extent do you agree 
with the statement  that “I have no idea about 
prices to be offered by buyers beforehand?” 
Scale 1-5) 
ex-ante TU2 - 0 
ex-ante TU (To what extent do you agree 
with the statement  that “I know beforehand 
about the quality requirements of buyers?” 
Scale 1-5) 
during TU + 0 
during TU (To what extent do you agree with 
the statement  that “I suffered loss caused by 
decisions that were changed unilaterally by 
buyers during the transaction?”2 Scale 1-5) 
ex post TU + 0 
ex post TU (To what extent do you agree 
with the statement  that “I suffered loss 
caused by delayed payments by buyers?” 
Scale 1-5) 
Institutional 
Environment 
 
initiation 0 + 
cooperative was initiated by village cadres or 
another government organisation=1, 
otherwise=0 
village cadre 0 + 
any family member has experience as village 
cadre =1, otherwise =0 
region +/- +/- regional dummy (Shaanxi=1; Shandong=0) 
Note: TC denotes transaction cost. 
+ stands for positive impact; - stands for negative impact; +/- stands for unclear direction; 0 stands for no impact.  
                                                 
1  mu is traditional Chinese unit of area (1 hectare = 15 mu). 
2  The change during the transaction mainly refers to quitting the transaction unilaterally or lowering the promised 
intentionally by the buyer before the final deal is reached by both parties. 
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Indicators of production-specific assets are as follows. We use the apples-bearing land area (labelled 
‘area’) to proxy output size and farm scale. To deal with potential endogeneity, we use a five-year lag 
for this variable. The share of land dedicated to apple production is used to measure the farmer’s 
degree of specialisation. The more specialised the farm is, the more likely the farmer will have 
specific assets on the farm (Pascucci et al., 2012a). The degree of participation in non-farm work for 
the household head is included as an indicator of access to cash income. Studies have shown that non-
farm activities can be an important source of cash income for farm households (Reardon, et al., 1994). 
We expect that farmers have more liquidity, and hence lower transaction costs, with increasing 
participation in non-farm work.  
Human capital increases “the ability to perceive, interpret, and respond to new events in a context of 
risk” (Schultz, 1982). Farmer’s education level, age and household size are used as indicators of 
human capital. In addition, the frequency of participation in technical training and the self-evaluated 
level of apple producing skills1 are also included.  
We use the number of plots each household cultivates, the distance to the nearest wet market2, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not there are apple brokers3 in the village or nearby to depict 
geographical location. Farmers in mountainous or hilly areas tend to have small and scattered land 
holdings (Tan, et al., 2008). Moreover, the distance to the nearest agricultural wet market is used as an 
indicator of market access. A dummy variable indicating presence of apple brokers in the same village 
or nearby villages is used to proxy the availability of market information. We hypothesise that farm 
households with more plots, larger distance to a wet market, and lack of information sources 
experience higher transaction costs in marketing. 
We measure transaction uncertainty (TU) based on farmers’ transaction experiences. Questions about 
farmers’ perceptions of transaction uncertainty are grouped into three categories: ex ante uncertainty, 
uncertainty during the delivery, and ex post uncertainty. Five-level Likert scales are used to measure 
the degree of uncertainty. To measure physical environmental uncertainty, which affects economic 
activities and transaction costs, we use an indicator of whether there have been production losses 
caused by extreme weather in the past 5 years.  
We control for the institutional environment. The Chinese government has been crucial in the genesis 
of cooperatives in China. Particularly since 2007, government support has been an important reason 
for the foundation of cooperatives (Deng, et al., 2010). We use three dummy variables to sketch the 
institutional settings: whether the cooperative was initiated by village cadres or by another 
                                                 
1 “Self-evaluated level of apple producing skills” might not only capture farming skills but also perceived self-efficacy 
(Wuepper and Sauer, 2016). 
2 A wet market is a traditional (street) market selling fresh produce and meat (Tracey-White, 1991). 
3 The term of “apple broker” refers to a person who functions as an intermediary between farmers and buyers in searching, 
contacting and bargaining.   
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government organisation, whether family members have been village cadres, and a dummy variable 
reflecting the region in which the household resides. The first two institutional variables are assumed 
to only affect the farmer’s choice of membership, not the choice of marketing channels. 
Using exclusion covariates in the switch equation that do not enter the outcome equation is the 
preferred approach for model identification (Deb and Trivedi, 2006). The three variables that are used 
as such in our model are the frequency of participating in training for apple production in 2009, 
whether cooperatives were initiated by village cadres or other government organisations, and whether 
any family member has experience as village cadre. Technical training in apple production increases 
the likelihood that farmers specialise in apple production, and therefore join apple cooperatives. The 
training usually does not include marketing-related training, and therefore is unlikely to have a direct 
effect on the choice of marketing channels. There are also no a priori reasons to expect that the way in 
which cooperatives are initiated has a direct effect on farmers’ choice of marketing channels. 
Likewise, cooperative membership is likely to be affected by the presence of one or more family 
members with village cadre experience. But a direct effect of village cadre experience on marketing 
channel choice is much less plausible. Furthermore, due to the potential problem of reverse causality 
between farmer’s degree of specialization in apple production and cooperative membership, we 
exclude the specialization variable from the cooperative membership equation. For the same reason, 
we also exclude the non-farm work variable from the switch equation. 
 
3.6 Results  
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics  
3.6.1.1 Marketing channels 
We find that most farm households plant more than one apple cultivar. The most common 
cultivars are Fuji, Gala, Delicious, and Jonathan. In Shandong, Fuji is the dominant cultivar 
planted, accounting for 70.2% of the total planting area and 76.2% of the total apple output in 
2008; in Shaanxi, the plantation area of Fuji apples equals 65% of the total area and the 
planting area has been increasing (Cong, 2008). We thus focus our analysis on Fuji apples 
only.  
The main marketing channels for apple farmers are wholesalers, small dealers and 
cooperatives. As shown in Table 3.2, the share of wholesalers in the marketing channels is 
43.7 percent, followed by small dealers (41.9 percent), cooperatives (10.6 percent) and other 
channels (3.7 percent).  Relatively more non-member farmers sell their apples to small 
dealers and relatively fewer non-member farmers sell their output to cooperatives. Most 
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farmers use just one marketing channel; 52 out of 625 farmers (8.3 percent) sell their apples 
through two marketing channels. To avoid losing relevant information about these 
households, we use dummy variables for each of the channels used by the farmers in the 
sample as dependent variables and use three endogenous switching probit models for 
estimating the determinants of cooperative memberships and the effect of memberships and 
other factors on farmers’ choices of each of the three marketing channels.  
Table 3.2 Apple marketing channels used by members and non-members of cooperatives 
Marketing Channel Members Non-members Total (%) 
Wholesalers 176 (44.0%) 120 (44.8%) 296 (43.7%) 
Small dealers 156 (38.1%) 128 (47.8%) 284 (41.9%) 
Cooperatives 59 (14.4%) 13 (4.9%) 72 (10.6%) 
Other channels 18 (4.4%) 7 (2.6%) 25 (3.7%) 
Total 409 (100%) 268 (100%) 677 (100%) 
 
3.6.1.2 Descriptive statistics: Cooperative members and non-members  
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of cooperative 
membership and the explanatory variables used in the regression analyses as well as their 
mean differences between member farmers and non-member farmers. We find that, in 
general, apple farm households are highly specialised with 84 percent of the land dedicated to 
apples on average, but with dispersed (3.73 plots per household on average) and small 
production scales (mean apples-bearing land area of 0.55 ha). As to the differences between 
the two groups, cooperative members have higher education levels, more plots of land and 
participate more in technical training for apple production on average than non-members; and 
their families have more experience as village cadres on average than non-members. In 
contrast, non-members are more specialised in apple production and have higher apple 
producing skills on average than members. 
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Table 3.3      Descriptive statistics  
Variable Name 
Members 
Mean (S.D.) 
Non-members 
Mean (S.D.) 
Difference 
Full sample 
Mean (S.D.) 
membership 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
0.60 
(0.49) 
gender 
0.99 
(0.12) 
0.97 
(0.16) 
0.02* 0.98 
quality 
83.38 
(17.71) 
82.69 
(17.69) 
0.69 
83.1 
(17.69) 
area  
8.59 
(10.85) 
7.63 
(22.06) 
0.96 
8.2 
(16.3) 
non-farm work 
0.10 
(0.34) 
0.13  
(0.30) 
-0.03 
.11 
(0.36) 
specialisation 
0.83 
(0.23) 
0.85 
(0.23) 
-0.02** 
0.84 
(0.23) 
age 
51.99 
(7.99) 
52.05 
(9.66) 
-0.06 
52.01 
(8.69) 
education 
9.47 
(2.27) 
8.88 
(2.52) 
0.59*** 
9.23 
(2.39) 
household size 
3.75 
(1.37) 
3.64 
(1.49) 
0.11 
3.7 
(1.42) 
training 
2.09 
(2.15) 
1.22 
(1.66) 
0.87*** 
1.74 
(2.01) 
skill level 
2.39 
(0.69) 
2.63 
(0.72) 
-0.24*** 
2.53 
(0.72) 
region 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.5) 
0.05 0.47 
plots 
3.86 
(2.16) 
3.55 
(1.71) 
0.31** 
3.73 
(1.99) 
apple brokers 0.42 0.43 -0.01 0.43 
distance 
7.53 
(8.50) 
6.83 
(8.32) 
0.7 
7.25 
(8.43) 
weather loss 
0.79 
(0.40) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
0.01 0.79 
ex ante TU1 
3.34 
(1.38) 
3.37 
(1.37) 
-0.03 
3.35 
(1.37) 
ex ante TU2 
4.22 
(1.03) 
4.18 
(1.02) 
0.04 
4.21 
(1.02) 
during TU 
3.02 
(1.45) 
2.88 
(1.42) 
0.14 
2.96 
(1.44) 
ex post TU 
2.75 
(1.57) 
2.62 
(1.52) 
0.13 
2.69 
(1.55) 
initiation 
0.45 
(0.5) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.04 
0.43 
(0.5) 
village cadre 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.11*** 0.22 
Observations 374 251 -- 625 
Note: S.D. denote standard deviations.  
 ***, **, and * denote that mean values for cooperative members are significantly different from non-member farmers at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
3.6.2 Estimation results 
We use the endogenous switching probit model (ESP) specified in (1) -(4) to estimate the 
factors affecting cooperative membership and choice of marketing channels. As shown in 
Table 3.1, we use 19 explanatory variables to estimate factors affecting farmers’ choice of 
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membership and 20 explanatory variables for the choice of marketing channels1. We focus on 
the three main marketing channels, i.e. wholesalers, small dealers and cooperatives (see Table 
3.2). Due to the small share of apple farmers using other channels (3.7%; see Table 3.2), we 
do not distinguish it as a separate channel in the marketing channel choice equations.  
First, we check the potential multicollinearity of explanatory variables on the basis of 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) in two separate linear probability models estimated using 
OLS (Menard, 2002). For the membership equation, the highest VIF is 7.74 (average of 1.87) 
and for the three delivery equations of each market channel the highest value is 8.16 (average 
of 1.89)2. Both values are lower than the often chosen critical value of 10 (Spanos and 
McGuirk, 2002), indicating that multicollinearity is not a major problem. Table 3.4 shows the 
estimation results. 
                                                 
1 Besides the variables listed in Table 3.1, we also include the square term of “area” in the estimations. 
2 If we delete the squared area term in both models, the average values of VIF in the membership model and marketing 
channel model decrease to 1.18 and 1.17, respectively. 
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Table 3.4  Estimation results for endogenous switch probit model of three main marketing channels1 
Variables 
Switch Model wholesalers small dealers cooperatives 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
membership -- -- 0.961*** 0.196 -1.116*** 0.353 0.201 0.769 
gender 0.367 0.389 0.166 0.378 -0.190 0.383 -0.052 0.539 
quality            -- -- 0.006** 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 
area  0.040*** 0.014 -0.038* 0.021 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.029 
(area)2    0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
non-farm work -- -- 0.236* 0.134 -0.311** 0.160 0.092 0.235 
specialisation -- -- 0.459** 0.231 -0.622*** 0.246 0.589 0.378 
age 0.002 0.007 -0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.010 
education 0.045** 0.023 -0.002 0.023 -0.023 0.026 0.040 0.035 
household size -0.002 0.044 -0.078* 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.119* 0.063 
training  0.135*** 0.028 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
skill level 0.252*** 0.077 -0.044 0.077 -0.018 0.088 0.126 0.118 
region  0.135 0.142 0.358*** 0.136 -0.235 0.148 -0.298 0.204 
apple brokers -0.120 0.128 0.455*** 0.121 -0.195 0.122 -0.707*** 0.186 
plots  0.052* 0.030 0.045
*
 0.027 -0.065** 0.033 0.053 0.034 
distance  0.003 0.006 0.012* 0.006 -0.012* 0.007 0.006 0.009 
weather loss 0.102 0.129 -0.076 0.124 0.087 0.127 0.365* 0.198 
ex-ante risk1 -0.028 0.040 0.018 0.037 0.033 0.039 -0.076 0.054 
ex-ante risk2 0.021 0.052 0.012 0.049 0.015 0.050 -0.104 0.068 
during-risk 0.009 0.038 -0.077** 0.036 0.071** 0.037 -0.037 0.051 
ex-post risk 0.045 0.036 -0.029 0.034 0.045 0.035 0.028 0.049 
initiation -0.017 0.099 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
village cadre 0.232* 0.129 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
_cons  -2.219*** 0.725 -1.095 0.789 0.969 0.828 -2.775 1.170 
ρ  -- -- -0.664*** 0.099 0.590** 0.338 0.243 0.398 
no. of obs. 625  625  625  625  
 Note: *  ,  ** and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
                                                 
1 Each marketing channel choice model has one corresponding switch model. Because the estimated coefficients in each 
switch model have the same signs and similar degrees of significance, we present the results for the switch model of the 
wholesalers channel for simplicity.  Estimation results of the other two switch models are shown in Table A.3.1 in the 
Appendix.  
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3.6.2.1 Switch model: Cooperative membership 
The second and third column of Table 3.4 present the estimation results for the cooperative 
membership switch model. We find that the apple bearing area has a significant positive 
effect on the probability of being a member of a cooperative. As regards the human capital 
indicators, we find that education of the household head, the frequency of participating in 
production trainings and the self-evaluated skill level have significant positive effects on 
cooperative membership. The age of the household head (an indicator of working experience) 
and household size, on the other hand, do not significantly affect membership decisions. With 
respect to the indicators of geographic location, only the number of plots owned by the 
household has a significant impact on membership. We do not find significant effects for the 
indicators of transaction uncertainty. Finally, only one of the two institutional environment 
variables is found to have a significant impact on membership decisions. We find that 
households with family members having experience as village cadre are significantly more 
likely to participate in a cooperative. It may also be noted that two of three instrumental 
variables used for identification, frequency of training and experience as village cadre, have a 
significant effect on membership.  
3.6.2.2 Outcome model: Choice of marketing channel  
The six columns at the right-hand side of Table 3.4 summarise the estimation results for the 
three main marketing channels. The values of ρ are significant (at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively) in the wholesalers and small dealers models. These findings support the premise 
that the cooperative membership decision is an endogenous decision in the choice of these 
marketing channels. For the cooperative channel, however, we find that ρ does not 
significantly differ from zero. Thus membership can be considered exogenous in the case of 
selling to cooperatives. Therefore, in principle an ordinary probit model could be applied for 
estimating the factors affecting the choice of this channel. However, note that this result may 
be due to the relatively small number of farmers selling to cooperatives. Therefore, for 
congruency we stick to the endogenous switching probit results for all three market outlets.  
The most striking result is that for cooperative membership, which is the main focus of our 
study. We find that membership has a significant positive effect on the probability that an 
apples farmer will sell the output to a wholesaler, and a significant negative effect on the 
probability of selling to a small dealer. But membership of a cooperative does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of selling apples to a cooperative.   
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With regard to production-specific assets, we find that land area has a significant non-linear 
impact on the probability of selling to wholesalers. With an increase in the apples bearing 
area, farmers seem to be less inclined to sell apples to wholesalers. But when the area exceeds 
19 mu (about 1.27 ha), the probability of selling to wholesalers increases with the area. The 
positive relationships between apples bearing area and selling to small dealers or cooperatives 
are both not statistically significant. We further find that more specialized apple farmers and 
those who are more involved in non-farm work are more likely to sell their output to 
wholesalers and less likely to sell it to small dealers. The results do not show significant 
relationships between human capital assets and choice of marketing channels, with one 
exception. We find that large households are significantly more likely to sell to cooperatives 
and significantly less likely to sell to wholesalers.  
Geographic location seems to play an important role in marketing channel choices. We find 
that the presence of apple brokers in the village or nearby villages has a significant positive 
impact on the probability of selling to wholesalers and a significant negative impact on 
selling to cooperatives. Farmers living in villages with a relatively large distance to the 
nearest agricultural wet market and farmers with a relatively large number of plots are more 
likely to sell their output to wholesalers and less likely to sell it to small dealers. Selling to 
cooperatives is not significantly affected by these two indicators of remoteness. We further 
find that, controlling for other factors affecting channel choices, farmers in Shandong 
province are more likely to sell their apples to wholesalers as compared to farmers in Shaanxi 
province1.  
The impact of transaction uncertainty on marketing channel choice is limited. We find 
evidence that farmers who experienced a weather-induced output loss during the previous 
five years are more likely to sell their apples to cooperatives. Selling to wholesalers or small 
dealers is not significantly affected by extreme weather losses. Ex ante and ex post 
transaction uncertainties do not have significant effects on farmers’ output channel choices. 
But uncertainty during a transaction, as caused by unilateral decisions of the buyer, makes 
apples farmers more likely to sell to small dealers and less likely to sell to wholesalers. 
 
                                                 
1 It is not possible to replace the province dummy by 14 county dummies in the model, because the cooperatives channel 
equation can no longer be estimated in that case (given the limited number of households selling through that channel).  
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3.7. Discussion 
3.7.1 Determinants of marketing channel choices 
Our major finding is that cooperative membership has a significantly positive effect on the 
choice of wholesalers, a negative effect on the choice of small dealers and an insignificant 
effect on the choice of cooperatives as marketing channel for the apple farmers surveyed for 
this study. We will discuss this result and its policy implications in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
As regards the other factors affecting marketing channel choices, the land area bearing fruits 
is found to have a significant negative effect on the probability of selling to wholesalers up to 
a turning point of almost 19 mu (about 1.27 ha.). This finding suggests that very small 
farmers often sell their apples jointly with other farmers to wholesalers; with increasing land 
size they are more likely to sell all their output to small dealers or cooperatives. But the 
estimated coefficients for land area in the equations for the latter two marketing channels do 
not differ significantly from zero (at a 10 percent level).  
With respect to other production-specific assets, we find that farmers who are more involved 
in non-farm work and those who devote a larger share of their land to apples production are 
more likely to sell their output to wholesalers and less likely to sell it to small dealers. 
Transaction costs incurred at the farmers’ side may explain the first of these two findings. 
Farmers involved in non-farm work will face relatively high opportunity costs of the time that 
they spend on negotiating transactions, obtaining information, and so on. The amount of time 
spent on output selling transactions will generally be lower for the wholesalers channel, 
especially when cooperatives coordinate such transactions. The finding that more specialised 
apples farmers are more likely to sell their output to wholesalers may have to do with the 
apple quality. More specialised farmers will generally have more knowledge about 
appropriate production technologies and be able to produce more uniform output. The costs 
involved in quality checking and grading, which is usually done by the wholesalers 
themselves, are therefore less. 
We do not find evidence that sunk costs of investments in human assets affect the choice of 
output channels by apples farmers. The only human capital variable that has a statistically 
significant impact is household size in both the wholesalers and the cooperatives channels 
equations. It exerts a negative and positive impact (at the 10 percent level) on selling to 
wholesalers and cooperatives, respectively. The results suggest that larger households may 
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have closer contacts with cooperatives and therefore are more likely to sell their output 
through cooperatives, rather than the other channels. More research is needed to examine the 
exact underlying mechanism.   
The presence of apple brokers in the village or nearby villages has a significant positive 
impact on the probability of selling to wholesalers and a significant negative impact on 
selling to cooperatives. Similar to cooperatives, apple brokers usually help organise 
transactions commissioned by wholesalers, especially in villages without cooperatives. Our 
findings indicate that apple brokers induce a switch in marketing channels from cooperatives 
towards wholesalers in villages where cooperatives are present. Other geographical location 
factors are also found to play important roles. Farmers living in villages with a relatively 
large distance to the nearest agricultural spot market are more likely to sell their output to 
wholesalers and less likely to sell it to small dealers. Proximity to a wet market usually means 
more potential buyers. In particular, there will be more itinerant small dealers with relatively 
limited travel radius near a wet market. These small dealers prefer to buy apples from sellers 
nearby to economise on their costs. Similar results are found for the number of plots 
cultivated by a household. Farm households with a large number of plots usually live in 
relatively remote, hilly or mountainous areas which are less accessible for small traders.   
Cooperatives usually buy all grades of their members’ apples, even the ones with blemishes 
caused by extreme weather during the growth period. This fact probably explains why we 
find that farmers who experienced an output loss during the previous five years are more 
likely to sell their apples to cooperatives. Ex ante and ex post transaction uncertainties do not 
have significant effects on farmers’ output channel choices.  Uncertainty about selling 
conditions offered to the farmers and negative past payment experiences apparently did not 
affect marketing channel choices in the survey year. Due to the relatively large transaction 
volumes, wholesalers usually buy apples from different farmers within the same village 
and/or nearby villages. They thus can choose among different farmers supplying apples, and 
usually select farmers who offer apples of comparatively high quality. The significant 
positive effect of the quality variable in the wholesalers’ channel equation is consistent with 
this observation. Farmers that have not been selected have to take the loss caused by this 
uncertainty during transactions, and will need to sell to other channels, e.g. small dealers. 
This explains why we find that uncertainty caused by unilateral decisions of the buyer makes 
apples farmers more likely to sell to small dealers instead of wholesalers. 
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3.7.2 Determinants of cooperative membership 
The significantly positive effect of land area on cooperative membership is in line with our 
hypothesis that large-scale farms have more specific assets for apples production. As these 
assets cannot easily be transferred to other productive purposes, farmers with a larger area of 
apple bearing land have a greater probability to join cooperatives. Likewise, we find that 
human asset specificity as reflected by the level of education of the household head, the 
frequency of technical training and the perceived skill level have significant positive effects 
on cooperative membership. The only significant indicator of geographic location is plots. 
Farm households with a larger number of plots usually live in relatively remote, hilly or 
mountainous. They usually experience higher transaction costs during marketing and thus are 
more likely to join a cooperative.  This result is in line with our expectations. However, we 
do not find significant effects for the five transaction uncertainty indicators.  
Finally, we find that households with one or more family members having experience as a 
village cadre are significantly more likely to participate in a cooperative. Village cadres in 
China are supposed to fulfil state tasks (Kung, et al., 2009) and are therefore generally quick 
responders to new agricultural technologies and techniques and to the new government 
policies. Given the recent focus in Chinese policy making on the development of 
cooperatives, it is no surprise that households with village cadre experience are more likely to 
become members of a cooperative. 
3.7.3 Robustness checks  
As a robustness check, we compare the endogenous switching probit results (Table 3.4) with 
results from a linear probability model estimated with 2SLS (2SLS-LPM; Table A.3.2 in 
Appendix) and a bivariate probit model (BPM; Table A.3.3 in Appendix).  
Compared with the endogenous switching probit (ESP) estimates, we find that the 2SLS 
coefficient estimates have similar signs and effects but are less efficient1,2. This is also 
reflected in a smaller number of statistically significant parameters in the 2SLS compared to 
the ESP. The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of cooperative 
                                                 
1 Coefficients and standard errors of ESP and 2SLS-LPM are not directly comparable due to different transformations used. 
Amemiya (1981) suggested to multiply the probit coefficients and standard errors by 0.4 (and add 0.5 for the constant) to 
make them comparable to LPM parameters.  
2 The three different marketing choice equations can also be estimated together as a system using 3SLS (3SLS-LPM). 
However, since all three equations contain the same variables theoretically there is no gain in efficiency (Greene, 2008: 257-
258). This was confirmed when estimating such a system (results available upon request).  
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membership in the 2SLS are in line with the statistically significant correlation coefficient 
estimated by the ESP presented in the bottom row of Table 3.4. The main conclusion of our 
study regarding the impact of cooperative membership on farmers’ choice of marketing 
channels remains the same.  
Comparing the results estimated by the BPM and the ESP, we find that the coefficients are 
very similar both in magnitudes and significance levels. However, generally the ESP 
produces smaller standard errors than BPM, which gives ESP a comparative advantage. The 
conclusions that we can draw from the BPM are exactly the same as the ones drawn from the 
ESP in Section 7.1 above.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
This paper seeks to examine how cooperative membership affects farmers’ choice of 
marketing channels, taking into account potential endogeneity of cooperative membership 
decisions. Using transaction cost economics as a theoretical framework, we employ three 
endogenous switching probit models to estimate the determinants of each marketing channel 
based on field survey data collected among 625 farming households in Shaanxi and 
Shandong provinces in China. The empirical results show that cooperative membership has a 
significantly positive effect on the choice of wholesalers as marketing channels, along with a 
negative effect on choosing small dealers and an insignificant effect on choosing 
cooperatives.  
We can explain the varying effects of cooperative membership on farmers’ choice of 
marketing channels in particular from the services provided by cooperatives. Cooperatives of 
apple farmers mainly provide marketing information services and marketing coordination 
activities to their members. As a result, current market shares of apple cooperatives are small 
(see also Table 3.2). Even if cooperatives do not buy their members’ apples, most of them 
collect marketing information, introduce wholesalers to members and help coordinate 
transactions for members. Membership thus exerts a positive effect on the choice of 
wholesalers, a negative effect on the choice of small dealers, but no significant effect on the 
choice of cooperatives as the marketing channel.  
We thus can conclude that the majority of the surveyed cooperatives are supply cooperatives, 
rather than marketing ones. Most of these cooperatives were established after 2007 and they 
are still young compared to other entities in the market. According to Cook and Burress’s 
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(2009) cooperative life cycle framework, they are still in the phase of economic justification 
or organizational design. Hence, it is not surprising that only a small share of the members 
sell their apples to the cooperatives. Cooperatives still need time to develop, and to realize 
their potential in facilitating smallholder access to markets and strengthening their economic 
position. 
One important field in which cooperatives can play a crucial role is in improving food 
traceability. Due to the increasing purchasing power of consumers, technical developments of 
examining food safety, and especially the recent food scandals, there is growing attention for 
food traceability, food safety and food quality in China. Cooperatives are regarded as a form 
of collective action that can help realize food traceability and thus promote food safety 
(Narrod, et al., 2009). For China, Jia, et al. (2012a) find that those agricultural products that 
are sold to supermarkets and export firms via cooperatives meet stringent food safety 
standards and quality requirements. Products sold directly to small traders or wholesalers are 
generally not tested for their safety (Huang, et al., 2008). Our survey data also show that 
among the 30 households in our sample who had their apples tested for pesticide residues, 24 
households (80%) sold apples to cooperatives. However, we find that membership of apples 
cooperatives does not promote marketing apples through cooperatives. Promoting food 
quality and food safety therefore requires more than just promoting cooperative membership. 
In particular, a preferential treatment of marketing-oriented cooperatives may be justified 
from the public health aspects of the food quality improvements that such cooperatives are 
expected to generate.      
The number of Chinese agricultural cooperatives has increased rapidly since 2006. Over 40% 
of farm households had joined at least one cooperative by the end of 2015. However, the 
market share held by cooperatives is still low. What role cooperatives play in the changing 
agricultural markets and how they can benefit both smallholder farmers and consumers in 
China are questions that still need to be further explored. Answers to these two questions not 
only concern the food safety of consumers, but also concern Chinese smallholder farmers’ 
options in adapting to new high-value added markets and increasing their incomes. Our 
research only provides some first insights into the limited role played by apples cooperatives 
in the selling of products. More research is needed, particularly on the aforementioned two 
issues, to augment the science-based evidence needed for designing appropriate food policies 
that stimulate the role of farmers’ cooperatives in promoting food quality and safety as well 
as smallholder welfare.   
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One potential limitation of our research is that due to data constraints, we have only explored 
the determinants of farmers’ choice of marketing channels from the perspective of farmers. If 
we would have data about buyers and other parties in the value chain, especially information 
about the flexibility of each marketing channel, the services provided and the prices offered 
by different buyers, we could use this to gain additional insights into farmers’ choices of 
marketing channels. A fruitful future research direction would be to focus on collecting and 
analysing such detailed information on channel characteristics.  
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Appendix: 3.1 
Table A.3.1 Switch model estimation results corresponding to other two marketing channels  
Variables 
small dealers cooperatives 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
gender 0.396 0.397 0.412 0.377 
area 0.039*** 0.013 0.041* 0.022 
(area)2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
age 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 
education  0.045** 0.023 0.045* 0.023 
household size  -0.001 0.044 0.000 0.044 
training  0.130*** 0.029 0.127*** 0.030 
skill level  0.249*** 0.077 0.258*** 0.078 
region  0.141 0.142 0.151 0.145 
apple brokers -0.121 0.128 -0.139 0.129 
plots  0.047 0.030 0.052* 0.030 
distance  0.003 0.007 0.004 0.007 
weather loss  0.105 0.129 0.095 0.131 
ex-ante risk1 -0.030 0.040 -0.027 0.040 
ex-ante risk2 0.026 0.053 0.021 0.053 
during-risk 0.009 0.038 0.010 0.038 
ex-post risk 0.047 0.036 0.050 0.037 
initiation  0.000 0.102 -0.010 0.109 
village cadre  0.235* 0.133 0.221 0.143 
_cons  -2.234 0.740 -2.279*** 0.730 
Note: *  Denotes significance at 10%; ** Denotes significance at 5%; *** Denotes significance at 1%. 
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Appendix: 3.2 
Table A.3.2 2SLS-LPM regression results 
Variables 
wholesalers small dealers cooperatives 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
membership 0.557** 0.261 -0.567** 0.248 0.008 0.146 
gender 0.047 0.166 -0.057 0.158 0.017 0.093 
quality  0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
area  -0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.003 
(area)2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
non-farm work  0.116 0.073 -0.136** 0.069 0.019 0.041 
specialisation 0.173 0.108 -0.232** 0.103 0.105* 0.060 
age -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
education -0.005 0.011 -0.006 0.011 0.007 0.006 
household size -0.035* 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.020** 0.010 
skill level  -0.031 0.041 0.006 0.039 0.023 0.023 
region  0.118* 0.064 -0.061 0.061 -0.046 0.036 
apple brokers 0.204*** 0.055 -0.084 0.052 -0.108*** 0.031 
plots  0.013 0.013 -0.018 0.012 0.015** 0.007 
distance  0.005* 0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 
weather loss  -0.038 0.055 0.037 0.053 0.051* 0.031 
ex-ante risk1  0.008 0.017 0.013 0.016 -0.010 0.009 
ex-ante risk2  0.009 0.022 0.003 0.021 -0.018 0.012 
during-risk -0.033** 0.016 0.029** 0.015 -0.008 0.009 
ex-post risk -0.014 0.016 0.020 0.015 0.005 0.009 
constant      0.061 0.363 0.820** 0.346 -0.111 0.204 
no. of observ. 625  625  625  
2 (Durbin score) 7.128*** 5.008** 0.344 
F (Wu-Hausman) 6.956*** 4.870** 0.332 
Note: S.E. denotes standard errors. 
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Appendix: 3.3 
Table A.3.3 Bivariate Probit model (BPM) regression results 
Variables 
wholesalers small dealers cooperatives 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
membership 0.994*** 0.272 -1.116*** 0.352 0.201 0.769 
gender 0.153 0.382 -0.190 0.383 -0.052 0.539 
quality  0.006** 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 
area  -0.038* 0.020 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.029 
(area)2  0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
non-farm work 0.231 0.145 -0.311** 0.160 0.092 0.235 
specialisation 0.450** 0.229 -0.622*** 0.246 0.589 0.378 
age -0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.010 
education -0.003 0.023 -0.023 0.026 0.040 0.035 
household size -0.078* 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.119* 0.063 
skill level  -0.049 0.081 -0.018 0.088 0.126 0.118 
region  0.349** 0.147 -0.235 0.148 -0.298 0.204 
apple brokers 0.453*** 0.120 -0.195 0.122 -0.707*** 0.186 
plots  0.043 0.029 -0.065** 0.033 0.053 0.034 
distance  0.012* 0.007 -0.012* 0.007 0.006 0.009 
weather  loss  -0.075 0.123 0.087 0.127 0.365 0.198 
ex ante TU1 0.018 0.037 0.033 0.039 -0.076 0.054 
ex ante TU2 0.012 0.049 0.015 0.050 -0.104 0.068 
during TU -0.075** 0.036 0.071** 0.037 -0.037 0.051 
ex post TU -0.030 0.034 0.045 0.035 0.028 0.049 
constant  -1.057 0.818 0.969 0.828 -2.775* 1.170 
 -0.686*** 0.170 0.590** 0.231 0.201 0.769 
No. of 
observations 
625  625  625  
Note: S.E. denotes standard errors. 
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 Cooperative Membership and Smallholder s’ Yields and Profits- 
Evidence from apple farmers in China1 
 
Abstract 
Cooperatives are regarded as an institutional vehicle to help farmers mitigate market 
imperfections and improve smallholder welfare. Though much research has been done on 
what effect cooperatives have on farmers’ welfare, the pathway through which cooperatives 
affect farmers’ welfare remains largely undiscovered. We examine the effect of cooperative 
membership on yields and profits by using the field survey data collected among 551 apple 
farm households in Shaanxi and Shandong Provinces, China. Endogenous treatment 
regression models are employed to assess the average treatment effects of cooperative 
membership on the yield and profits per unit area. We find that cooperative membership has a 
significantly positive effect on yield, but no significant effect on profits per unit area. Two 
pathways explain the different effects. First, cooperative services change members’ 
production practices, especially the use of inputs that lead to higher land productivity. 
Second, members on average spend more on fertilizers and use more hired labor than non-
members, which results in higher production costs. The extra revenues generated by the 
increased yields roughly compensates the extra production costs of the members.  
Key words 
Cooperatives, apple farmers, yields, profits, China 
  
                                                 
1 Unpublished paper by Jinghui Hao, Nico Heerink, Jos Bijman and Wim Heijman. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Smallholder farmers play a vital role in the global agricultural community. Collectively, they 
manage four-fifths of the world’s small farms and provide over 80% of the food consumed in 
the developing countries. One billion out of the 1.4 billion poor people living on less than 
US$1.25 per day earn their living from agriculture (IFAD, 2013). To combat rural poverty, 
developing countries have been trying to improve small-scale farms’ productivity and 
profitability (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014b). Small-scale farms often face sincere market 
failures, which impede their access to markets and the possibility to improve productivity 
growth.  
Cooperatives can help farmers overcome market failures. They can facilitate farmers’ 
participation and improve their bargaining power through joining forces in both input and 
output markets, thereby increasing agricultural income and reduce rural poverty (Fischer and 
Qaim, 2012; Markelova et al., 2009). Compared with contract farming or other types of 
institutions, a cooperative is generally more inclusive of smallholders, because of advantages 
in collective actions and social capital (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014a).  
 One constraint on the development of modern agriculture in China is land fragmentation and 
small-scale farms, which can be ascribed to the household responsibility system since 1979 
(Tan, et al., 2008). Under circumstances of vertical coordination of a supply chain, small 
farmers become increasingly vulnerable in the negotiation with other traders in the market. 
To facilitate the smallholders’ market access, Chinese government has been enhancing the 
development of cooperatives since the beginning of the 21st century. By October 2015, over 
40% of farm households had become members of at least one cooperative1.  
A considerable body of research has examined cooperatives’ effectiveness. On the one hand, 
for example, Wollni and Zeller (2007) and Sauer, et al. (2012) indicate that cooperatives can 
improve the coffee and milk prices that farmers in Costa Rica and CIS countries received, 
respectively. Abebaw and Haile (2013) and Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014b) find that 
cooperatives promote the use of chemical fertilizers and agricultural innovations, which 
contributes to improved agricultural productivity and increase farm incomes. On the other, 
                                                 
1  Translated by authors from the news report entitled “1.47 million cooperatives including 40% of farmer households 
nationwide”. The original text is written in Chinese and was released on January 1, 2016; it can be found at 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0111/c1001-28035566.html. 
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Addai, et al. (2014) find that farmer organization membership exerts no significant impact on 
the yields or technical efficiency of maize farmers in Ghana.  
In the case of watermelon farmers in China, Ito, et al. (2012) claim that a cooperative enables 
smallholders to increase farm incomes and is an important avenue to improve their economic 
status. Similarly, Ma and Abdulai (2016) show that apple cooperative membership can 
improve yields and household incomes. Both studies have examined the effects of 
cooperative membership on farmers’ welfare in China. However, these studies do not 
examine the question how cooperatives affect farmers’ welfare. Insights into this question 
can be useful to evaluate the Chinese policy of developing modern agriculture by promoting 
farmers to participate in farmer cooperatives and to foster other new types of agricultural 
business entities (Hu, 2012). The objective of this paper is to fill this research gap by 
examining the mechanism through which cooperative membership affects yields and the 
profits.  
We focus our analysis on apple farmers. As the world’s leading producer of apples, China 
produced more than half of the total apple output in 2015 (Frederick et al., 2015). Apples are 
the fruit crop with the largest acreage and the highest production value in China. 
Furthermore, they have been the dominant income source of farmers in the two main apple 
production regions: the Bohai Gulf area and the Loess Plateau area (Wang and Huo, 2014). 
The empirical analysis is based on field survey data collected among 551 apple farm 
households in Shaanxi Province located in the Loess Plateau and Shandong Province in 
Bohai Gulf. We employ the endogenous treatment regression model (ETRM) to control for 
potential endogeneity of cooperative membership in estimating its effect on yields and 
profits. Given that the ETRM allows interactions between treatment and outcome covariates, 
we examine the pathway through which cooperative membership affects yields and the 
profits.  
 
4.2 Conceptual framework 
Figure 1 shows the mechanism through which cooperative membership is expected to affect 
farmers’ yields and their profits per unit area.  
Generally, cooperatives can help dismantle obstacles caused by market failures due to, for 
instance, distorted input and output markets and missing credit markets, and facilitate 
farmers’ market access (Markelova, et al., 2009). Firstly, cooperatives can improve farmers’ 
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barging power and market access through joint collaboration, which allows members to 
obtain inputs at a lower price and to sell products at a higher price. Secondly, cooperatives 
can offer specific trainings, technical assistance and other extension services of production. 
Research shows that cooperatives generally increase the probability of adopting artificial 
fertilizers and other improved technologies (Abebaw and Haile, 2013, Verhofstadt and 
Maertens, 2014a). Therefore, we assume that these services not only improve members’ total 
factor productivity, but also members’ production practices. Particularly, the application of 
inputs (both in quality and quantity) affect both the quality and quantity of output (yield), 
which impact the production costs and thus profits from production. Thirdly, cooperatives 
can smooth the information flow between farmers and the market. Hence, farmers can 
produce to better meet market requirements (Thorp, et al., 2005, Wollni and Zeller, 2007). In 
addition, cooperatives also assist members with product marketing by either buying products 
from their members or sharing marketing information. The marketing service will affect the 
output price received by members.  
Given the reasons above, we assume that member farmers can have more production 
advantages than non-members. We only focus on the analysis of the mechanism of the effect 
of cooperatives on farmers’ yields and profits from the input aspect, without considering 
external environmental factors (e.g. the output prices and available marketing channels) in 
this paper. In Figure 1, the unexamined part has been shown in Italic font and the unstudied 
relationship in dashed arrows. 
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4.3 Farm Survey  
We conducted a survey among farm households between January and March 20151 in 
Shaanxi Province in the Loess Plateau area and Shandong Province in the Bohai Gulf area. A 
multistage sampling procedure was used for the selection of observation units. In the first 
stage, we used the probability proportional to size (PPS) method to select 7 counties (out of 
the 10 most important apple production counties) in Shaanxi and 8 counties (out of the 10 
most important apple production counties) in Shandong according to the size of apple 
production in 2014. In the second stage, we asked the Agricultural Bureau in each county for 
the list of apple cooperatives in the county. 5 cooperatives were randomly selected from those 
lists. Therefore, in total we first selected 75 cooperatives. However, the chairmen of 12 out of 
the 75 selected cooperatives could not be reached. We dropped these 12 cooperatives from 
our sample, resulting in a final sample of 63 cooperatives that were interviewed (30 in 
Shaanxi and 33 in Shandong). We did face-to-face interviews with the chairperson or other 
officials involved in cooperative management.  
                                                 
1 Our survey was conducted in two periods, before and after the Spring Festival. 
(External factors are not shown here.) 
Note: Words in Italic font stand for the unexamined. 
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Next, 10 to 12 farm households were interviewed in the village where a cooperative is 
located. At least 6 cooperative members in each village were interviewed. This gave a total 
number of 700 farm households that were interviewed, composed of 429 member farm 
households and 271 non-member households. Information was collected on apple production 
in 2009 and 2014 (including input use, costs and yields), and household and farm 
characteristics (e.g., age, education and farm size). The collected information was based as 
much as possible on written records; for farmers that did not keep records it was based on 
recall data. Some of the interviewed farmers had not yet sold the apples harvested in 2014. 
We excluded these farmers from our analysis. Therefore, data from 551 farmer households 
can be used for analyzing the determinants of yield. Specifically, 336 member farmers (185 
in Shaanxi and 151 in Shandong) and 215 non-member farmers (109 in Shaanxi and 106 in 
Shandong) were used in the analysis.  
Given the data availability, we analyze the effect of cooperatives on farmers’ yields and 
profits through the quality and quantity of input used. Therefore, we do not examine other 
factors of farmers’ profits such as marketing channels, output prices, and other external 
environmental factors. 
 
4.4 Estimation methodology 
4.4.1 Econometric framework 
Based on our conceptual framework, we build the Cobb-Douglas production function 
(Debertin, 1986). The logarithm form of the production function can be written as: 
ln 𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐾 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐿 + 𝛼3 ln 𝑇 + 𝛼4 ln 𝐼 + 𝛾𝐶 + 𝛿𝑍           (1) 
Where Y is the yield; 𝛼0 is the constant; K, L and T represent the capital, labor and land 
inputs, respectively; I is a vector of variable inputs for agricultural production, C is a vector 
of product- and farmer-specific characteristics variables and Z is a vector of membership – 
dummy variables. 𝛼0- 𝛼4, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are the coefficients to be estimated. 
It is well-known that a profit function can be expressed with the same explanatory variables 
as a production function when input and output prices do not vary among the units of 
observations. We assume that the cooperative services lead to different production practices 
among farmers, especially the application of inputs. We thus assume that the fixed production 
factors (K, L and T) as well as the product- and farmer-specific characteristics (C) have a 
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similar impact on yields for members and non-members, but that the impact of variable 
inputs differs between the two groups. The mechanism through which cooperative 
membership affects the yield can be written as: 
ln 𝑌0 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐾 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐿 + 𝛼3 ln 𝑇 + ∑ 𝛽0𝑗 ln 𝐼𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1 + 𝛾𝐶     (2) 
ln 𝑌1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐾 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐿 + 𝛼3 ln 𝑇 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗 ln 𝐼𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1 + 𝛾𝐶 (3) 
where Y0 and Y1 denote the yield obtained by non-members and members, respectively;  j is 
the number of variable inputs;  β0j and β1j are the parameters of different effects of variable 
inputs on the yield for non-members and members, respectively, keeping all other variables 
constant. The profit functions can be expressed in a similar way: 
ln 𝑃0 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 ln 𝐾 + 𝜃2 ln 𝐿 + 𝜃3 ln 𝑇 + ∑ 𝜔0𝑗 ln 𝐼𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1 + 𝜎𝐶 + 𝜏𝑆 (4) 
ln 𝑃1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 ln 𝐾 + 𝜃2 ln 𝐿 + 𝜃3 ln 𝑇 + ∑ 𝜔1𝑗 ln 𝐼𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1 + 𝜎𝐶 + 𝜏𝑆 (5) 
where 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 denote the profits per unit area obtained by non-members and members, 
respectively; 𝜃0 is a constant; 𝜃1 , 𝜃2 and 𝜃3 are the parameters of capital, labor and land 
inputs to be estimated, respectively;  𝜔0𝑗 and 𝜔1𝑗 are the parameters of different effects of 
variable inputs on the profit to be estimated for non-members and members respectively, 
keeping all other variables constant. S denotes the variables that are excluded in the yield 
function but included in the profit function, e.g. apple quality.  
4.4.2 Endogeneity of cooperative membership 
Equations (1) -(5) assume that farmer i’s choice of membership is exogenous to yields and 
the profits from apple production. However, farmers may self-select to join cooperatives 
because of unobserved factors such as incentives and farming ability. These unobservable 
factors may also impact product yields and profits, which makes the error terms of the 
membership equation correlate with that of the output equations. In such a case, membership 
is endogenous in both yield and profit equations. Neglecting or failing to account for 
endogeneity will bring about inconsistent estimates and lead to spurious or even biased 
conclusions (Heckman, 1979, Gerber, 1998).  
4.4.3 Treatment effects assessment 
A treatment effect is the average causal effect of a binary variable on an outcome variable of 
scientific or policy interest. In practice, simple comparisons of the outcome between the two 
groups or even regression-adjusted comparisons may provide misleading estimates of 
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treatment effects because of endogeneity due to unobserved and uncontrolled differences 
between the control and the treatment groups. Matching and instrumental variables (IV) are 
the two most commonly used statistical techniques to solve the problem of endogeneity when 
estimating treatment effects (Angrist, 2010). Both matching and  IV regression are motivated 
by the assumption that the only source of omitted variables or selection bias is from observed 
covariates based on the conditional independence assumption (Angrist, 2010). Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) has been one of the popular methods to evaluate treatment effects.  
But the obvious disadvantage of PSM is that it only controls for observed heterogeneity. The 
IV method can avoid this disadvantage and control for unobserved heterogeneity in principle 
(Kabunga, et al., 2012). A typical IV treatment effects model is composed of one selection 
equation and one outcome equation, which assumes that the impact of the selection can be 
captured by a simple parallel shift with respect to the outcome variable (Kabunga, et al., 
2012). This assumption does not fit the fact that cooperative membership is expected to 
influence not only the output (e.g. yield and net returns from products), but also the input use 
during the production. These interactions can be depicted through the estimation of the 
endogenous treatment-regression model (ETRM), which allows interactions between 
treatment and outcome covariates.  
We measure the treatment effect through the average treatment effect (ATE), the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) and the average treatment effect on the untreated 
(ATEU). The specific details of ETRM and treatment models can be found in STATA 
Glossary and Index (Release 14, pp. 36-67). 
4.4.4 Model specification  
4.4.4.1 Outcome equations 
Based on the forms of capital categorized by Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000), we group the 
explanatory variables into six different categories, viz. social capital, physical assets, human 
capital, variable inputs, local physical environment and social environment. We measure the 
profit as farmers’ average profits1 from apple production per unit of land in 2014. Table 4.1 
shows the definitions of the variables and expected effects of the independent variables used 
in the estimation of both the treatment equation and outcome equations.   
                                                 
1  The cost of family-member-labour (or free labour) input and indirect fixed costs are not subtracted from the average net 
income.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptions of variables and expected effects 
 Variable  
Name 
Expected 
effects on 
yield/mu 
Expected 
effects on 
profits/mu 
Expected 
effects on 
membership 
Description 
Output 
log_yield  n.a. n.a. n.a. logarithm of yield per mu1(unit: jin2) 
log_profit n.a. n.a. n.a. 
logarithm of profit from apple production per mu in 
2014 (unit: yuan) 
Social capital  
membership +/- +/- n.a. cooperative membership 
village cadre +/- +/- + 
whether the household head or any other family 
member has the work experience of being village cadre 
(1= yes;0=no) 
 fruit_year  +/- +/- n.a. age of apple trees 
 dwarf 
rootstock 
+/- +/- n.a. 
whether the apple trees are grafted on dwarf rootstocks 
(1=yes;0=no) 
Physical asset 
land size +/- +/- +/- area of land bearing apples (unit: mu) 
plots +/- +/- n.a. number of land plots cultivated by the household 
specialization n.a. + +/- share of  the land area allocated to apple production(%) 
quality  n.a. + +/- 
the ratio of apples without blemishes in the total apple 
output in 2009 
income_2009 + + +/- 
total incomes from apple production in 2009 (unit: 
yuan) 
non-farm  n.a. n.a. +/- 
if the household head participates in non-farm work=1, 
otherwise=0) 
Human capital 
gender  +/- +/- +/- gender of the household head (1=male;0=female) 
age  +/- +/- +/- age of the household head 
education  + + + years of education of the household head 
training  n.a. n.a. + frequency of participation in technical training in 2009  
skill level + + + self-evaluated level of producing skills (1=bad;2=mediocre;3=good;4=excellent) 
Variable 
inputs 
fertilizer + +/- n.a. 
total fertilizer cost per mu for apple production (unit: 
yuan) 
pesticide + +/- n.a. 
total pesticides cost per mu for apple production (unit: 
yuan) 
family labour + +/- n.a. 
own family-labour input per mu for apple production 
(unit: labour days) 
hired labour + +/- n.a. 
hired-labour input per mu for apple production (unit: 
labour days) 
irrigation + +/- n.a. frequency of irrigation for apple trees in 2014 
bagging + +/- n.a. 
whether double-layer bags have been used for bagging 
apples in 2014 (1=yes;0=no) 
Local physical 
environment 
weather - - n.a. 
whether there is production loss caused by extreme 
weather in 2014 (1= yes;0=no) 
loss n.a. n.a. + 
whether there was production loss caused by extreme 
weather from 2009 to 2013 (1= yes;0=no) 
distance n.a. n.a. + 
distance to the nearest agricultural spot market (unit: 
km) 
region +/- +/- +/- regional dummy variable (1=Shaanxi; 0=Shandong) 
Social 
environment 
test n.a. n.a. + 
whether local cooperative development is one criteria 
for evaluating the performance of village cadres (1= 
yes;0=no) 
organization n.a. n.a. + 
the number of entertainment organizations for villagers 
in the village 
Note: “+”, “-” and “0” stand for positive effect, negative effect and no effect, respectively. “+/-” denotes ambivalent effect.  
                                                 
1  mu is the traditional Chinese unit of area (1 hectare = 15 mu). 
2  jin is the traditional Chinese unit of weight (1 kg = 2 jin) 
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The focus of our research is the effect of cooperative membership on farmers’ yields and 
profits. Therefore, the membership variable is the most important explanatory variable in this 
paper. Based on the majority of the existing literature, we assume that cooperative 
membership has positive effect on both yields and profits (Wollni and Zeller, 2007; Sauer et 
al. 2012). To some extent, cooperative membership can be a measurement of an aspect of 
social capital. Whether the family members have work experience as a village cadre is used 
as a second proxy of social capital. Given that literature can be found about both the positive 
(Grootaert, 1999) and negative effect (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Crespo, et al., 2014) of 
social capital on household welfare and collective action, we cannot specify the signs of the 
effects of village cadre on production yield or profits per unit area.  
Physical assets include age of apple trees and the rootstock of apples grafted on), land size 
(indicated by the area of land bearing apples), degree of land fragmentation (measured by 
number of plots each household owns), level of specialization in apple production (indicated 
by the share of land allocated to apple production) and the fruit quality. It has been proven 
that tree age and rootstocks of apple cultivar grafted on partly determine the size of apples 
(Marini, et al., 2002, Treder, et al., 2010) and hence both the yields and profits. Farm 
characteristics, such as land size and number of plots each household owns, have a direct 
effect on yields. For example, on the one hand, large farms can decrease production costs due 
to the economy of scale and their higher flexibility in crop use and risk bearing (Chambers 
and Foster, 1983). On the other hand, the negative relationship between farm size and output 
can be found in the research by Otsuka, et al. (2007) and Lipton (2009). Following the 
previous research, we assume that both the relationship between tree age and yields and the 
relationship between land size and yields and profits are quadratic. Additionally, farmers with 
more plots for a given farm size use more labor and fewer modern technologies, which tends 
to increase the production cost (Tan et al., 2008). Specifically, we need to note that the 
variables of quality and the degree of specialization in apple production are not included in 
the estimation of the determinants of yield, but is included in the profit equation.  
Total income from apple production in 2009 and a dummy whether the household head 
participates in non-farm work are used as proxies of liquidity. We expect that easier access to 
cash and credit can decrease liquidity constraints for farmers to invest in production. The 
adequate liquidity imposes positive effect on apple yields, but ambivalent impact on the profit 
from apples.  
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Human capital increases “the ability to perceive, interpret, and respond to new events in a 
context of risk” (Schultz and Schultz, 1982). Here human capital is indicated by household 
head’s education, age, gender and self-evaluated level of apple producing skills. The 
expected effects of age and gender on yields and profits are not explicit, but education is 
expected to be positive.  
Variable inputs for production mainly includes fertilizers, pesticides, labor input (including 
own family labor and hired labor), bagging and irrigation costs during the growth period. 
Input use is expected to have positive effects on yields, but an unclear effect on profits.  
The local physical environment is represented by production loss caused by extreme weather 
during the growth period in 2014 and a regional dummy variable to distinguish the different 
agro-climatic characteristics between Shaanxi and Shandong. Extreme weather can harm both 
the yield and the profits from apple production.  
4.4.4.2 Cooperative membership 
The aim of the treatment equation is not to perfectly explain farmers’ decisions about 
cooperative membership, but to account for unobserved heterogeneity that could bias the 
effect of membership on either apple yields or profits in the outcome equations. In principle, 
the parameters of the model (consisting of both treatment and outcome equations) can be 
identified, even though the treatment equation uses identical covariates as the outcome 
equation. However, Deb and Trivedi (2006) suggest that using exclusive restrictions or 
instruments can result in more robust identifications.  
We thus include four extra variables in the treatment equation as instruments: (1) a dummy 
weather loss variable (whether the household suffered apple production loss caused by 
extreme weather from 2009 to 2013); (2) the frequency of accepting trainings of apple 
production in 2009; (3) whether the local cooperative development is one of the criteria for 
evaluating the village carder’s performances or not; (4) the number of entertainment 
organisations for the villagers in the village. Reasons for choosing these four variables as 
instruments are as follows. (1) Extreme weathers can harm the apple quality. Farmers usually 
have difficulties in marketing the degraded apples. Cooperatives tend to buy members’ apples 
of all grades including degraded ones because of marketing contracts before harvest. 
Experience of marketing difficulties before 2014 can affect farmers’ membership decision, 
but not apple yields or profits. (2) Given the service provided by most cooperatives in China, 
some farmers, especially the ones needing trainings to improve their production skills, are 
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more likely to participate in cooperatives than others. Trainings in 2009 can impact on the 
yields and profits in 2009, but little impact on those of 2014. In contrast, trainings in 2009 
can influence farmers’ membership in 2014. Variables (3) and (4) concern with social 
environment, which are not assumed to impact individuals’ apple production, but positively 
impact on membership decisions. 
Additionally, we include variables of farm characteristics and of human capital in the 
equation. Specifically, the degree of specialization may also influence the incentive to 
participate in group activities (Fischer and Qaim, 2014). We thus also include the variable of 
specialization in the membership equation. 
 
4.5 Descriptive analysis 
Table 4.2 shows the mean and standard deviation values of dependent and independent 
variables and the mean differences between member farmers and non-member farmers. Mean 
yield per mu1 for members is 4,140 jin2 or 2,070 kg, about 290 jin more than non-member 
farmers. The yield difference is not significantly different from zero. Mean profits from apple 
production per mu for members are 7,838 yuan (1043 euro3) and 7,498 yuan (998 euro) for 
non-members. The difference between these two groups is 340 yuan, and is not statistically 
significant.  
In general, apple farmer households are highly specialized in apple production. On average 
84% of total land has been allocated to apple production. Their farms are dispersed ( 3.71 
plots per household on average) and small ( 8.59 mu or 0.57 Ha on average). Though no 
significant difference exists between these two groups relating to land size, members have 
significantly more plots (with the mean of 3.84 plots) of land than non-member farmers. 
There is no significant differences between the two groups with respect to physical assets and 
variable inputs in production. However, differences in human capital and social capital are 
significant. Compared with non-members, member farmers have higher education levels and 
participate in more production trainings. Member farmers and their family members also 
have a higher probability of being village cadres.  
                                                 
1 Mu is a Chinese unit of area. 1 hector=15mu. 
2  jin is the traditional Chinese unit of weight (1 kg = 2 jin). 
3 The calculation is based on the exchange rate of EURO to RMB on 31-12-2014: 1 EURO=7.512 RMB. 
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In regard to variable inputs, there is no significant difference between the two groups except 
for the labour days and bagging. Labour is one of the most important components of costs for 
apple production1. Specifically, non-member farmers use more own family-labour per mu 
than member farmers do. Member farmers tend to use more hired labour during production, 
though the total labour input on average in apple production per mu is not significantly 
different between these two groups. Bagging is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
household used two-layered paper bags or not to cover the fruit during the growth period to 
protect them from environmental hazards. All the households used apple bags in 2014. We 
use the dummy variable to distinguish the bag costs. The result shows that higher percentage 
of members used double-layered bags than that of non-members. 
  
                                                 
1 According to Huo, X., Liu, T., Liu, J., 2015. 2014 Annual Report on the Development of Chinese Apple Industry 
available., the average labour costs of apple production account for 45% and 46% of the total production costs in the Bohai 
Gulf Area and the Loss Plateau Area, respectively in 2014 (the original test is in Chinese and translated by the authors). 
76 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the models 
 Variable  
Name 
Members 
Mean (S.D.a) 
Non-members 
Mean (S.D.) 
Difference 
(S.E.b) 
Full sample 
Mean (S.D) 
Output 
yield  4140.70  (2045.15) 
3851.78 
(2326.67) 
288.90 
(188.45) 
4028.16 
(2162.70) 
profit 7838.45 (7308.46) 
7497.75 
(6671.75) 
340.70 
(621.17) 
7705.75 
(7063.01) 
Physical asset 
fruit_year  17.59 (7.1) 
18.01 
(7.28) 
-0.42 
(0.62) 
17.75 
(7.17) 
dwarf rootstock 0.11 (0.31) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.26) 
land size 8.91 (11.85) 
8.08 
(23.82) 
0.83 
(1.53) 
8.59 
(17.50) 
plots 3.84 (2.25) 
3.50 
(1.63) 
0.34** 
(0.177) 
3.71 
(2.04) 
specialization 0.83 (0.23) 
0.85 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.84 
(0.23) 
quality  0.84 (0.17) 
0.82 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.83 
(0.17) 
income_2009 36027.60 (58970.04) 
29465.12 
(70345.06) 
6562.48    
(5554.59) 
33471.56 
(63660.92) 
non-farm  0.10 (0.30) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
Human capital 
gender  0.99 (0.12) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.14) 
age  52.00 (7.98) 
52.12 
(9.78) 
-0.12 
(0.76) 
52.05 
(8.71) 
education  9.39 (2.20) 
8.86 
(2.51) 
0.53*** 
(0.20) 
9.18 
(2.34) 
training  2.05 (2.14) 
1.20 
(1.72) 
0.85*** 
(0.17) 
1.72 
(2.03) 
skill_level 2.25 (0.68) 
2.03 
(0.66) 
0.22***  
(0.06) 
2.16 
(0.68) 
Social capital 
membership 1.00 (0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
village cadre 0.31 (0.46) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
Variable inputs 
fertilizer 2177.17 (1448.21) 
1986.10 
(1260.03) 
191.07    
(120.28) 
2102.75 
(1379.95) 
pesticide 460.94 (320.18) 
463.50 
(304.81) 
-2.565 
(27.43) 
461.93 
(314.00) 
family labour 19.87 (14.76) 
21.97 
(1.00) 
-2.10* 
(1.28) 
20.69 
(0.628) 
hired labour 10.64 (9.14) 
8.89 
(10.44) 
1.74** 
(0.84) 
9.95 
(0.41) 
total labour 1 30.5 (16.66) 
30.85 
(17.53) 
-0.36 
(1.48) 
30.63 
(16.98) 
irrigation 2.88 (3.11) 
2.60 
(2.83) 
0.28 
(0.26) 
2.77 
(3.00) 
bagging2 0.87 (0.34) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.84 
(0.36) 
Local physical 
environment 
weather 0.82 (0.39) 
0.79 
(0.41) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.80 
(0.40) 
loss 0.68 (0.467) 
0.62 
(0.48) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
region 0.55 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
distance 7.23 
(8.43) 
7.12 
(8.46) 
0.11 
(0.74) 
7.19 
(8.43) 
Social 
environment 
test 0.65 (0.46) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
organization 1.89 
(1.68) 
1.75 
(1.56) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
1.84 
(1.63) 
 
Number of 
observations 336 215 -- 551 
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. “a” denotes standard deviations. “b” 
denotes standard 
                                                 
1 The total labour input is not one of the explanatory variables that are used for the explanation later. 
2 Bags here refer to the bags used to cover the fruit during the growth period to protect them from environmental hazards. All 
the households used bags in 2014 for apples. Four types of bags were used, viz. plastic bags, single-layer paper bag, double-
layer bags with two colours and double-layer bags with three colours (with the price ranking from low to high). We 
transformed the categorical variable into a dummy variable (whether the household used two-layer bags or not). 
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4.6 Estimation Results and Discussion 
First, we check the potential multicollinearity of explanatory variables on the basis of 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the two linear regression models and one linear 
probability model after using OLS to estimate these explanatory variables. For the yield 
equations, the highest VIF is 18.15 (average of 3.6). The two square terms (tree age and land 
size) contribute to the high VIF. Neglecting these two square terms, the average VIF will 
decrease to 1.33, and the highest VIF will decrease to 2.77. Similarly, for the profit equation 
the highest VIF will decrease to 2.95 (average of 1.34). For the membership regression 
model, the highest value of VIF is 7.92 (average of 1.92). The values are lower than the 
common chosen critical value of 10 (Spanos and McGuirk, 2002). Therefore, we can claim 
that these explanatory variables are not suspected of multicollinearity. The estimation results 
of ETRM are shown in Table 4.3. 
The Wald test in the last row of Table 4.3 indicates that the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the treatment-assignment errors and the outcome errors for the control and treatment 
groups (non-member and member groups) should be rejected. The values of ρ are significant 
at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. These findings support the premise that the 
cooperative membership is endogenous in both the yield and the profit equations. 
4.6.1 Cooperative membership 
The estimates of the factors of cooperative membership is shown in the column of Treatment 
Equation. Here we present the estimation results for the treatment equation for the yield 
equation. The estimation results of the treatment equation for profits can be found in Table 
A.4.1 in Appendix. Though the results are different with respect to magnitudes, they are 
similar in signs and significant levels.  
The results show that physical assets play an important role in farmers’ choice of 
membership. Land size has a nonlinear effect on cooperative membership. With the increase 
of the bearing area, farmers are more inclined to participate in the cooperative. When the area 
reaches more than 150 mu or 10 Ha, the probability of participation declines with the increase 
in land size. Incomes from apple productions in 2009, apple quality and technical training 
have positive impacts on membership. The results are in line with our previous assumptions 
about these factors’ impacts on the membership.  
In addition, we find that the experience as a village cadre has positive effect on cooperative 
membership. Village cadres fulfil state tasks (Kung et al., 2009), and they are generally quick 
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responders to the government's policy calls. Given the Chinese government's policy of 
supporting the development of cooperatives, village cadre are more likely to become a 
member at a cooperative. 
Production losses caused by extreme weather are found to increases the probability that 
farmers become members. Extreme weather harms apple quality. Contrary to private traders, 
cooperatives usually buy blemished apples caused by bad weather. Finally, the more 
entertainment organizations a village has, the more probably for farmers to participate in 
cooperatives. Such organizations give villagers more opportunities to communicate with each 
other, which contributes to mutual trust and thus promotes cooperation among farmers. The 
estimation results are in line with our hypotheses. The significant effects of the extra 
variables for estimating the treatment equation are consistent with our previous hypothesis 
and provides evidence for their effectiveness as IVs. 
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Table 4.3 Estimation results, endogenous treatment regression model 
 Variable Name 
Outcome equations Treatment equations 
 log Yield 
S.E. 
log Profits 
S.E. 
Cooperative membership 
S.E. 
 fruit_year  0.05
*** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) -- 
 
square_fy -0.001
** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) -- 
 
dwarf rootstock 0.05 (0.07) 
0.04 
(0.10) -- 
 
land size -0.02
*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 
(land size)2 0.0001
*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00) 
 
plots -0.01 (0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 
specialization -- -0.24 (0.18) 
-0.39 
(0.27) 
 
quality  -- 1.22
*** 
(0.26) 
0.83** 
(0.39) 
 
income_20091(log) 0.03
* 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
 
non-farm  -0.02 (0.07) 
0.02 
(0.12) -- 
 
gender  0.01 (0.19) 
-0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.38 
(0.42) 
age  0.00 (0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
education  0.00 (0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
training  -- -- 0.10
*** 
(0.04) 
skill level 0.03 (0.04) 
0.04 
(0.05) -- 
 membership(M) 1.15 (0.87) 
0.39 
(1.05) -- 
village cadre -0.10
* 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
 Cross terms  
of membership 
and input 
variables 
aM0* (log_fertilizer)  
0.04 
(0.08) 
 
0.11 
(0.10) 
 
 
-- 
bM1*(log_fertilizer) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.04)  
M0*(log_pesticide) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
 
 
0.12 
(0.08) 
 
-- 
M1*(log_pesticide) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.07)  
M0*(log_hirelabour) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
 
-- 
M1*(log_hirelabour) 
0.20*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.13*** 
(0.04)  
M0*(log_familylabour) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
 
 
-- 
M1*(log_familylabour) 
0.07* 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.07)  
M0*(irrigation) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-- 
M1*(irrigation) 0.02 (0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
 
M0*(bagging) 0.03 (0.06) 
 
0.02 
(0.07) 
 
-- 
M1*(bagging) 0.02 (0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.06)  
 
weather 0.00 (0.07) 
0.05 
(0.08) -- 
 
loss -- -- 0.19
* 
(0.12) 
                                                 
1 We include the logarithm of incomes from apple productions in 2009 as one of the explanatory variables. Our data shows 
that 18 out of 528 households got non-positive incomes, accounting for 3% of the total households. We assign “1” to these 
zero values. Following Battese’s idea (1997), we add a dummy variable to the equations such that efficient estimators are 
obtained using all observations with values of apple incomes to avoid bias. We found that the dummy variable is not 
significant in either the regression of yields or profits/mu.  
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 Variable Name 
Outcome equations Treatment equations 
 log Yield 
S.E. 
log Profits 
S.E. 
Cooperative membership 
S.E. 
 
distance -- -- 0.00 (0.01) 
 
region -0.26
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.35*** 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
 
organisation -- -- 0.06
* 
(0.04) 
 
test -- -- -0.15 (0.12) 
 
constant 5.72
*** 
(0.84) 
6.19*** 
(1.02) 
-1.37 
(0.88) 
  -0.50
* 
(0.24) 
0.46** 
(0.20) -- 
 
Wald 2 2.69* 4.02** -- 
 
No. of observations 551 528 551 
Note: ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
“a” denotes the estimated coefficients for the group of non-members; “b” denotes the estimated coefficients for the group of members. 
 
4.6.2 Yield  
The first column of Outcome Equations in Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for apple 
yields. We can tell the different effects of input on two groups of farmers from the results for 
the cross terms of membership and input variables. Given the importance of the cross terms 
for our analysis, we will discuss them further in Section 6.4.  
As expected, physical assets are important determinants of yields. Both the age of apple trees 
and land size have a nonlinear effect on yield. The estimated age at which trees give 
maximum yield is 25 years while apple farmers at 100 mu are found to give the highest 
yields. The result reflects the fact that most Chinese farms are small in scale and most of 
them have not reached economies of scale. The income from apples in 2009 have a positive 
effect on the yield, which is in line with our hypothesis. 
Few indicators of human capital or social capital has significant effect on the yield, except for 
village cadre variable. Its significant negative impact may be explained from the fact that 
village cadres may spend less time in apple production than other farmers. Instead, they may 
have relatively more other income resources, because of better social networks. The regional 
dummy is significant at 1% level, which indicates that controlling for other factors, apple 
farmers in Shaanxi have lower yields than farmers in Shandong.     
4.6.3 Profit 
The estimates of the determinants of profits from apple production are shown in Column 5 in 
Table 4.3. Because we use the logarithm of profits from apple production per mu as one of 
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our dependent variables in our analysis, we removed the 23 households with a negative profit 
from apple production in 2014 (accounting for 4.2% of 551 households). Finally, data of 528 
farmers1 were used for analyzing profits/mu, including 322 member farmers (174 in Shaanxi 
and 148 in Shandong) and 206 non-member farmers (103 in Shaanxi and 103 in Shandong). 
In respect of the impact of physical asset on profits per unit area, we learn that with the 
increase of the land size, the profits/mu will decrease. The reverse relationship between land 
size and profits is in line with Ali and Deininger (2015). According to Fan and Chan‐Kang 
(2005), the inverse relationship can be attributed to the differences in land use intensity, land 
fertility, and managerial factors. For Chinese smallholder farmers, the most important labor 
force is from the household members. With constraints of capital and labor supply, increasing 
the land size is likely to harm the profits because of inadequate investment. Particularly, 
Table A.4.2 shows that with the increase of land size, farmers tend to hire more labor and use 
less family labour. With the increasing cost of employing labor, the room for profit will 
decrease undoubtedly, given the homogeneous price level of apples to farmers.   
The apple quality exerts a positive effect on the profits/mu at the 1% level. It is intuitively 
reasonable that the higher the quality of apples the farmer produces, the more profits the 
farmer can get due to securing comparatively better prices. Similarly, the incomes from apple 
production in 2009 have a significantly positive impact on the profits. Better access to cash 
and credit can increase the probability to adopt new technologies and increase inputs, which 
can possibly improve profits from the production. The results confirm our hypothesis.   
None of the indicators of human capital or social capital has significant effect on the profits 
per unit area. This can be related to the attribute of apple production. Comparatively, apple 
production is more of capital-intensity than labour-intensity due to fertilizers and other input 
investment.  From the coefficient of the regional dummy variable, we can learn that 
compared with farmers in Shandong Province, farmers in Shaanxi Province have both lower 
yields and profits from apples per unit area on average. The result implies that farmers in 
Shandong have a higher productivity than farmers in Shaanxi. Possible reasons can be 
                                                 
1 According to Wicklin (2011), there are two common ways to handle negative values when one wants to log-transform the 
data. Solution 1 is to translate and then transform. The common technique is to add a constant value to the data prior to 
applying the log transform. Solution 2 is to handle negative values by marking them as missing values. Here we choose 
Solution 2.  
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multifaceted, for instance, differences in physical environment and orchard management 
skills and experience.  
4.6.4 Yields and profits: group specific effects of input use  
From the cross terms of the dummy variable for membership and the variables of various 
inputs shown in Table 4.3, we can learn the pathways how the different effects of the inputs 
on both yield/mu and profit/mu bring about for both the member and non-member group. The 
main findings are as follows. 
Firstly, the application of fertilizers positively affects both the yield and profits per unit area 
for the member group, but has no significant effects on either yield or profit for the non-
member group. Secondly, inputs of hired labour and self-labour exert significantly positive 
impacts on members’ yields, but no significant impact on non-members’ yields. Furthermore, 
the input of hired labor has a bigger and more significant effect on the profit/mu for the 
member group than for the non-member group. In contrast, the coefficient of pesticide costs 
is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for non-members’ yields, but insignificant 
for members’.  
The results can be explained by the effects of cooperative service on apple farmers’ 
production practices. As explained in the Conceptual Framework presented in Figure 1, 
cooperatives can improve farmers’ access to both input and output markets, which may allow 
members to obtain inputs with cheaper prices and of better quality. This access can thereby 
lead to changes both in the quality and quantity of inputs used by farmers. Furthermore, 
cooperatives offer specific trainings, technical assistance and other extension services of 
production, which can influence the production practice of member farmers. For example, 
member farmers may apply specific kind of fertilizers at specific times during the apple 
growth period according to the suggestions or guides of the cooperative. This specific 
practice may lead to changes in both the quality and quantity of apple outputs.  
Similarly, cooperatives also advise members to use different types of pesticides during 
production, mainly due to the specific requirements of pesticide practices determined by a 
certain production certification (e.g. organic products) or some buyers’ stringent requirements 
of the pesticide residues on apples in response to the increasing food safety concern. These 
pesticides can usually be less toxic and thus probably less effective than traditional pesticides. 
Members, therefore, are probably inefficient in pesticide use. This notion may explain the 
insignificant effect of pesticides on the yield improvement for members. 
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In summary, the services provided by the cooperative can make a difference both in the 
quality and quantity of the used inputs for apple production, which result in the difference in 
effectiveness and efficacy of inputs used. Hence, the outputs (yields and profits) are different 
between the two groups. Our previous assumptions have been confirmed by the results. 
4.6.5 Estimating treatment effects 
We estimate the treatment effects of membership on the yield/mu and the profits/mu from 
apple production by measuring ATET, ATUT and ATE, which are presented in Table 4.4. 
More detailed results of treatment effects can be found in Table A.4.3 and Table A.4.4 in 
Appendix. We can learn that ATET (in percentage) for the yield/mu is 7.84%, which means 
that if the members had not participated in the cooperatives, their average yield/mu would 
have been 7.84% lower, keeping other variables constant. ATEU is 5.50%, which means that 
non-member farmers could have gained an increase of 5.50% in the yield/mu had they 
participated in the cooperatives, keeping other variables constant. ATE is 3.51%, meaning the 
predicted yield/mu of the treatment group (member farmers) is 3.51% more than that of the 
control group (non-member farmers) on average.  
Table 4.4 Treatment effect of cooperative membership on apple yield/mu and profits/mu 
 Treatment effect Contrast (members vs non-members) 
 ATET ATET in % ATEU ATEU in % ATE ATE in % 
yield/mu 0.57** 7.84** 0.54* 5.50* 0.56** 3.51** 
profits/mu -0.44 -0.23 -0.46 -3.30 -0.45 1.29 
Note: ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
As for the treatment effects on the profits/mu, however, we can learn that neither ATET, 
ATEU nor ATE is statistically significant. Therefore, we can conclude that the treatment 
effect of membership on the profits/mu from apple production is not different from zero.  
The significantly positive treatment effect of membership on the apple yield can be explained 
through the difference between members and non-members in the effectiveness and efficacy 
of input used for production, which has been explained in the previous section.  
The possible reason for the insignificant treatment effect of membership on the profits from 
apple production lies in the difference between the value of extra outputs and the extra cost of 
inputs. We can generally conclude that member farmers make more investment in inputs than 
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non-members from Table 4.2, especially in fertilizers and hired labour. With the increasing 
prices of fertilizers, pesticides and other inputs in the domestic market, namely the labour 
costs, the gained profits from the extra yields may not cover the extra input costs. Therefore, 
even though the members have a higher average yield/mu than non-members, their profit 
from apple production per mu is not significantly different from their counterparts.  
4.6.6 Robustness checks  
As a robustness check, we estimate the determinants of yields and profits by using ETRM 
without cross terms of membership and input variables (Table A.4.5) and 2SLS (Table 
A.4.6), respectively. 
The estimation coefficients of membership by using ETRM without cross terms are its ATE 
on yields and profits, respectively. We learn that the ATE estimate of membership on yields 
is 0.61, which is significantly different from zero. However, the ATE estimate of membership 
on profits is -0.49, which is not statistically significant. The results are essentially the same as 
the ones produced by ETRM with cross terms. Furthermore, the other coefficient estimates 
also have similar signs and significant levels. 
Compared with the ETRM estimates, we find that the 2SLS coefficient estimates have similar 
signs and effects but are less efficient. This is also reflected in a smaller number of 
statistically significant parameters in the 2SLS compared to the ETRM. The results of the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of cooperative membership in the 2SLS are in line 
with the statistically significant correlation coefficient estimated by the ETRM presented in 
the bottom row of Table 4.4.  
For the robustness check of the treatment effect, we also estimate the treatment effects of 
membership with propensity score match method (PSM, Table A.4.7). By comparing the 
results produced by PSM and ETRM, we find that the coefficients are similar in significant 
levels, but are very different in magnitudes – the estimated ATE and ATET by PSM are way 
smaller than the ones estimated by ETRM. Note that PSM only control for observable 
heterogeneity. Neglecting the unobservable results in underestimated treatment effects, which 
gives ETRM a comparative advantage. But the conclusions that we draw from the PSM are in 
line with the ones from the ETRM.  
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4.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
To further explore the answer to the question how agricultural cooperatives affect farmers’ 
welfare, we have analyzed the effect of cooperative membership on the yield and the profits 
from apple production. We find that although cooperative membership has significantly 
positive treatment effects on the apple yield, it has no significant treatment effect on the 
profits. The empirical analysis is based on the field survey data of 551 apple farm households 
in Shaanxi and Shandong, China.  
Using ETRM approach, we examine the pathways through which cooperative membership 
produces differences between the member and non-member groups in yields and profits. We 
find that distinctions both in the use levels and productivities of fertilizers and hired labours 
input mainly contribute to the differences.  
Due to the production trainings and other services provided by the cooperatives, on the one 
hand, the two groups can have differences in both effectiveness and efficacy of inputs use. 
Benefited (from the training) members can have higher yields than non-members in general. 
On the other hand, members tend to invest more on inputs than non-members. With the 
increasing labour prices and other inputs, the gains from the extra yields do not cover the 
extra costs. Therefore, even though the members have a higher average apple yield than non-
members, their profits from apple production per mu is not significantly different from their 
counterparts.  
Owing to data limitations, we analyze this question mainly from the input aspect, without 
considering the external market environment. For the same reason, we estimate the treatment 
effect of membership on the yield and profits per unit area by comparing the member and 
non-member groups based on the cross-sectional data. If panel data were available, we could 
not only control for farmer-specific factors that affects both dependent and explanatory 
variables, but allow to compare ex-ante with ex-post (participating in cooperatives) among 
farmers to gain a deeper insight into the treatment effects and the corresponding reasons. 
Most of the existing research indicates that the cooperative exerts a positive effect on farmer 
incomes (Sauer, et al., 2012, Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014b, Ma and Abdulai, 2016). Our 
research puts a question mark to this statement. The Chinese government has been 
implementing policies to develop modern agricultural sector by promoting farmers to 
participate in farmer cooperatives and to foster other new types of agricultural business 
entities since 2012. The conclusion from the paper suggests a negative side-effect of this 
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policy and makes us ponder over the problem. Meanwhile, our conclusion brings about other 
further questions: since cooperatives cannot increase farmers’ profits effectively, what is the 
rationality for farmers’ participation and continuation in cooperatives? Can Chinese 
cooperatives develop sustainably? Given the effect of cooperatives on farmers’ production 
practices, especially the use of fertilizers, further research may focus on the impacts of 
policies promoting farmers’ cooperative and the related policies on environmental and food 
quality issues.   
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Appendix 4.1 
Table A.4.1 Estimation of treatment equation for the model of profits/mu 
Variable Name Coefficients 
land size 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
(land size)2 -0.0001*** 
(0.00) 
 
specialization -0.45*
(0.28) 
 
quality  0.52 
(0.37) 
 
income_2009(log) 0.03 
(0.03) 
 
non-farm  -0.05 
(0.17) 
gender  -0.33 
(0.41) age  0.00 
(0.01) education  0.03 
(0.03) training  0.12*** 
(0.04) skill level 0.28*** 
(0.09) village cadre 0.26* 
(0.15) 
loss 0.16 
(0.12) region 0.02 
(0.13) constant -1.14 
(0.89) No. of observations 528 
Note:             ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Appendix 4.2 
Table A.4.2 Correlation of input with land size 
Input variables Correlation P-value 
fertilizer 0.01 0.77 
pesticide 0.07 0.11 
hired labour 0.39 0.00*** 
family labour -0.19 0.00*** 
total labour 0.06 0.19 
irrigation 0.02 0.58 
Note:             ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 4.3 
Table A.4.3 Average treatment effect of cooperative membership on yield 
  Membership decision  
  Participation (Treatment=1) Non-participation (Treatment=0) 
Farmer subsample 
#Mean yield/mu1 S.E. #Mean yield/mu2 S.E. 
Members 8.18 0.02 8.10 0.02 
Non-members 8.10 0.03 8.05 0.02 
Difference in % 7.84%** 0.03 5.50%*3 0.03 
Note:    ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
             S.E. stands for standard errors. 
               #The yield/mu shown are predictions based on the coefficients estimated with the endogenous treatment regression 
model (ETRM). As the dependent variables in ETRM outcome equations are the logarithms of yield/mu and profits/mu 
respectively, the predictions are also given in log forms. Converting the means back to original numbers would lead to 
inaccuracies, due to the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means (AM-GM inequality) (Kabunga, et al., 2012). 
 
Appendix 4.4 
Table A.4.4 Average treatment effect of cooperative membership on profits/mu from apple production 
 
Membership decision 
 
Participation (Treatment=1) No-participation (Treatment=0) 
Farmer subsample #Mean profits/mu4 S.E. #Mean profits/mu5 S.E. 
Members 8.75 0.02 8.60 0.02 
Non-members 8.75 0.03 8.64 0.03 
Difference in % -0.23% 0.04 -3.30%6 0.04 
Note:    S.E. denotes standard errors. 
                    # Please check the note in Table A.4.5. 
            ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
                                                 
 
1 The mean yield/mu when the treatment is received. 
2 The mean yield/mu when the treatment is not received. 
3 5.33% is the average treatment effect of yield/mu on the untreated group (non-member farmers) in percentage. 
4 The mean net incomes/mu when the treatment is received. 
5 The mean net incomes/mu when the treatment is not received. 
6 -3.01% is the average treatment effect of profits/mu on the untreated group (non-member farmers) in 
percentage. 
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Appendix 4.5 
 Table A.4.5 Estimation results, endogenous treatment regression model (without cross terms) 
 
Variable 
Name 
Outcome equations Treatment equations 
Coefficients (log yield) 
(Standard Errors). 
Coefficients (log profits) 
(Standard Errors). 
Coefficients (membership) 
(Standard Errors). 
 fruit_year  0.05
*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-- 
 square_fy -0.001
** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-- 
 dwarf rootstock 0.05 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
-- 
 land size -0.02
*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 (land size)2 0.0001
*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00) 
 plots -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 specialization -- -0.24 
(0.17) 
-0.39 
(0.26) 
 quality  -- 1.23
*** 
(0.23) 
0.86** 
(0.32) 
 
income_2009 (log) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
 non-farm  -0.01 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
-- 
 gender  0.04 
(0.19) 
-0.15 
(0.24) 
-0.39 
(0.39) 
age  0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
education  0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
 training  -- -- 0.10
*** 
(0.03) 
 skill level 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
-- 
 membership(M) 0.61
*** 
(0.19) 
-0.49 
(0.25) 
-- 
 village cadre -0.10
* 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
 log_fertilizer 
0.07** 
(0.04) 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
 
 
log_pesticide 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
 
 
log_hirelabour 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
 
-- 
log_famlylabour 
0.05 
(0.04) 
 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
 
 
-- 
irrigation 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
 
bagging 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
 
 
weather 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-- 
 loss -- -- 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
 
distance -- -- 
0.00 
(0.01) 
 region -0.26
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.35*** 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
 
organisation -- -- 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
 test -- -- -0.14 
(0.12) 
 constant 
6.02*** 
(0.48) 
6.66*** 
(0.68) 
-1.39* 
(0.79) 
  -0.53
** 
(0.15) 
0.48** 
(0.17) 
-- 
 Wald 2 4.33** 4.52** -- 
 
No. of observations 551 528 551 
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Appendix 4.6 
Table A.4.6 2SLS regression results 
Variable 
Name 
Outcome equations 
Coefficients (log yield) 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficients (log profits) 
Standard Deviation 
fruit_year  0.05
*** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
square_fy -0.001
*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
dwarf rootstock 0.01 (0.11) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
land size -0.02
*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
(land size)2 0.0001
*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
plots -0.01 (0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
specialization -- -0.21 (0.18) 
quality  -- 1.22
*** 
(0.25) 
income_2009 (log) 0.02 (0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
non-farm  0.03 (0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
gender  0.13 (0.23) 
-0.24 
(0.28) 
age  0.00 (0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
education  0.00 (0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
skill level -0.05 (0.06) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
membership(M) 0.90
** 
(0.43) 
-0.82 
(0.58) 
village cadre -0.13 (0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
 log_fertilizer 0.06 (0.04) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
log_pesticide 0.04 (0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
log_familylabour 0.06 (0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
log_hirelabour 0.13
*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
irrigation -0.01 (0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
bagging -0.01 (0.05) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
weather -0.04 (0.08) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
region -0.33
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.30* 
(0.13) 
constant 6.25
*** 
(0.57) 
6.37*** 
(0.76) 
2 (Durbin) 4.99** 3.00* 
F (Wu-Hausman) 4.81** 3.00* 
No. of observations 551 528 
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Appendix 4.7 
Table A.4.7 Treatment effect of cooperative membership on apple yield/mu and profits/mu (estimated by PSM） 
 Treatment effect Contrast (members vs non-members) 
 ATET ATE 
yield/mu 0.14** 0.13** 
profits/mu -0.07 0.02 
Note: ***, ** and * denote the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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 Cooperative member commitment, trust and social pressure: The 
role of members’ participation in the decision-making1 
Abstract 
Member commitment concerns cooperatives’ viability and success. Though separate research 
about the antecedents of member commitment has been done, systematic research into 
member commitment within agricultural cooperatives is rare, especially the way how these 
antecedents (or correlates) affect member commitment. Using a sample of 391 farmer 
cooperative members in China, this study investigates whether trust in the cooperative 
leadership and social pressure affect cooperative member commitment and the mechanism by 
which these two antecedents exert effect on member commitment by employing structural 
equation models. Our study finds that both trust and social pressure are positively associated 
with three components of member commitment – affective commitment, continuance 
commitment and normative commitment in a direct way. Furthermore, trust influences 
affective commitment indirectly via the partial mediator of member participation. Generally, 
these findings provide an empirical evidence on the important role of the cooperative 
chairperson in Chinese cooperatives and on the influence of social pressure with Chinese 
characteristics in maintaining cooperative membership.  
Key words 
Member commitment, trust, social pressure, member participation  
                                                 
1 Unpublished paper by Jinghui Hao, Jos Bijman and Wim Heijman. 
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 5.1 Introduction  
Organizational commitment reduces withdrawal cognition and turnover behaviors and 
increases positive performances of both employees and organizations (Meyer et al., 2002). In 
the cooperative context, member commitment concerns a cooperative’s viability. Particularly 
at an early stage of collective action, member commitment is an essential input for 
organizations to succeed (Tadesse and Kassie, 2017). Member commitment maintains 
membership and trade volumes even when transactions become more unstable and 
opportunities to reorganize show up (Fulton, 1999). Lacking member commitment can lead to 
the demise of the cooperative. However, not much attention has been paid to research about 
member commitment in cooperative settings.   
Member commitment has not been uniformly conceptualized (Klein et al., 2009). Mowday et 
al. (1979, p.226) defined organization commitment as “the relative strength of an individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization”. Following the more recent 
organizational commitment literature (Meyer, et al., 2002; Solinger et al., 2008), member 
commitment is defined as an attitude towards the organization or towards a behaviour 
involving the organization (Cechin et al., 2013).  
Important advances have been made regarding distinguishing the mind-sets leading to 
commitment. We can gain some insights about the antecedents and correlates of member 
commitment in cooperative settings from both quantitative and qualitative studies of 
commitment. The antecedents of member commitment include economic and social factors, 
such as the price of the product or service provided by the cooperative and trust (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2001; Mayer and Gavin, 2005). Besides, organizational factors, for example, 
being a member of the board of directors, can also influence member commitment to the 
cooperative (Cechin, et al., 2013). In addition, commitment is affected by the degree of 
membership heterogeneity and the way how the property rights are defined and allocated 
within the cooperative (Bijman and Verhees, 2011).   
Most of the research referred above is based on the three-component model of commitment 
proposed by Allen and Meyer (1990). According to Allen and Meyer, different components 
of commitment correlate with different factors. For instance, affective commitment is 
correlated with the comfortable feelings with the individual’s role and competence in the 
organization, while continuance commitment is related to the individual’s perception with 
regard to the alternative availability and the particular investment made within the 
97 
 
organization. However, there is very little empirical research that systematically investigates 
the factors contributing to the different mind-sets of member commitment from the 
perspectives of both member characteristics and organization characteristics. By examining 
the antecedents of member commitment from both perspectives of members and 
cooperatives, we can gain a better insight into the means of maintaining and improving 
member commitment under the cooperative settings. 
 
5.2 Background 
China is deeply influenced by Confucian philosophy. The Chinese society is emphasized by a 
strong respect for hierarchy to preserve harmonious interpersonal relationships  (Li and Sun, 
2015). Chinese society (mainland China) is also characterized by high power-distance and 
collectivism. Saving face culture is a byproduct of Confucianism and collectivism and 
influences Chinese’s ways of thinking and behavior. Hofstede (2001, p.211) suggests that “in 
the collectivistic Chinese society, the individual is not inner-directed at all but controlled by a 
need for not losing face.”  Saving face culture emphasizes that not only does an individual’s 
own face matter, but others’ also do (Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003). Mutual-face is one of 
the most important concerns for Chinese’s social life, which can be social pressure sometimes 
for individuals’ social life.  
Entrepreneurial farmers play an important role not only in developing modern agriculture but 
also farmers’ cooperatives in China. Liang and Hendrikse (2013) find that entrepreneurial 
farmers, who usually have more capital and better capabilities with social or professional 
networks than common farmers, play a critical role in the initiation of cooperatives. These 
initiators are usually the leaders (or chairpersons) of the cooperatives. Leaders play a critical 
role in the organisation. Trust in the leaders inﬂuence the employees’ attitudes and 
commitment to the organisation and participation behaviours (Barling, et al., 2010, Paunova, 
2015). 
Besides, members’ trust with cooperatives influences the performance and the success of 
cooperatives. Specifically, trust is supposed to be able to improve cooperation between 
individuals by enhancing communication and decreasing transaction costs (Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998). Trust can also reduce free-riding problems and facilitate collective action (Ostrom, 
2000), thus can improve members’ participation in the governance and commitment to the 
cooperative (Ole Borgen, 2001).  
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Although much research has been done on the antecedents of member commitment, there has 
been little systematic research into the member commitment to agricultural cooperatives, 
especially the way how these antecedents affect member commitment. Given the important 
role that leaders play in the cooperatives and the characteristics of Chinese culture, we focus 
on two factors -- trust in the cooperative leadership and social pressure. We examine the 
mechanism how trust and social pressure affect members’ commitment in Chinese 
cooperatives. Better understanding of the means through which trust and social pressure can 
enhance commitment is needed to clarify the relationships and thus allow to explore more 
effective means of improving member commitment.  
The objective of this study is twofold. First, we want to identify the antecedents of member 
commitment, especially the effect of trust and social pressure on member commitment. 
Second, we seek to examine the mechanism how trust and social pressure produce effect on 
member commitment. 
 
5.3 Theoretical Framework 
Commitment has been discussed under different settings. The four most important settings 
include commitment in marketing relationship between buyers and sellers, organizational 
commitment between employees and employers, commitment to associations or clubs 
between members and associations and member commitment to cooperatives between 
members and their cooperatives (Sloot, 2016). Specifically, organizational commitment has 
received more attention than the other three kinds of commitment.  
We build our theoretical framework on Meyer and Allen’s (1991) three-component model of 
organizational commitment. Organizational commitment theories can be applied to member 
commitment to cooperatives to some extent. Both organizational commitment and 
cooperative commitment is about the connections between individuals and the organizations 
they belong to. Cooperatives are business organizations. Farmers participate in cooperatives 
to realize their business objects, for example, to improve their market status by joint forces. 
Besides, organizational commitment theories try to explain the employees’ motivations and 
reasons for being committed to organizations, which is in line with our research objectives of 
cooperative commitment in this aspect.  
Allen and Meyer (1990) conceptualize and measure the commitment in three different 
components: affective commitment, continuance commitment and normative commitment. 
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Affective commitment refers to an individual’s identification with and involvement in the 
organization. Individuals with a strong affective commitment have positive emotion 
attachment to the organization. They stay within the organization because they want to do so. 
Normative commitment is obligation-based and is the result from personal internalization of 
normative pressures (Wiener, 1982). Individuals with a high level of normative commitment 
believe that staying within an organization is a “right” and moral thing to do. They feel 
obliged to stay (Meyer and Allen, 1991). Continuance commitment reflects that individuals 
are aware of the costs associated with leaving the organization. Members with high level of 
continuance commitment stay within the organization because they do not want to bear the 
cost of leaving.   
5.3.1 The antecedents of commitment 
Meyer and Allen (1991) think that given the conceptual differences of the three components 
of commitment, the antecedents of the psychological states reflecting the three components of 
commitment are different. Individuals who feel competent to meet job challenges and clear 
and comfortable with their role in the organization tend to have affective commitment to the 
organization. Alternatives and side bets are important antecedents of continuance 
commitment (Stanley et al., 2013). Less research about normative commitment has been done 
than about the other two components of commitment and most of the studies are based on 
theoretical rather than empirical analysis. The antecedents for normative commitment thus 
have not been indicated specifically by empirical research.  
Meyer, et al. (2002) have categorized the antecedents of commitment are into four groups: 
demographic characteristics, individual differences, work experiences and 
alternatives/investments. However, other antecedents of commitment may be also important, 
such as social environment factors and organizational factors.  
Organizational culture is a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organization’s 
members. These beliefs and expectations produce norms that powerfully shape the behavior 
of individuals and groups (Schwartz and Davis, 1981). Given the deep influence of Confucius 
culture on Chinese’s beliefs and behaviors, cultural factors, e.g. social pressure, should not be 
neglected. Another focus of antecedent of member commitment is trust (in the leadership) 
given the fact that chairpersons play an important role in the development of Chinese 
cooperatives. 
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As regards to the organizational factors, Morris and Steers’ (1980) empirical research about 
the relationship of several aspects of organization structure with organizational commitment 
suggests that organizational structure should be included as one important variable in 
estimating factors influencing organizational commitment. According to their research, 
variables of organization structures represent structural properties of the organization 
including decentralization, work group size and other aspects. Organizational structure does 
not only refer to the organization’s physical composition (e.g. group size), but also the 
organization’s internal governance, which refers to structures and processes of decision-
making within organizations (Jones, 2013; Bijman et al., 2014). 
Trust   
Though a concise and widely accepted definition of trust remains elusive, trust can 
fundamentally be conceptualized as a psychological state. Trust is characterized as a state of 
perceived vulnerability or risk, which derives from an individual’s uncertainty about the 
dependents’ motive, intentions and prospective actions (Kramer, 1999). According to 
Robinson (1996), trust is a person’s beliefs about the other’s future actions to be beneficial, at 
least not harmful, to one’s interest. In the cooperative settings, members’ vulnerability 
towards the cooperative can be understood in view of their dependence on the latter in terms 
of revenue and information (Borgen, 2001; Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). It is this uncertainty 
about the behavior of one of the parties of the exchange which makes trust a determinant of 
the attitudes and behaviors of the other party (Kollock, 1994). Trust in the cooperative affects 
both members’ participation in the cooperative governance and commitment to the 
cooperative. 
According to Salancik and Pfeffer (1978), individual attitudes and behaviors can be predicted 
by studying the informational and social environment where attitude forms and behavior 
occurs and adapts. The existing research has indicated the important influence of social and 
cultural environment on human behaviors (Carter, 2013).  
Latane (1981) defines social impact as any influence on individual feelings, thoughts, or 
behavior that is exerted by the real, implied, or imagined presence or actions of others, which 
indicates the influence of social environment in shaping the participants. We define social 
pressure here as personal concerns with the negative impact of factors relating to the social 
environment and local culture on the person’s feelings, thoughts and behaviors. Social 
pressure is a narrow and personal interpretation of social norms in this sense.  
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Due to China’s Confucian legacy, the interpersonal relationship (or guanxi) is the most 
important characteristic of China society. Chinese tend to “view themselves interdependent 
with the surrounding social context” (Tsui and Farh, 1997, p.60) and thus value not only self-
face, but also others’ face. On the one hand, guanxi can be one’s important social capital. On 
the other hand, guanxi has become one of the social norms that Chinese follow in their social 
life. Concerns for guanxi and mutual-face with people in the same community influence 
Chinese’s attitude to both personal relationship and the relationship with organizations. These 
concerns can be social pressure and affect individuals’ choices sometimes.  
Member Participation 
Morris and Steers (1980) find empirical evidence for a significant positive influence of 
organization structure on organization commitment and individuals’ perceived participation 
in the decision making. Though views diverge on how to define participation in a group 
(Agarwal, 2001), here we specify member participation as the member’s participation in the 
decision-making process within the cooperative.  
The importance of membership participation for the cooperative is determined by the 
characteristics of cooperatives -- a cooperative is owned, controlled and patronized by its 
members.  First, members’ participation in the decision making can help to realize members’ 
control over the cooperative. In addition to the capital provided by the cooperative members, 
cooperatives are also financed by a fairly amount of unallocated equity capital (Dunn, 1988). 
Second, members’ participation relates to the core element of the cooperative – the principle 
of democracy. Participating in the decision-making process allow members to voice their 
opinions. When their voice is not valued or heard, they may choose to terminate membership.  
5.3.2 Hypotheses about the relationship among trust, member participation and member 
commitment  
Trust in cooperatives improves members’ participation in the governance (Borgen, 2001). 
Using data of Swedish farmers, Nilsson et al. (2009) have found confirmation for the claim 
that trust in the cooperative management is positively correlated with members’ involvement 
in the cooperative decision-making processes. We thus hypothesize that: 
H1: Trust in cooperatives improves member participate in the decision-making process.  
Trust induces commitment (Yilmaz and Hunt, 2001).  Jiang and Probst (2016) use data from 
1071 staff and administrative professionals at a large university and show that trust in 
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management is positively related to affective commitment. When the members trust their 
cooperatives, particularly regarding cooperatives’ ability, goodwill and honesty, member 
commitment tends to increase and identification with the cooperative becomes stronger 
(Jiménez et al., 2010). The possible cause is that people trusting each other can synchronize 
and work together constructively and thus can improve the decision quality and make 
problems solved effectively. This leads to increased commitment (Sholihin et al., 2011). 
Similarly, employees who trust the management are likely to be more committed to the 
organization (Laschinger et al., 2000). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Trust in cooperatives is positively associated with member commitment. 
Member commitment is related to member participation in the cooperative. Osterberg and 
Nilsson (2009) maintain that member participation in the cooperative decision-making 
process positively relates to members’ commitment to the cooperative. The more the 
members perceive that they participate in the governance of the cooperative governance, the 
more committed to the cooperative they are. Active member participation and member 
commitment makes cooperatives survive in the long run (Bhuyan, 2007). We thus 
hypothesize that： 
H3: Member participation is positively associated with member commitment. 
If H1, H2 and H3 are all supported in the subsequent empirical analyses, it will be reasonable 
to propose that member participation plays a mediating role between trust and member 
commitment. That is to say, not only does trust impact members’ commitment to 
cooperatives directly, but also indirectly via members’ participation in the decision-making 
process. 
Social pressure, member participation and member commitment 
Literatures on the relationship between social influence and participation can be found in 
research on community governance and community cooperation. Kandori (1992) points out 
that members in the community can observe each other’s behaviors and reactions. Social 
norms, particularly peer monitoring of complying to the norms and sanction rules within 
community, can force members to participate in community activities. We hypothesize that: 
H4: Social pressure leads to member participation. 
Given the distinctive characteristic of different components of commitment, we cannot make 
a uniform hypothesis about the relationship between local social pressure and member 
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commitment. When we consider the impact of social pressure on behavioral intentions, it is 
reasonable that the greater the pressure on members to conform to the community’s norms 
and objectives, the more burdensome members will feel. The burdensome feelings can be 
negative to affective commitment. Therefore, we hypothesis that: 
H5: Social pressure is negatively related to affective commitment. 
Community applies both awards and punishments to members depending on members’ 
behaviors which are either in accordance with or deviating from the social norms (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2002). Individuals’ socialization is reached by living by the social norms of one’s 
community and punishing when not complying. Social pressure and other social influences 
generate internalization and identification on community members (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 
2002). Social pressure thus has a positive influence on normative commitment.   
Hence, we hypothesize that:  
H6: Social pressure is positively related to normative commitment. 
Social pressure comes from individuals’ concerns about the negative effects exerted by 
guanxi. Destroying guanxi with others can affect individuals’ economic or other benefits and 
leaving cooperatives thus can make Chinese cooperative members to have a sense of loss. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H7: Social pressure is positively related to continuance commitment. 
The conceptual framework is presented in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 Conceptual framework 
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5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Research setting, subjects and design 
We conducted a survey among farm households in the Shaanxi Province in the Loess Plateau 
area and the Shandong Province in the Bohai Gulf area.  The survey was carried out between 
January and March 2015. A multistage sampling procedure was used for the selection of 
observation units. In the first stage, we used the probability proportional to size (PPS) method 
to select 7 counties (out of the 10 most important apple production counties) in Shaanxi and 8 
counties (out of the 10 most important apple production counties) in Shandong according to 
the size of apple production in 2014. In the second stage, we asked the Agricultural Bureau in 
each county for the list of apple cooperatives in the county; 5 cooperatives were randomly 
selected from those lists. Therefore, in total we first selected 75 cooperatives. However, 12 
out of the 75 selected cooperatives could not be reached. Therefore, we dropped these 12 
cooperatives from our sample resulting in a final sample of 63 cooperatives that were 
interviewed (30 in Shaanxi and 33 in Shandong). We did face-to-face interviews with the 
chairperson or other officials involved in cooperative management. Data about the 
cooperative (e.g. number of members, initiation) were collected. Members were also 
interviewed individually and information about the demographical and farm characteristics 
was collected, such as age, education, farm size and asset investments, and attitude towards 
cooperatives and towards colleagues. 429 member households were interviewed. Due to the 
missing information, 38 out of the 429 were removed from the sample and data about 391 
members were used in the analysis.   
5.4.2 Measures 
Member Commitment  
Despite the theoretical and practical importance of commitment to an organization, its 
measurement is difficult. As mentioned in the previous part, member commitment is 
generally measured in two ways, either by behaviors or by attitudes. For instance, 
commitment is usually measured using proxy variables such as financial contribution to the 
cooperative or selling outputs to the cooperative. Even though these proxies measure certain 
forms of commitment, sometimes contributions are mandatory, and members sell to the 
cooperative not because they are committed, rather they have no option. Hence, measuring 
commitment through behavior is less appropriate.   
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Following the more recent organizational commitment literature (Solinger, et al., 2008; 
Cechin, et al., 2013), member commitment is defined as members’ attitudinal commitment to 
the organization. Our measurement is based on the well-established three-component model 
by Allen and Meyer (1990) and Meyer et al. (2002)    (pp. 20-52), v.i.z. affective, normative, 
and continuance commitment. We adapted the items to the farmer cooperative context.  
The affective component is believed to be an emotional attachment to an organization, so that 
the strongly committed member identifies with the organization. The normative component 
refers to members’ sense of obligation to remain with the organization. The continuance 
component corresponds to a lack of choices and when leaving it would entail the loss of 
acquired advantages for members.  
Responses to the statements about members’ attitudes towards cooperatives were made on a 
5-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree). The resulting instrument 
yielded 12 separate commitment constructs measuring the three bases of affective, 
continuance, and normative commitment. The following three items are examples of the 
modification: (1) “I will feel proud if the cooperative is developing successfully.” (Affective 
Commitment); (2) “It would be economically costly for me to leave my cooperative.” 
(Continuance Commitment); and (3) “Jumping from this cooperative to other organization 
seems unethical to me.” (Normative Commitment). Column 4 in Table 2 lists the reliability 
coefficients for the 12 commitment constructs. All coefficient alphas are above 0.70 except 
Normative Commitment that is at 0.56. These alphas are acceptable given the early stages of 
research with these constructs (Nunnally, 1978). Additionally, the results of exploratory 
factor analysis indicate that the items for Affective Commitment, Continuance Commitment 
and Normative Commitment load nicely onto a single latent factor, respectively. The 
construct validity will be discussed in the measurement model estimations.  
Trust 
Here we conceptualize trust as trust in the leadership, which is defined as members’ 
confidence in the leader person’s motives with respect to matters relevant to the members’ 
benefits and leaders’ abilities of dealing with cooperative business.  
The chairperson plays an important role both in the initiation and the operation of a Chinese 
farmer cooperative. Chairpersons’ capability in information collection and marketing affects 
the viability and development of the cooperative (Liang and Hendrikse, 2013). Given the 
critical role of the cooperative chairperson, we thus measure members’ trust with the 
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cooperative by measuring their trust in the chairperson. For example, trust in the 
chairperson’s character (“I trust in the co-op chairperson’s character.), trust in the 
chairperson’s management capability (“I trust in the chairperson’s management ability.”) and 
members’ self-evaluation with the trustworthiness of the cooperative in general (“The co-op 
has a good reputationof being reliable.”). The scale reliability test shows that all coefficient 
alphas are above 0.70 and the results of exploratory factor analysis indicate that the items for 
trust load nicely onto a single latent factor.  
Social pressure  
Interpersonal relationship (or guanxi) is one of the most important components of Chinese 
social values. Guanxi is double-edged and it does not only benefit parties involved, but can 
also become social pressure for one party because of the high expectation from the others (Qi, 
2013). We have five statements to depict the social pressure within Chinese society context. 
(1) The reason why I stay in the cooperative is that social pressure forces me to do so. (2) My 
relationship with other members will be disturbed if I quit the cooperative. (3) Since most of 
the villagers have joined the cooperative, I will be isolated if I exit. (4) I will feel 
embarrassed if I go to the chairperson and tell him/her that I want to quit. (5) I worry that I 
will make the chairperson lose face if I quit. The coefficient alphas of these five items are 
around 0.80. The exploratory factor analysis indicates that the items for social pressure nicely 
load onto a single latent factor.  
Member participation 
The levels of participation range from nominal membership to dynamic interactive process in 
which the disadvantaged have voice and influence in the decision-making (White, 1996).  
Here the participation refers to participation in the decision-making process. We generally 
follow the participation typology (see Table 5.1) proposed by Agarwal (2001), where the 
participation levels are defined by the extent of people’s activeness. 
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Table 5.1 Typology of member participation in the decision-making 
Form/level of participation Characteristic features  
Nominal participation Merely membership in the group. 
Passive participation 
Attending meetings and listening in on decision making, without speaking 
up. 
Consultative participation 
Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee of 
influencing the decisions. 
Active participation Fully expressing opinions, whether solicited or not. 
Note: This is a modified version of the typology presented in Agarwal (2001). 
 
Other variables about organizational structure 
Besides members’ participation in the decision making process, other aspects of organization 
structure are also taken into account, for example, organization’s internal governance, which 
refers to structures and processes of decision-making within organizations (Bijman, et al., 
2014). Therefore, we include variables of whether the member has shares in the cooperative, 
whether the cooperative distributes dividends to members, and whether the board of directors 
are democratically elected. Other variables about organization’s physical composition (e.g. 
group size) and whether there are constraints for members to exit the cooperative are also 
included.  
Control variables and other variables 
Control variables include members’ demographical and household characteristics, for 
example, gender, age, education, farm size and household size. According to Baumeister and 
Leary (1995), members of strongly cohesive groups are more inclined to participate readily 
and to stay with the group. Thus self-evaluated group cohesiveness is included for both 
participation and member commitment models. We measure group cohesion by two 
indicators – members’ concern about the cooperative’s future development and the self-
evaluation of the cooperative’s problem solving abilities. Additionally, we also include 
variables of members’ satisfaction with the service provided by the cooperative. The member 
satisfaction is indicated by the farmer on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very satisfied to 
very unsatisfied.  
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Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the measurements of different latent constructs 
and other variables used in the analyses.   
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Table  5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Note: “na” denotes not applicable. S.D. denotes standard deviations. 
Variable 
name 
Mean (S.D.) 
Reliability 
coefficient 
α  
Scale 
reliability 
coefficient 
Description 
age 51.793 (8.077) na na Age of the household head 
education 8.440 (2.918) na na Education years of the household head 
village 
cadre 
0.258 (0.438) na na 
Whether the household head or other family member has the 
work experience of being the village cadre. (0=no) 
housesize 3.775 (1.372) na na Household size 
non-farm 0.102 (0.320) na na 
Whether the household participates in the non-farm work (0=no; 
1=yes) 
land 8.181 (7.386) na na size of land bearing fruits (unit: mu) 
share 0.148 (0.356) na na whether have shares in the co-op (0=no; 1=yes) 
dividends 0.138 (0.345) na na whether the coop have dividends (0=no; 1=yes) 
BoD 0.404 (0.491) na na 
Whether the Board of Directors are democratically elected (0=no; 
1=yes) 
exit 0.100 (0.300) na na Whether there is constraint to exit the co-op (0=no; 1=yes) 
satisfaction 4.043 (0.917) na na 
degree of satisfaction with the coop in general (in Likert scale: 1= 
very unsatisfied; 5= very satisfied) 
land_coop 3995.9 (5581.8) na na The total land size of the members and the co-op (unit: mu) 
region 0.483 (0.500) na na Regional dummy (Shandong=0; Shaanxi=1) 
cohesion1 2.637 (1.334) na na Members care little about the co-op’s future development. 
cohesion2 4.202 (1.001) na na The members can generally solve the problems together. 
trust1 4.455 (0.884) 0.722 
0.812 
I trust in the co-op chairman's character. 
trust2 4.320 (1.046) 0.722 I trust in the chairman's management ability. 
trust3 4.189 (1.043) 0.779 The co-op has great reputations of being reliable. 
Pressure1 2.059 (1.271) 0.742 
0.812 
The reason why I stay in the co-op is that social pressure forced 
me to do so. 
Pressure2 2.315 (1.398) 0.755 
My relationship with the members will be disturbed if I quit the 
co-op membership. 
Pressure3 2.223 (1.347) 0.738 
Since the majority of the villagers have joined in the co-op, I will 
be isolated if I exit. 
Pressure4 2.049 (1.230) 0.814 
I worry that I will make the chairman to feel lose face if I want to 
quit. 
AC1 4.005 (1.114) 0.741 
0.774 
I will treat the co-op business as my own. 
AC3 4.090 (1.125) 0.669 
I don't think that I could become as emotionally 
attached to another co-op as this one. 
AC4 4.317 (0.884) 0.678 I feel that the members are like my families. 
CC1 3.437 (1.448) 0.800 
0.800 
It would be very economically costly for me to leave my co-op. 
CC2 3.816 (1.280) 0.696 I can have stable marketing channels if I stay in the co-op. 
CC3 3.693 (1.325) 0.703 I can sell my apples with higher prices if I stay in the co-op. 
CC4 4.279 (1.063) 0.790 
I can have better access to market information if I stay in the co-
op. 
NC1 3.453 (1.447) 0.801 
0.772 
Jumping from this co-op to other organization seems unethical to 
me. 
NC2 4.271 (0.935) 0.667 
I believe that loyalty is important and therefore I feel a sense of 
moral obligation. 
NC3 4.115 (1.137) 0.594 I was taught to remain loyal when I was young. 
participation 2.463 (1.092) na na 
Self-evaluated levels of participating in the decision-making 
process:1=Membership in the group; 
2=Attending meetings and listening in on decision making, 
without speaking up 
3=Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee 
of influencing the decisions 
4=Fully expressing opinions, whether or not solicited 
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5.5 Analysis, results and discussions 
To test the hypothesis, structural equation modeling (SEM) methods are used for the analysis 
with STATA 14.0. SEM simultaneously examines both measurement and structural 
equations. The measurement equation identifies the relationship between the indicators and 
the constructs (or latent variables) they represent (Bollen and Long, 1992). The structural 
equation specifies the relationships among constructs. Though these two equations can be 
estimated together, they should be interpreted separately (Hulland, 1999). The estimates of 
measurement equations and structural equations are shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.5, 
respectively. 
Values of the indices measuring the overall model fit are all below the acceptance criteria. 
For affective commitment estimations, the values of root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is 0.031, comparative fit index (CFI) 0.969 and standardized root 
mean squared residual (SRMR) 0.031. For continuance commitment, the values for RMSEA, 
CFI and SRMR are 0.031, 0.967 and 0.033, respectively. For normative commitment, the 
values for RMSEA, CFI and SRMR are 0.048, 0.927 and 0.033, respectively. The results 
show that the SEM models fit the data well.  
5.5.1 Measurement model analysis 
The results reveal that all measures are significant at the 1% level and about or above the 0.60 
loading level. Loading with a minimum of 0.60 indicates that the measures account for at 
least 60 percent of the variance of the underlying latent variable (Chin, 1998). Furthermore, 
construct validity requires convergent and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010), which can 
be assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability statistics (CR) 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The values of AVE for the latent constructs are all above 0.5 and 
CR for the constructs are all above 0.7. These results thus confirm the good validity of the 
latent constructs. 
 
  
111 
 
Table 5.3 Estimation results from measurement models by using SEM 
Note:*** denotes the 1% significance level. CR and AVE are the abbreviations of composite reliability and average variance 
extracted, respectively.  
  
Construct Indicators Coefficient Standard Errors 
TRUST 
CR=0.88 
AVE=0.59 
trust1 0.785*** 0.027 
trust2 0.799*** 0.026 
trust3 0.722*** 0.031 
SOCIAL PRESSURE 
CR=0.88 
AVE=0.53 
Pressure1 0.788*** 0.029 
Pressure2 0.764*** 0.029 
Pressure3 0.762*** 0.031 
Pressure4 0.573*** 0.041 
AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT 
(AC) 
CR=0.86 
AVE=0.55 
AC1 0.717*** 0.031 
AC2 0.738*** 0.030 
AC3 
0.764*** 0.029 
CONTINUANCE 
COMMITMENT 
(CC) 
CR=0.88 
AVE=0.53 
CC1 0.589*** 0.037 
CC2 0.842*** 0.022 
CC3 0.836*** 0.022 
CC4 0.610*** 0.036 
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT 
(NC) 
CR=0.86 
AVE=0.55 
NC1 0.570*** 0.040 
NC2 0.806*** 0.031 
NC3 
0.826*** 0.036 
112 
 
5.5.2 Structural model analysis 
The structural model is applied to test the hypothesized relationships. In this study, we do 
step-by-step estimations by using SEM to test the effects of trust and social pressure on 
different components of member commitment and member participation, which also allows 
us to examine the role of participation in the relationship between trust, social pressure and 
member commitment. The results are presented in Table 5.4. 
First, we include only trust in the SEM to estimate the direct effect of trust on Affective 
Commitment (AC), Normative Commitment (NC) and Continuance Commitment (CC), 
respectively. The results are presented in the 3rd line of Panel A in Table 5.4. We learn that 
trust has a positive direct effect on AC, NC and CC, respectively (R2 is 0.438, 0.332 and 
0.174, respectively). Similarly, we also include only social pressure in SEM to estimate the 
direct effect of trust on AC, NC and CC, respectively. We conclude from the estimation 
results of social pressure (shown in the 3rd line of Panel B) that social pressure also has 
positive direct effect on AC, NC and CC. 
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Table 5.4 Estimates of direct and mediating effects of trust and social pressure on AC, NC and CC by using SEM 
  
Panel A: Direct effect, only including TRUST  
 AC NC CC 
Trust 0.662*** (0.042) 0.418*** (0.055) 0.576*** (0.045) 
R2 0.438 0.332 0.174 
    
Panel B: Direct effect, only including social pressure 
 AC NC CC 
Social pressure 0.147**(0.061) 0.330*** (0.055) 0.120** (0.059) 
R2 0.021 0.332 0.014 
 
Panel C: Effect of  trust on AC/NC/CC, respectively ( including both trust and participation as antecedents of AC/NC/CC ) 
 participation AC participation NC participation CC 
Trust 0.260***(0.05) 0.615***(0.04) 0.262***(0.05) 0.399***(0.05) 0.259***(0.05) 0.579***(0.04) 
participation -- 0.180***(0.04) -- 0.092*(0.055) -- -0.013 (0.050) 
Direct effect 1.602***(0.368) 1.130***(0.298) 1.723***(0 .410) 
Indirect effect 0.122***(0.034) 0.068*(0.042) -0.010 (0.039) 
Total effect 1.724***(0.372) 1.198***(0.298) 1.713***(0.412) 
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Note: *, **, *** denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are inside the brackets. 
 
Next, to test the role of member participation between trust and social pressure and different 
components of commitment, we include member participation and trust (or social pressure) 
as antecedents of AC, NC and CC, respectively based on the first step. The results are shown 
in Panel C and Panel D of Table 5.4, respectively.  
Panel C and Panel D show that trust has positive direct effect on both three components of 
commitment and member participation. In contrast, social pressure has insignificant direct 
effect on member commitment. Besides, both trust and social pressure exert significant 
indirect effects on both affective and normative commitment through member participation. 
Trust has no significant indirect effect on continuance commitment, but social pressure does.  
Thirdly, we conduct the full model estimations by including both trust and social pressure 
and other control variables. The results are shown in Table 5.5. The further decomposed 
effects of trust and social pressure on different components of commitment are shown in 
Table 5.6. From the estimated coefficients of trust for both participation equations and 
commitment equations and the computation of direct/indirect/total effects of trust on member 
commitment, we learn that trust has a positive direct effect on both member participation and 
the three components of member commitment.  
Trust has positive indirect effects only on affective commitment, but no significant indirect 
effect on either normative commitment or continuance commitment. However, the total effect 
Panel D: Effect of social pressure on AC/NC/CC (including social pressure and participation as antecedents of 
AC/NC/CC, respectively) 
 participation AC participation NC participation CC 
Social 
Pressure 
0.015 (0.033) 0.14**(0.059) 0.015 (0.05) 0.329***(0.05) 0.015(0.037) 0.118**(0.059) 
participation -- 0.336***(0.05) -- 0.169***(0.05) -- 0.133**(0.053) 
Direct effect 6.387 (14.635) 16.630 (55.159) 6.159 (16.046) 
Indirect effect 0.228***(0.039) 0.129***(0.043) 0.101**(0.042) 
Total effect 6.615 (14.636) 16.759 (55.161) 6.260 (16.047) 
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of trust on three components of member commitment is significant and positive (shown in 
Table 5.6), which confirms hypotheses H1 and H2. 
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Table 5.5 Estimation results of structural models: standardized estimates of affective commitment (AC), normative 
commitment (NC)continuance commitment (CC) and participation 
Explanator
y variables 
Participation AC Participation NC Participation CC 
coef. S. E. coef. S. E. coef. S. E. coef. S. E. coef. S. E. coef. S. E. 
age 0.068 0.053 0.103** 0.048 0.068 0.053 0.093* 0.054 0.068 0.053 -0.081 0.050 
education 0.099** 0.050 0.008 0.045 0.100** 0.050 -0.046 0.051 0.099 0.050 0.031 0.047 
village 
cadre 
0.055 0.052 -0.034 0.047 0.055 0.052 0.033 0.053 0.055 0.052 0.016 0.049 
non-farm -0.039 0.050 -0.022 0.045 -0.039 0.050 0.027 0.051 -0.039 0.050 -0.074 0.047 
land size 0.001 0.049 -0.055 0.044 0.001 0.049 -0.064 0.050 0.001 0.049 -0.007 0.046 
share 0.007 0.070 -0.021 0.062 0.007 0.070 0.006 0.070 0.008 0.070 -0.005 0.065 
dividends 0.059 0.070 0.040 0.063 0.059 0.070 0.053 0.071 0.058 0.070 0.014 0.066 
BoD 0.089* 0.049 -0.002 0.045 0.089* 0.049 0.013 0.050 0.089 0.049 0.089* 0.046 
exit -0.085* 0.048 0.009 0.044 -0.086* 0.048 -0.013 0.049 -0.085 0.048 -0.083* 0.046 
satisfication -0.017 0.056 0.234*** 0.051 -0.017 0.056 0.259*** 0.056 -0.018 0.056 0.199*** 0.052 
land_coop -0.109 0.048 0.034 0.043 -0.109 0.048 0.047 0.049 -0.109 0.048 -0.075* 0.045 
region 0.243 0.051 0.128*** 0.048 0.243 0.051 0.154*** 0.054 0.243 0.051 0.049 0.051 
cohesion1 -0.050 0.052 
-
0.129*** 
0.047 -0.049 0.052 0.003 0.053 -0.050 0.052 -0.133*** 0.048 
cohesion2 -0.031 0.054 0.219*** 0.048 -0.031 0.055 0.106** 0.055 -0.031 0.054 0.120** 0.051 
Participatio
n 
-- -- 0.152*** 0.046 -- -- 0.057 0.053 -- -- -0.051 0.048 
Trust 0.260*** 0.067 0.371*** 0.062 0.260*** 0.067 0.222*** 0.071 0.261 0.067 0.396*** 0.065 
Pressure -0.025 0.055 0.098** 0.049 -0.026 0.055 0.256*** 0.055 -0.025 0.055 0.120*** 0.051 
constant 2.237 0.693 -- -- 2.233 0.693 -- -- 2.238 0.693 -- -- 
Note: *, **, *** denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. S.E. stands for standard errors. 
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Table 5.6 Mediating role of participation between trust, social pressure and different components of commitment 
We learn from Table 5.5 that member participation is only positively associated with 
affective commitment, but not with the other two components of member commitment. 
However, the estimates of participation change as we add more explanatory variables into the 
model, which can be seen from Panel C and Panel D in Table 5.4 to Table 5.5. The results 
suggest that member participation is closely associated with members’ affection with the 
cooperative, but not related with continuance benefits or social norms and obligations. This 
reflects the voluntary participation principle of cooperatives. Members participate in the 
cooperative decision-making activities because they “want to”, not because they feel 
obligated to. The reason for the insignificant effect of social pressure on member 
participation is that member participation is voluntary and self-motivated. This conclusion is 
not contradicted with H4. Similar result can be found in the research by Bagozzi and 
Dholakia (2002).  
We also learn that social pressure is positively and directly associated with three components 
of member commitment from Table 5.5. The results support hypotheses H6 or H7, but are 
contrary to H5. The contradiction can be explained by the deep influence of the Confusion 
culture. Concerns for guanxi and mutual-face internalize the burdensome feelings and further 
transform the negative feelings into a sense of obligation or even affections.  
To further investigate the pathway how trust and social pressure produce effect on the 
dependent variables, we carry out mediation tests of trust and social pressure, respectively. 
Baron and Kenny (1986)  and Avolio et al. (2004) argue that partial mediation exists when 
the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables remain significant if we 
control for the effects of mediating variables. The mediation analysis show that member 
 
Affective Commitment Normative Commitment Continuance Commitment 
 
Trust 
Social 
Pressure 
Trust Social Pressure Trust 
Social 
Pressure 
Direct effect 
1.041***(0.322) 0.078**(0.040) 0.642** (0.268) 0.211***(0.051) 1.188***(0.374) 0.103**(0.045) 
Indirect 
effect 0.112
***(0.034) -0.003(0.007) 0.043 (0.040) -0.001 (0.003) -0.040(0.038) 0.001(0.003) 
Total effect 
1.153***(0.323) 0.075*(0.040) 0.685***(0.265) 0.210***(0.051) 1.148***(0.374) 0.104**(0.045) 
Note: *, **, *** denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are inside the brackets. 
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participation partially mediates only the relationship between trust and affective commitment. 
That is to say, trust does not only influence affective commitment in a direct way, but also in 
an indirect way via the partial mediator of member participation. Social pressure only has 
significant direct effect on the three components of commitment. 
With regards to the effects of other organizational factors, we learn from the results presented 
in Table 5.5 that if the board of directors are elected democratically and there are no 
constraints for members to quit cooperative membership, members tend to participate in the 
cooperative decision making more actively. The cooperative size is negatively associated 
with continuance commitment. Members’ degree of satisfaction with the service provided by 
the cooperative and group cohesiveness have positive impact on three components of member 
commitment. In addition, more educated members tend to participate more in the decision 
making process. Older people have stronger affective and normative commitment to the 
cooperatives.   
 
5.6 Conclusions and discussion 
Member commitment is important to cooperatives’ viability and success, but its determinants 
are partly understood. We systematically investigate the factors contributing to the different 
forms of member commitment from the perspectives of both members’ and their 
organizations’ characteristics. Given the important role of chairpersons played in Chinese 
cooperatives, we specifically examine the relationship among trust in the cooperative leaders, 
social pressure and members’ participation in the decision-making process using a sample of 
391 farmer cooperative members in China.  
Our study finds that both trust and social pressure are positively associated with the three 
components of member commitment – affective commitment, continuance commitment and 
normative commitment. Member participation plays a partially mediating role between trust 
and affective member commitment. Generally, these findings offer empirical evidence on the 
importance of trust in the cooperative leadership and of social pressure in maintaining 
cooperative membership and member commitment. Besides, other organizational factors such 
as democratic election of the Board of Directors and constraints in quitting membership also 
significantly affect members’ participation in the decision-making process, but not member 
commitment.  
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The Chinese government has been promoting farmers to participate in farmer cooperatives 
since 2006. Liang and Hendrikse (2013) found that the genesis of cooperatives in China is not 
the result of bottom–up collective action by small farmers, but is due to the political pressure 
and the converging interests of specific agricultural entrepreneurs. Deng et al. (2010) claimed 
that the government is of primary importance in the cooperative establishment. However, 
successful farmer cooperatives must be voluntarily initiated (Cook, 1995). Therefore, can 
Chinese cooperatives develop sustainably given that the pursuit of potential policy benefits 
has been the important motivation for their formation?  
Our research has partially answered the question from both members’ and cooperative 
perspectives. Though some scholars hold negative views about the future of Chinese 
cooperatives (Yuan, 2013; Deng and Wang, 2014), members’ trust in their cooperative 
leaders and Chinese community environment in the village are positive in forming member 
commitment to some extent. To improve member commitment to cooperatives, especially 
affective commitment and normative commitment, trust is the key factor. Besides improving 
trust among members, chairpersons and other members in management positions need to 
enhance management skills and abilities to earn more trust from other members. Meanwhile, 
cooperatives can improve the service quality to increase members’ satisfaction with 
cooperatives’ service and group cohesion thus to improve member commitment. 
Additionally, cooperatives should stick to democratic principles and involve members in 
decision-making processes, through which to improve members’ affective commitment. 
Finally, cooperatives should be aware of negative effect of growth and expansion. Enlarging 
the cooperative scale can have negative effect on member’ continuance commitment.   
Despite these contributions, we acknowledge the limitations of this research, which is due to 
methodological and data constraints. Because member commitment is measured by Likert 
scales from 1 to 5, Generalized Structural Equation Model (GSEM) is thus more appropriate 
than standard linear Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) for our case given its metrics for 
fitting not just linear but also generalized linear models. However, GSEM is a newly 
developed modelling method. The post-estimation tests, especially the test for the goodness 
fit of models are not complete in statistical software, e.g. STATA. We thus choose SEM 
instead of GSEM because of this constraint. The other limitation refers to the data about the 
measurement of latent constructs. The data used is based on members’ self-report. Although 
we have taken various precautions to test the reliability and discriminant validity of 
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constructs, the results must still be interpreted with caution, for example, we have tried to 
avoid the use of words about causal relationship in the antecedent analysis.  
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 Synthesis 
This chapter summarizes and reflects on the thesis as a whole. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 present 
the research objectives and the four research questions addressed in Ch. 2 – 5 as well as the 
answers to those questions. This is followed by further conclusions, drawn from the study as 
a whole (Section 6.3), and a discussion of the main limitations of the thesis. The chapter ends 
with a critical discussion about the research project and a reflection on the Chinese policy of 
promoting cooperatives. 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The food market in China is experiencing structural change characterized by an increasing 
demand for better quality food and for food produced according to stricter safety standards 
(Narrod, et al., 2009). Such changes in food markets call for better coordination of the 
sequential activities in the value chain (Fritz and Schiefer, 2008).   
The implementation of the Household Responsibility System since the early1980s led to land 
fragmentation and the prevalence of small farms. Facing changes in food markets, livelihoods 
of small farmers become increasingly vulnerable due to asymmetric information and small-
scaled production. These constraints cause high cost of complying with stricter production 
standards and weak bargaining positions when dealing with other entities in the food chain. 
Cooperatives are considered to be an institutional vehicle that can better link smallholder 
farmers to the market and help them obtain the benefits from modern food chains (Ito, et al., 
2012, Royer, et al., 2016).  
Due to the national government’s supportive policies, the number of cooperatives has been 
increasing rapidly since 2007, and 47% of Chinese farm households now participate in at 
least one cooperative. However, whether these cooperatives really work in the interest of 
their farmer-members is still an open question. Some scholars have pointed out that Chinese 
cooperatives deviate from the traditional member-ownership and member-benefit principles 
and that some cooperatives have rent seeking problems such that small-scale farmer-members 
are getting exploited by large-scale farmer-members.  
This thesis assesses the impact of cooperatives on Chinese smallholder farmers. This 
assessment is done in four steps: (1) a description of the current development status of 
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Chinese agricultural cooperatives; (2) an exploration of the economic and non-economic 
factors affecting farmers’ choice of participating in cooperatives; (3) an evaluation of the 
impact of cooperatives on farmers’ choice of marketing channels and production behaviours; 
and (4) a discussion of the factors that affect the durability of agricultural cooperatives in 
China. The results and conclusions from this study provide insights into ways in which the 
government can enhance its support for cooperatives to help smallholder farmers cope with 
the challenges of China’s modern food markets. 
 
6.2 Research objective and research questions 
The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of cooperatives on smallholder 
farmers. This objective is met by providing answers to four specific research questions.   
The first research question – “What are the developments and characteristics of farmers’ 
cooperatives in China?” – is answered based on an extensive review of both Chinese and 
English language literature on agricultural cooperatives. The main characteristics of Chinese 
cooperatives can be summarized as follow: (1) the establishment is often the result of the 
combined efforts of entrepreneurial farmers recognizing economic opportunities in changing 
market conditions and governmental policy of promoting farmers’ cooperatives; (2) 
cooperative equity mainly comes from a small group of members, the so-called core 
members, rather than from all the members of the cooperative; (3) decision rights are usually 
held by the core members; (4) proportional voting rights is legitimate in Chinese farmers' 
cooperatives rather than the strict one-member one-vote rule; (5) membership heterogeneity 
is large; (6) the Chinese government has been crucial for the genesis of cooperatives after 
2007, and government support has been instrumental in the establishment of a large number 
of new cooperatives. Unfortunately, abundant government support has also lead to the 
establishment of many so-called ‘fake’ cooperatives (Pan, 2011, Deng and Wang, 2014).    
To answer research questions 2, 3 and 4, empirical analyses have been carried out based on 
data collected from a field survey among apples farmers in Shaanxi and Shandong provinces. 
Apples are the fruit with the largest plantation acreage in China. Profits from apples are the 
main income source for the farmers in the main producing regions. Our survey data show that 
the characteristics of the apple cooperatives are generally in line with the key characteristics 
summarized in Chapter 2. Specifically, more than 40% of the 63 surveyed cooperatives were 
initiated by or had village leaders and other government organizations involved in the 
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establishment. Around 90% of the cooperatives received or had received concrete policy 
support (mainly financial support and subsidies from local governments) after their 
establishment. In all of these cooperatives core members and common members can be 
distinguished, with core members usually having additional voting rights due to their large 
equity shares or trading volumes with the cooperatives. It may therefore be assumed that the 
insights obtained for apple farmers and their cooperatives have a high relevance for 
smallholder farmers and cooperatives in general in China.  
The second research question – “What are the effects of cooperative membership and other 
factors on farmers’ choice of marketing channels?” – is answered on the basis of transaction 
cost economics theory by employing endogenous switching Probit models, which take into 
account the potential endogeneity of cooperative membership decisions. The estimation 
results show that cooperative membership has a significantly positive effect on the choice of 
wholesalers as marketing channel, along with a negative effect on choosing small dealers and 
an insignificant effect on choosing cooperatives as marketing channel. 
The third research question – “What is the effect of cooperative membership on smallholder 
farmers’ yields and profits and how are the effects produced?” – is explored by applying 
endogenous treatment regression models (ETRM) to estimate the effects of cooperative 
membership on yields and profits per unit area for members and for non-members. The 
pathways through which the different effects for the two groups are produced are examined 
by ETRM. It is found that, although cooperative membership has significantly positive 
treatment effects on apple yields, it has no significant treatment effect on profits. This finding 
can be explained by differences in effectiveness of input use by member farmers and non-
member farmers mainly due to the trainings provided by the cooperatives. 
The fourth research question – “What are the factors that affect member commitment to 
cooperatives in China?” – is analysed by estimating structural equation models, which take 
both members’ and cooperatives’ characteristics into account. The results show that both trust 
and social pressure are positively associated with the three components of member 
commitment – affective commitment, continuance commitment and normative commitment. 
Furthermore, member participation plays a partially mediating role between trust and 
affective member commitment. 
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6.3 Additional conclusions 
Four additional conclusions can be drawn from the study as a whole. They are discussed in 
the following sections.  
6.3.1 Insignificant impact of government support on farmers’ participation in cooperatives 
The Chinese government has been crucial in the genesis of cooperatives in China. 
Particularly since 2007, government support has been an important motivation for the 
foundation of cooperatives (Deng, et al., 2010). We thus hypothesize that cooperative policies 
affect farmers’ individual decisions about participating in cooperatives. Two dummy 
variables have been used to sketch the policy settings: whether the cooperative was initiated 
by village cadres or by another government organisation in Chapter 3 and whether the 
performance of local cooperatives is one criteria for evaluating the performance of village 
cadres in Chapter 4. We found that neither of the policy variables has a statistically 
significant impact on farmers’ decisions to participate in cooperatives. Comparing the results 
in Chapter 2 with those in Chapters 3 and 4, we can conclude that even though Chinese 
government policy has played a crucial role in the establishment of cooperatives, the policy 
does not significantly affect farmers’ individual decisions to participate in a cooperative. This 
conclusion reflects the voluntary participation principle for cooperatives.  
6.3.2 Cooperative services make the difference 
Not only can cooperatives enable farmers to bargain collectively with buyers of farm 
products (Bijman and Iliopoulos, 2014) and facilitate farmers’ access to markets (Markelova, 
et al., 2009), they also offer specific trainings, technical assistance and other extension 
services to members. Research shows that cooperatives generally increase the probability of 
adopting synthetic fertilizers and other high-yielding technologies (Abebaw and Haile, 2013, 
Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize that these cooperative services 
not only improve members’ access to output market, but also change members’ production 
practices. The empirical analyses for apples farmers in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 generally 
confirm the hypotheses. The effects of cooperative membership on farmers’ choice of 
marketing channels (positive for the wholesaler channel, negative for the small dealers 
channel, and insignificant for the cooperatives channel) can be explained by the cooperatives’ 
small market share at present and the marketing information services and marketing 
coordination activities provided to the members. Even if cooperatives do not buy their 
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members’ apples, most of them collect marketing information, introduce wholesalers to 
members and help coordinate sales transactions for members.   
We found that the effectiveness of input use is different between member and non-member 
groups. Although cooperative membership has significantly positive treatment effects on 
apple yields, it has no significant treatment effect on profits. This finding differs from the 
positive effects of cooperative membership on farmers’ welfare found in most studies so far 
(e.g. Ma and Abdulai, 2016). The different result for apple yields and profits can be due to 
production trainings and other services provided by the cooperative or by differences between 
members and non-members in the efficacy of inputs use. Members receiving training have 
higher yields than non-members. However, members tend to spend more on purchasing 
inputs than non-members. Given the high wage rates and high prices of non-labour inputs in 
China during the survey year, the gains from the extra yields do not cover the extra costs. 
Therefore, even though members have a higher average apple yield than non-members, their 
profits from apple production per unit area are not significantly different from those of their 
counterparts. 
6.3.3 Early stage of development  
Chinese cooperatives have been developing quickly both in number and scope, especially 
since the first farmers’ cooperative law was implemented in 2007. Compared with most 
cooperatives in Western Europe with more than a century of cooperative history, Chinese 
cooperatives are still young and in the phase of economic justification or organizational 
design according to the cooperative life cycle framework (Cook and Burress, 2009). Chinese 
cooperatives differ from their counterparts in Western Europe by the top-down initiation of 
Chinese cooperatives, their voting rights proportional to equity holding and to the volume of 
transactions with the cooperative, and by the existence of core members. The small market 
shares of cooperatives and the insignificant effect of cooperative membership on farmers’ 
selling products to cooperatives and on farmers’ profits suggest that cooperatives in China are 
still in an early stage of development. 
6.3.4 Important role of cooperative leaders in cooperative development 
The analysis of the genesis of Chinese cooperatives shows that the convergence of interests 
of specific entrepreneurs and local political leaders has been a major factor in the initiation of 
cooperatives. The involved entrepreneurs usually became cooperative leaders once the 
cooperative has been established. The success of cooperatives crucially depends on the 
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functioning of its leaders, as we found in Chapter 5 that members’ trust in cooperative leaders 
positively affects member commitment (including affective commitment, continuance 
commitment and normative commitment). Because member commitment concerns 
cooperatives’ viability and success, we can draw the conclusion that cooperative leaders play 
important roles not only in the initiation of cooperatives, but also in the sustainability of 
cooperatives in China.  
 
6.4 Research Method and its Limitations  
6.4.1 Sample selection 
There are two reasons for choosing apple farmers and apple farmer cooperatives as the 
subjects of this study. The first reason for focusing on apples farmers and apple farmer 
cooperatives in China is that China is the world’s leading producer of apples, producing 
roughly 55% of the total apple output in 2015 (Frederick, et al., 2015). Apple is the fruit crop 
with the largest acreage and the highest production value in China, and has been the dominant 
income source of farmers in the two main apple production regions – the Bohai Gulf and the 
Loess Plateau (Hou and Liu, 2014). Apple is one of the most important fruits consumed in 
China. Therefore, I chose apple as an example of a horticultural crop with high-value added. 
An extensive field survey was carried out between January and March in 2015. Data about 
700 apple farm households’ production and marketing behaviours and perceptions about 
transactions were collected in Shaanxi Province located in the Loess Plateau and Shandong 
Province in Bohai Gulf areas.  
The second reason is related to the constraints of organising field surveys in the countryside 
of China. A field survey of farmers needs the assistance from the local government. For 
example, the local Agricultural Bureau in a county usually has the latest information about 
the cooperatives in that county. The first step for selecting the targeted cooperatives is getting 
the name list and the latest contact information about the local cooperatives from the Bureau. 
Therefore, a connection with the Bureau is essential to carry about a survey. Our partner, 
Northwest Agriculture & Forestry University, has been conducting research about the apple 
economy in China for more than 10 years and is familiar with the two research areas and has 
good contacts with the local governments. These advantages made it relatively convenient for 
us to conduct field surveys in Shaanxi and Shandong provinces.  
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6.4.2 Data 
Like in most empirical research, some important data limitations exist in the empirical 
analyses. First, the data used in the analyses are collected by face-to-face interviews with 
apple farmers. The data about the inputs used and the marketing details are partly based on 
farmers’ written records. Farmers who did not record their production and marketing details 
answered the questions by memory recalls. This may have resulted in errors in data of inputs 
used and outputs marketing. The approaches used in this thesis assumed that these data errors 
can be considered as random disturbances. In addition, some variables have missing data. For 
instance, some of the interviewed farmers had not yet sold any apples of the 2014 harvest but 
still kept the apples in local cold storages during the survey. I thus excluded these farmers 
from our analysis in Chapter 3. 
Second, all the empirical analyses in the thesis are based on cross-sectional data. In Chapter 
4, I analysed the factors affecting farmers’ yields and profits mainly from the input aspect, 
without including variables about the external market environment which may be different 
for different units of observations. Furthermore, the treatment effect of membership on the 
yield and profits per unit area is assessed by comparing member and non-member groups. If 
panel data were available, it would be possible to compare ex-ante and ex-post cooperative 
participation decisions among farmers while controlling for factors that remain constant over 
time. Thus the changes in farmers’ participation decisions over time and their impacts on the 
yield and profits can be examined under the assumption that the market environment 
remained constant.   
Due to data constraints, I have only explored the determinants of farmers’ choice of 
marketing channels from the perspective of farmers in Chapter 3. If I had data about buyers 
and other parties in the value chain, especially information about the flexibility of each 
marketing channel, the services provided and the prices offered by different buyers, a richer 
insight into farmers’ choices of marketing channels would have been gained. Given these 
data limitations, follow-up research should preferably focus on performing panel data 
analyses once suitable data sets for applying such methods become available, and on 
examining marketing from demand as well as supply perspectives.  
6.4.3 Research method 
In Chapter 2 we use a comparative literature review. By comparing six key aspects, the 
characteristics and development of Chinese farmer cooperatives have been compared with 
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those of Western European cooperatives, and the underlying causes have been explored. 
However, due to the relatively young age of Chinese cooperatives and their small market 
shares at present, few scientific studies in Chinese or English about the role of cooperatives in 
value chains are available. In addition, there is hardly any literature on the relationship 
between members and their cooperatives in China while there is an extensive literature on the 
relationship between members and cooperatives in Western Europe. Particularly research on 
member commitment is missing for Chinese cooperatives. Therefore, I could not compare 
cooperatives in China with the Western European ones for these two important aspects. 
In the other parts of the thesis I used econometric methods. A potential disadvantage of 
applying econometric methods is that the estimation results may provide only partial answers 
to the research questions. Interpretations can be made only on the basis of the specific 
variables included in the models and the specific theories underlying the relationships for 
those variables. For example, in Chapter 3, when I examined determinants of farmers’ choice 
of different marketing outlets and farmers’ decisions of cooperative membership, I included 
variables about transaction specificities in the models. Psychological variables (such as 
farmers’ perceptions about different marketing choices) that may also affect farmers’ final 
choices were excluded because of the potential endogeneity of these perceptional variables.  
Furthermore, the difficulty in finding valid instruments for potentially endogeneous 
explanatory variables severely limits the extent to which econometric methods can be used 
for explaining reality. 
Another methodological limitation of this thesis is the method applied in Chapter 5 to 
examine factors explaining member commitment. Since the dependent variables are 
measured by Likert scales, with answers ranging from 1 to 5, Generalized Structural Equation 
Model (GSEM) is more appropriate than standard linear Structural Equation Model (SEM). 
GSEM is an appropriate estimation method when dependent variables are ordinal, but 
unfortunately econometric software like STATA does not provide post-estimation tests for 
GSEM. For this reason, I chose to apply SEM in Chapter 5. With the technical development 
of GSEM, GSEM may be preferred in future research when the dependent variable is 
categorical or ordinal.  
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6.5 Reflections on Chinese cooperative policies 
To further develop modern agriculture and to tackle the problem of linking small farmers to 
modern agro-food markets, the Chinese government has been encouraging famers to 
participate in farmer cooperatives to realize economies of scale in marketing and at the same 
time support other new types of agricultural businesses (Hu, 2012). With the policy support, 
cooperatives have been developing quickly in number and business scope in the past decade. 
The implementation of the first cooperative law in 2007 and the revision at the end of 2017 
show the importance of farmer cooperatives in Chinese agricultural policy.  
In contrast with the rapid increase in the number of cooperatives, the market share of 
cooperatives is still low. Chinese cooperatives are still in the early stage of development. 
What role cooperatives will play in the changing agricultural markets and how they can 
provide benefits to both smallholder farmers and consumers in China are questions that need 
to be further explored. Answers to these two questions concern Chinese smallholder farmers’ 
options in adapting to new high-value-added markets. 
Policy support has been an important driver for the initiation of cooperatives in China. 
However, abundant interference from the government can have negative effects on 
cooperative development, and even contribute to the creation of fake cooperatives (Deng and 
Wang, 2014). The establishment of these cooperatives is mainly motivated by obtaining 
financial support from the government.  
One of the most important elements of the 2017 revision of the farmers’ cooperative law is 
the revoking of the cooperative’s license when there is no business operation in two 
consecutive years. This revision can reduce the problem of fake cooperatives to some extent. 
Another revision is acknowledging the legal status of the cooperative union by the 
cooperative laws. A cooperative union is a cooperative of cooperatives, and carries out 
economic activities that require a scale that is beyond the scope of the individual member-
cooperatives.  
The impact of policy support for farmers’ cooperatives depends to a large extent on 
institutional reforms such as land tenure reforms. The recent land tenure reform of separating 
land ownership, land contracting right and land management right is expected to promote 
further development of land rental markets, and thereby contributes to larger operation scales 
of cooperatives by integrating the previously fragmented land. Hence, the recent land tenure 
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reform and policy promoting the development of agricultural cooperatives seem to mutually 
reinforce each other.  
Instability of policies can be an important factor in farmers’ decisions on cooperative 
membership and involvement in high-value chains. Policy promoting farmers’ cooperatives 
and related policies should preferably not change too often and too rapidly, in order to 
decrease farmers’ perception of policy uncertainty. If not, farmers’ motivation to participate 
and invest in the cooperatives is likely to be low.       
As this thesis shows, Chinese cooperatives are currently facing important problems inherent 
to their characteristics and development paths. But it also shows that members’ trust in the 
cooperative leadership and the Chinese community environment in villages positively affect 
member commitment. Being members of the cooperatives examined in this study does not 
significantly affect the selling of output through the cooperative marketing channels, nor does 
it affect farmers’ profits significantly. Potentially, Chinese cooperatives can be helpful for 
smallholders to improve their economic situation by adapting to the changes in the food 
market and strengthening their market position. Other institutional reforms in rural areas such 
as further land tenure reforms may be needed to realize this potential. 
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Summary 
China is facing two major challenges to further develop modern agriculture. The first 
challenge comes from the land fragmentation and small-scale farms. The second challenge is 
the adaptation of smallholder farmers to recent changes in the agro-food market, particularly 
the growing demand for safer and better quality food, technical developments in controlling 
food safety, and the rise of supermarkets. These recent changes require farmers to follow 
stricter and safer production standards and better sequential coordination work in the value 
chain. High compliance costs and the small production and transaction scales of smallholders 
can exclude them from the value chains. Well-functioning cooperatives enable smallholder 
farmers to unite, improve their bargaining power, and mitigate market failures.   
The Chinese government has actively promoted the development of farmers’ cooperatives 
since 2007, when the first law on farmers’ cooperatives was promulgated. Over 47% of 
Chinese farm households have participated in at least one cooperative by 2017 and the 
number is still growing. In contrast to the rapid growth in the number of cooperatives, their 
market share has remained low. Rent-seeking by a small group of cooperative members and 
other problems preclude a rapid expansion of the market share.    
The general objective of this research is to obtain a better understanding of the characteristics 
and the development path of Chinese cooperatives and the effect of cooperatives on farmers’ 
marketing and production behaviours. The objective is achieved by answering four research 
questions in four separate chapters. 
In Chapter 2 the development and characteristics of farmers’ cooperatives in China, 
especially since the promulgation of the first law on farmers’ cooperatives in 2007, is 
analysed. Views diverge among scholars on the effectiveness of cooperatives, which can be 
partly attributed to lacking understanding about the key characteristics of Chinese 
cooperatives. I compare Chinese cooperatives with the ones in Western Europe in six aspects, 
based on an extensive literature review of studies prepared both in English (from the 1940s to 
2016) and in Chinese (mainly from 2006 to 2016). Chinese cooperatives distinguish 
themselves from their counterparts in Western Europe mainly from the following aspects: (1) 
The establishment of most Chinese cooperatives is the result of combined efforts of policy 
advocacy of developing cooperatives and the need of entrepreneurial farmers to cope with 
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structural changes in the agro-food market. (2) Cooperative equity comes from a small group 
of members, called core members. (3) Additional voting rights are legitimate and are granted 
to members who hold big shares of a cooperative and have big transaction volumes with a 
cooperative. (4) Much member heterogeneity exists in Chinese cooperatives, especially 
between core members and common members. (5) Decision rights are held by core members 
in Chinese cooperatives. (6) Governmental supports can be instrumental to cooperative 
development, but abundant government interference is responsible for the existence of fake 
cooperatives which seek financial supports from the government but operate no business.  
Chapter 3 examines the effect of cooperative membership and other factors on farmers’ 
choice of marketing channels. A conceptual framework based on transaction cost economics, 
considering not only production-specific assets but also institutional environment and 
transaction uncertainties, is developed. Field survey data about 625 apple farmers are used for 
the analysis. Given the potential endogeneity of membership in estimating farmers’ choice of 
marketing channels, endogenous switch probit models are applied. The results show that 
cooperative membership has a significantly positive effect on the choice of wholesalers as 
marketing channels, along with a negative effect on choosing small dealers and an 
insignificant effect on choosing cooperatives. Cooperative services, especially marketing 
information services, and other marketing arrangement activities lead to the varying effects of 
membership on farmers’ choice regarding different marketing channels.  
The effect of cooperative membership on smallholder farmers’ yields and profits is examined 
in Chapter 4. A novel theoretical framework is built that shows the different mechanisms 
through which cooperatives membership, particularly the specific trainings, technical 
assistance and other extension services offered by cooperatives, affect farmers’ yield and 
profits from crop production. Given that cooperative membership is potentially endogenous 
to farmers’ yields and profits, endogenous treatment regression models (ETRM) are 
employed to assess the average treatment effects of cooperative membership on yields and 
profits per unit area. It is found that cooperative membership has a significantly positive 
effect on yields, but no significant effect on profits per unit area. Two pathways explain these 
different effects. First, cooperative services change members’ production practices, especially 
the use of inputs that lead to higher land productivity. Second, members on average spend 
more on fertilizers and use more hired labour than non-members, which results in higher 
production costs. The extra revenues generated by the increased yields roughly compensate 
the extra production costs of the members. 
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Chapter 5 deals with the antecedents of member commitment to cooperatives in China. Based 
on the three-component commitment model, I investigate the antecedents of member 
commitment from both members’ and cooperatives’ perspectives. Using a sample of 391 
farmer cooperative members in China, this chapter focuses on whether trust in the 
cooperative leadership and social pressure affect cooperative member commitment and if so, 
what is the pathway how these two antecedents produce their effects on member 
commitment. Structural equation models are estimated from the data set of cooperative 
members. The estimation results show that both trust and social pressure are positively 
associated with affective commitment, continuance commitment and normative commitment 
in a direct way. Furthermore, trust positively influences affective member commitment 
indirectly via the partial mediator of member participation. These findings offer empirical 
evidence on the importance of trust in the cooperative chairpersons’ leadership and social 
pressure in generating cooperative member commitment in China. 
The research reported in the thesis contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it provides 
a systematic analysis of the typical characteristics of Chinese cooperatives and their 
development paths in six key aspects. Second, it uses transaction costs economics as the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of factors affecting farmers’ marketing and production 
decisions. Third, it integrates psychological factors and cultural factors in the empirical 
analysis of member commitment to cooperatives. 
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